KØBENHAVNS UNIVERSITET
INSTITUT FOR PSYKOLOGI

PH.D.-AFHANDLING
MADS BANK

Brugerdrevne standarder og affektiv subjektivering

– En undersøgelse af styringsstrategier i pædagogisk og socialt arbejde

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En undersøgelse af styringsstrategier
i pædagogisk og socialt arbejde

Ph.d. afhandling af
Mads Bank

Man skriver altid for at give liv,
for at frigøre livet der hvor det holdes fanget,
for at aftegne flugtlinjer.

- Gilles Deleuze

Vejleder: Morten Nissen
Bi-vejleder: Dorthe Staunæs
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Abstract

This dissertation is interested in basic questions of how welfare state institutions can be developed and organized in ways so that they lead, educate, and govern citizens so they can govern themselves and develop their lives in more productive and preferred directions. This has been investigated through empirical research of social work involving young substance users. This is due to the fact that fundamental questions about cultural production of the subjectivity, the relationship between governing and autonomy, as well as paradoxes in the organization of the welfare state's institutions are especially apparent here.

The dissertation builds upon ethnographic research of two municipal institutions that work with youth with a (problematic) use of substances. This work is often difficult and the institutions try to accommodate to these challenges by including the perspectives of the participants and by drawing on systematic, narrative, and solution focused therapeutic methods.

The dissertation's analytical approach is governmentality studies which is combined with methodological approaches from practice research in order to engage in productive analyses as well as to contribute to the development of social work.

The dissertation displays through prototypical examples and theoretical analysis of how social work practices develop productive forms of governing where the youth develop their own standards for their lives and substance use, and attain a greater influence over their life and circumstances. An important aspect of this is that, the intervention not only focuses on the individual but is also directed towards parents, professionals, and the society at large.

The dissertation's most important contribution is to develop theoretical concepts and analyses of how affective phenomena such as mood, atmosphere, energy, and intensity contribute to the processes of subjectification. The dissertation contributes to a development of governmentality studies, social work, systemic, narrative, and solution focused therapeutic methods, and to a broader understanding of how to organize the welfare state's institutions so they are able to facilitate the development of productive forms of self-governance.

The dissertation consists of three articles: 'New Standards in Social Work: From Regimes of Visibility to Affective Subjectification', 'Tuning Governmentality studies through Heidegger: Analytical Strategies for Affective Subjectification', and 'Beyond Spaces of Counseling'.

The dissertation is part of the research project 'user driven (participant) standards in social work' from the research center SUBSTANce – Subjects & Standards, which is financed through a grant from the Danish Council for Independent Research.

Resumé

Denne afhandlings almene anliggende er at undersøge hvordan velfærdsstatens institutioner kan udvikles og organiseres på måder, så de leder og danner borgerne til at disse kan lede sig selv og udvikle deres liv i mere produktive og foretrukne retninger. Dette undersøges gennem empirisk udforskning af socialt arbejde med unge rusmiddelbrugere, fordi grundspørgsmål om kulturel dannelse af subjektivitet, forholdet mellem styring og selvledelse, samt paradokser i organisering af velfærdstatens institutioner står særligt tydeligt frem her.

Afhandlingen bygger på etnografisk udforskning af to kommunale institutioner, der arbejder med unge med et (problematisk) forbrug af rusmidler. Dette arbejde er ofte vanskeligt og institutionerne imødegår udfordringerne ved at inddrage og privilegere brugernes perspektiver, og ved at udvikle deres indsatser med inspiration fra systemiske, narrative og løsningsorienterede metoder.

Afhandlingens analytiske tilgang er governmentality studies, der kombineres med metodologiske tilgange fra praksisforskning, med henblik på at foretage produktive og vitalistiske analyser, samt bidrage til at udvikle og kvalificere det sociale arbejde.
Afhandlingen viser gennem prototypiske eksempler og teoretiske analyser hvordan der i det sociale arbejde udvikles produktive former for ledelse af selvledelse, hvor de unge udvikler egne standarder for deres liv og rusmiddelbrug, og får større indflydelse på deres liv og betingelser. Et væsentligt aspekt af dette er, at interventionen overskrider et individuelt fokus, samt også at de er rettet mod forældre, professionelle og det bredere samfund.

Afhandlingens væsentligste bidrag er at udvikle teoretiske begreber for, og analyser af, hvordan affektive fænomener som stemning, atmosfære, energi og intensitet bidrager til ledelse af selvledelse og subjektivering. Afhandlingen bidrager til en udvikling af governmentality studies, socialt arbejde, systemiske, narrative og løsningsorienterede terapiformer, og til en bredere forståelse af organisering og ledelse af selvledelse i velfærdsstatens institutioner.

Afhandlingen består af en introducerende og analyserende kappe, samt tre artikler: 'New Standards in Social Work: From Regimes of Visibility to Affective Subjectification', 'Tuning Governmentality studies through Heidegger: Analytical Strategies for Affective Subjectification', og 'Beyond Spaces of Counseling'.

Indholdsfortegnelse

Indledning

Prolog

I et møderum sidder en gruppe socialarbejdere. Fem af medarbejderne er fra den kommunale institution Helsingung i Helsingør kommune. I Helsingung er de ved at implementere en ny måde at arbejde med unge og rusmidler på, som er udviklet i institutionen U-turn i København, og de er derfor ved at få faglig supervision af to socialarbejdere fra U-turn.

Socialarbejderne har alle erfaringer med hvordan arbejdet med unge, der ryger hash eller tager stoffer, ofte kan være vanskeligt. Unge har ofte ikke lyst til at snakke med voksne professionelle om sig selv og deres problemer, og slet ikke hvis den voksne minder om en 'psykolog' og benytter psykologisk eller terapeutisk sprog i et terapilokale, hvor man sidder overfor hinanden og har øjenkontakt. Dette er særligt et problem i arbejdet med unge der har et forbrug af rusmidler, fordi de unge, selvom de i princippet kommer frivilligt til kommunens tilbud, ofte har fået vredet armen om på ryggen og er blevet presset til det af forældre og sagsbehandlere. Så ofte ønsker de unge egentligt slet ikke samtaler eller behandling, og de oplever ikke selv at de har et problem med rusmidler.

I supervisionen snakker medarbejderne om sådanne vanskeligheder i forhold til behandlingsarbejdet med en ung fyr, vi her kalder Kevin. Supervisorerne benytter det, der kan betegnes som en anerkendende tilgang, hvor de som metode til at udvikle og kvalificere arbejdet fokuserer på 'det der virker' for den unge og de professionelle. Socialarbejderen Lise bliver derfor interviewet om, hvordan det alligevel lykkedes at have samtaler med Kevin.

> *Dirk: Hvad tænker du, der har gjort, at han er blevet så glad for at have samtaler?*
>
> *Lise: Jeg tror, at han øh, jeg tror han har følt sig mødt, det tror jeg, og så tror jeg at han synes jeg er lidt freaky på en eller anden måde, altså.*
>
> *(der grines lidt)*
>
> *Lise: Og det tror jeg, at han synes. Han griner af mig... Han synes jeg er, jeg er sådan skør eller sådan noget, ikk.*
>
> *Dirk: Hvad gør du, når...*
>
> *Lise: Det ved jeg, det ved sgu ikk', vel, jeg kan mærke han sidder og fniser. Synes at… jeg bruger meget mit kropssprog og… altså, og jeg ku' tydeligt mærke, at gennembruddet kom vel den dag han fortalte mig at han gik til de der trampefester, hvor han tog en masse stoffer… og hvor jeg så spurgte ind til, "hvad fanden foregår der, hvad er det, det gør ved*

dig?" og hvor jeg så prøvede at lave en … "er der andre sammenhænge, hvor du så tramper eller?". Jeg havde sgu ikke hørt om det der trampe før, jeg synes det var enormt interessant, fordi det gav mig et indblik i ungdomskulturen også, ikk'.

Øh. Og så sagde han; "det gør jeg sgu hver gang morgen" siger han så "så ryger jeg en fed, og så tramper jeg mand!", "Nå", siger jeg. "Det lyder sgu spændende. Jeg ku' sådan tænke mig, at se hvordan man tramper. Hvis jeg nu sætter noget musik på her, gider du så at trampe for mig?"

(der smågrines)

Lise: Så sad han og den fik jo satanedeme…

[LIse viser hvordan man tramper, ved at stampe i gulvet.]

(De andre griner)

Lise: … og det var virkelig en øjenåbner for mig.

Dirk: Ja

Lise: … fordi jeg fik, jeg fik, jeg fik en forståelse for, hvad det var, at han fik ud af det tramperi dér. Han fik simpelthen den der ud-af-kroppen-oplevelse, alle de der inde-bestemte ting, øh… røg ud i øh, i det tramperi dér. Og jeg siger det er altså massivt fysisk! Øhm… så sagde jeg til ham … "Det fandeme spændende, det du lige har vist mig her, fordi jeg får sådan en forståelse for… Jeg mediterer jo. Og ved du hvad? Jeg tror du opnår præcis det samme, med at trampe, som jeg gør med at meditere. Jeg får tømt mit hoved, mit tankemylder" - "JA for fanden!", sagde han…

Hvad foregår der egentlig her? Hvad er det et eksempel på? Lise og Kevin både taler om og viser hvordan man 'tramper'. At trampe er en betegnelse for en dansepraksis i technomiljøet og som i vid udstrækning er forbundet til indtagelse af stoffet MDMA eller ecstasy. Socialarbejderen Lise gør dog hverken stofferne eller morgen-jointen til genstand, men er mere interesseret i hvordan Kevin oplever det, hvad han får ud af det og hvorfor det er fedt, og hun relaterer det til sine egne oplevelser med meditation.

I nogle stofbehandlingssammenhænge vil en sådan samtale meget sjældent forekomme, fordi det at tale positivt om stoffer anses for at være problematisk, og ofte vil der være et fokus på at undgå at tage, snakke om og tænke på stoffer. Sådan er det tydeligvis ikke her, til trods for at vi er i et kommunalt tilbud rettet mod unge der har problemer med stoffer. I denne institution arbejdes der med inspiration fra hvad der kaldes "narrative, systemiske og løsningsfokuserede" terapeutiske traditioner. Disse traditioner bestræber sig på at privilegere klienternes perspektiv, og på den måde kan eksemplet siges at være eksemplarisk, fordi behandleren ikke er optaget at stoffer eller problemer, men i stedet ligger vægt på hvad der er fedt for Kevin, hvad han er optaget af og hvad der

betyder noget for ham. Dette kan selvfølgelig ses som et eksempel på, hvordan man benytter forskellige mere eller mindre tilfældige teknikker og metoder til at udvikle arbejdet med unge og rusmidler på. Min påstand er dog, at det der sker mellem Lise og Kevin hverken er tilfældigt eller planlagt, men kan ses som et mere alment eksempel på, hvordan der udvikles nye metoder i socialt arbejde. Her arbejdes med at inddrage brugernes perspektiver, men der sker også noget mere, nemlig at der produceres hvad vi kan beskrive som en særlig intensitet, energi, stemning eller atmosfære i rummet og imellem Lise og Kevin, som i min forståelse i særlig grad bidrager til at skabe bevægelse, forandring og nye relationer mellem dem. Som Lise fortæller, så skete der et gennembrud.´

Min mere almene påstand er, at den måde Lise og de professionelle i Helsingung og U-turn arbejder med de unge på, kan ses som nogle mere almene strategier for, hvordan man leder og danner borgere i velfærdsstatens institutioner.

Organisering af velfærdstatens institutioner: Brugerinddragelse, standardisering og evidens

Den bredere kontekst, der gør at det ovenstående eksempel har en mere almen relevans, er, at den måde vi organiserer og udvikler velfærdsstatens institutioner på er under forandring. Indenfor uddannelse, socialt arbejde og behandling kan man spore to overordnede og delvist modsatrettede tendenser, nemlig en tendens til at inddrage borgere, brugere, klienter og patienter og en tendens til at standardisere, måle og benytte evidens.

På tværs af sektorer og institutioner i de skandinaviske velfærdsstater har der siden 1990erne været et stigende fokus på brugerinddragelse og brugerperspektiver (Pedersen, 2003). Denne udvikling er i Danmark og internationalt særligt udsprunget fra socialpsykiatrien og det sociale område, hvor både professionelle, brugere, brugerbevægelser og interesseorganisationer har kritiseret den manglende indflydelse og umyndiggørelse af borgerne (Pedersen, 2003). Disse kritikker opnår gradvist momentum, og er medvirkende til at det sociale område op gennem 1990erne i stigende grad forstår og italesætter personer med sociale problemer som 'brugere' fremfor 'klienter' og har et øget fokus på brugerinvolvering, bruger-inddragelse, medbestemmelse og at 'møde brugerne i øjenhøjde' (Houborg, 2012; Pedersen, 2003). Tendensen mod brugerinddragelse ses også tydeligt i lovgivningen. I "Lov om social service" fra 1997[1] under overskriften bruger-inddragelse (§112) pålægges kommuner og amter at inddrage brugerne i forhold til udformning og indhold af de sociale tilbud, både i relation til den enkelte bruger (§111) og som en bredere strategi hvor brugergrupper, brugerråd og brugerstudier skal inddrages i udviklingen af velfærdsstatens indsatser på social- og sundhedsområdet (Asmussen, 2003). Inden for psykologi og psykoterapi, som leverer en række teknikker og teorier til det sociale arbejde, sker der også en accentuering af brugerinddragelse og klientcentrering op gennem 1990erne. Casen med Kevin og Lise kan ses som et eksempel på, hvordan man søger at udvikle og kvalificere velfærdsstatens institutioner og indsatser ved at fokusere på borgernes

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[1] https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=112257: "brugerne af tilbud efter denne lov får mulighed for indflydelse på tilrettelæggelsen og udnyttelsen af tilbuddene."

forståelser, ved at skabe dialog, og ved at inddrage dem og give dem medbestemmelse (Karlsen & Villadsen, 2008).

Den anden tendens som ses nationalt og globalt er et øget fokus på at benytte standardisering og evidens til at styre, kvalificere og organisere velfærdsstaternes institutioner (Bowker & Star, 1999; Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Trickett & Beehler, 2013). Evidens er særligt udbredt i sundhedsområdet (Timmermans & Berg, 2003), men også på uddannelsesområdet (Biesta, 2007) og socialområdet[2] (Houston, 2005) er der stigende krav om at arbejde evidensbaseret. Evidensbevægelsen udspringer ifølge Lambert (2006) af en stigende erkendelse op gennem 1960erne af, at mange behandlingspraksisser har været baseret på tradition eller individuelle præferencer. Evidensmetodologien har dermed i udgangspunktet været et kollektivt redskab til objektiv og 'demokratisk' kontrol og styring af indsatser og behandling.

Evidensmetodologien søger at styre og kvalitetssikre en given intervention ved at benytte standardiserede behandlingsformer og monitorere på specifikke effekter, således at man kan sammenligne indsatser på tværs af praksisser og (fx nationale) kontekster og undersøge om der er evidens for, at det virker (Trickett & Beehler, 2013). I en dansk kontekst udrulles evidens på socialområdet typisk gennem implementering af standardiserede evidensbaserede programmer, der importeres fra USA eller Canada. Det betyder at man i stigende grad benytter manualer, der eksempelvis beskriver hvordan man skal anvende systematisk observation og feedback på ønsket adfærd for at skabe en positiv udvikling i arbejdet med børn, unge og familier.[3]

Helt overordnet set kan tendenserne i retning af brugerinddragelse og evidens ses som en del af den samme bestræbelse på både at udvikle, kvalificere og demokratisere, men også at styre, kontrollere og effektivisere velfærdsstatens institutioner. Selvom sådanne tendenser og diskussioner kan spores langt tilbage, kan man argumentere for at der i disse år sker en accelerering af styrings- og særligt standardiseringsbestræbelserne, hvilket også hænger sammen med at den danske velfærdsstat og dens institutioner op gennem 1980erne i stigende grad organiseres og styres gennem New Public Management (Lampland & Star, 2009; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). Dette omformer velfærdsstatens institutioner og de traditionelle infrastrukturer for udvikling og distribution af kundskab og kompetencer indenfor uddannelse, pædagogik, behandling og socialt arbejde. Umiddelbart kunne man fristes til at sige "selvfølgelig skal vi have brugerinddragelse" og "selvfølgelig skal vi evidensbasere", men brugerinddragelse og evidens er to delvist modsatrettede strategier for, hvordan vi organiserer og kvalificerer velfærdsstatslige organisationer, og samtidigt disponerer de for *forskellige* måder at styre, lede og (ud)danne borgerne på.

En problematiserende modfortælling i forhold til en ukritisk brug af evidens og standardisering i det sociale arbejde er, at det på nogle områder står i modsætning til en bestræbelse om at udvikle både indsatserne og borgernes ledelses af sig selv gennem brugerinddragelse. Som jeg skal argumentere for senere, så kan krav om evidens dermed siges at stå i modsætning til den form for ledelse og dannelse af borgere, som er det sociale arbejdes opgave.

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[2] http://www.socialstyrelsen.dk/born-og-unge/programmer-med-evidens
[3] Se fx http://www.socialstyrelsen.dk/born-og-unge/programmer-med-evidens/de-utrolige-ar

Evidenstilgangen har tilsyneladende nogle åbenlyse fordele ved at skabe objektiv viden om de indsatser, vi benytter. Omvendt er der ligeledes åbenlyse fordele ved at kunne inddrage brugerne i tilrettelæggelsen af fx behandling og dermed ansvarliggøre dem. Dette er ekstra væsentligt, når man arbejder med unge som Kevin, der ofte ikke har lyst til at tale med professionelle og da slet ikke om emner, der defineres i et evidensbaseret program, hvis det ikke opleves som relevant af den unge. Så derfor kan det anses for afgørende at socialarbejderen kan tilpasse samtalerne til der, hvor Kevin er lige nu og inddrage ham i udformningen og tilrettelæggelsen af behandlingen. Samtidig er det nok også svært at lave en standardiseret og evidensbaseret behandling, der kan indfange hvordan det at sætte techno på i samtalelokalet, at 'virke lidt skør' eller at skabe en særlig stemning måske lige netop er det der skal til for at behandlingen virker eller overhovedet kommer i gang.

Afhandlingens fokus

Denne afhandling udspringer af forskningscenteret SUBSTANce, hvor en række delprojekter med forskellige teoretiske tilgange og empiriske felter arbejder med den gensidige skabelse af subjekter og standarder. Mere specifikt er denne afhandling en del af en bredere udforskning i og omkring forskningsprojektet 'brugerdrevne standarder i socialt arbejde'. Afhandling bygger på en empirisk udforskning af socialt arbejde og hvordan institutioner og praksisser, der trækker på systemiske, narrative løsningsorienterede og anderkendende forståelser og metoder skaber forandring og udvikling, bl.a. ved at privilegere brugernes egne perspektiver.

Interessen for dette hænger bl.a. sammen med at jeg som psykolog har arbejdet med narrative terapeutiske tilgange, at jeg tidligere har udforsket hvordan sådanne metoder benyttes i pædagogisk behandlingsarbejde (Bank, 2010) og at jeg har skrevet teoretisk om narrativ psykologi og terapi (Bank, 2014).

Det empiriske nedslag åbner samtidigt for en meget bredere diskussion om, hvordan de måder vi tænker, organiserer, kvalificerer, udvikler og reformerer praksisser som uddannelse, pædagogik, behandling, socialt arbejde, rådgivning og terapi har indflydelse på, hvordan vi kan forme, skabe udvikle og (ud)danne velfærdsstatens borgere. Opmærksomheden på disse sammenhænge er i særlig grad informeret af governmentality studies, der er afhandlingens teoretiske og analytiske rygrad. Governmentality studies leverer en række analytiske greb og begreber, som gør det muligt at analysere de strategier hvormed vi i velfærdsstatens institutioner søger at skabe aktive selvledende borgere ved at omforme deres selvforhold og identitet.

Når jeg senere analyserer hvordan brugerinddragelse og evidens organiserer de velfærdsstatslige institutioner med en governmentality analytik, så bliver det tydeligt hvordan disse tendenser skaber nogle særlige rammer for, hvordan centrale problemstillinger om styring, ledelse, autonomi og selvledelse kan tænkes, artikuleres og håndteres. Spørgsmålet om hvordan vi styrer, organiserer og udvikler fx socialt arbejde hænger i dette perspektiv på afgørende måder sammen med spørgsmål om, hvordan vi kan tænke, forme og lede på borgernes ledelse af sig selv.

Afhandlingens empiriske fokus på socialt arbejde med unge, der tager (for mange) stoffer, er derfor ikke kun relevant i forhold til udvikling af socialt arbejde eller terapeutisk praksis, men er i ligeså høj udstrækning en udforskning af igennem hvilke strategier og logikker de velfærdsstatslige institutioner kan (og bør?) skabe aktive selv-ledende borgere.

Afhandlingens analytiske ramme governmentality studies har en tradition for at analysere hvordan borgere styres, ledes, formes og dannes, eksempelvis i institutioner som skoler, fængsler og psykiatriske institutioner (Foucault, 1973, 2002, 2003). Sådanne deskriptive analyser er velkendte og relevante, men kan også betegnes som negative, kritiske eller ligefrem paranoide (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Sedgwick, 1997). Dels fordi der oftest er et fokus på hvordan borgerne styres og dannes i relationer af magt og viden, mens der kun i begrænset omfang etableres et blik for hvordan borgerne inddrages og også forandrer de institutionelle betingelser. Dels fordi disse deskriptive analyser kun i ringe omfang bidrager til at udvikle mere hensigtsmæssige institutionelle praksisser. Derfor er der i forskningsfeltet omkring governmentality studies en stigende interesse for hvad jeg i forlængelse af

Foucault (1997, 2000b) og i lighed med Greco and Stenner (2013) vil betegne som en 'vitalistisk' og 'produktiv' analytisk interesse for, hvordan mennesker ikke bare formes i institutionelle praksisser, men også aktivt former og forandrer sig selv og deres omverden med henblik på at leve på mere foretrukne måder (Brown & Stenner, 2009).

Denne afhandling er informeret af begge disse blikke, og tager afsæt i det 'kritiske' med henblik på særligt at udvikle det 'vitalistiske', empirisk, teoretisk og metodologisk. Afhandlingens *kundskabsambition* er at være både kritisk, deskriptiv og at knytte an til hvad jeg ser som psykologiens normative forpligtelse til produktivt at bidrage til at skabe nye handlemuligheder (Gergen, 2008; Polkinghorne, 1988; White, 2008).

Afhandlingens *grundspørgsmål* eller *almene anliggende* er at undersøge hvordan velfærdsstatens institutioner (kan) udvikles og organiseres på måder, så de opmuntrer, motiverer, inspirerer, påvirker, forandrer, udvikler, danner og leder borgerne, så disse kan lede sig selv på måder, der sætter dem i stand til at få øget magt over deres eget liv og betingelser, samt at udvikle deres liv i mere produktive og foretrukne retninger (Foucault, 2000c). Her er jeg inspireret af Michel Foucault og har en bestræbelse om at bedrive en produktiv teoretisk kritik, der både undersøger og bidrager til udviklingen af sådanne vitalistiske former for ledelse af selvledelse.

> *"I can't help but dream about a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to bring an ouvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life: it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply not judgments but signs of existence: it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invent them sometimes – all the better. All the better."* (Foucault, 1997, p. 323)

For at undersøge dette er afhandlingens empiriske fokus på socialt arbejde, fordi dette kan siges at være et felt hvor de spændinger og udviklingsbestræbelser, der også ses indenfor andre velfærdsstatslige institutioner, som arbejder med uddannelse, pædagogik og behandling, er særligt tydelige. Dette skyldes både at det sociale arbejde trækker på elementer fra uddannelse, pædagogik og behandling uden at kunne reduceres til nogen af delene, samt at man i det sociale arbejde benytter særlige strategier til ledelse og dannelse af borgerne. Her er institutionerne U-turn og Helsingung, som vi så et eksempel fra, særligt interessante, bl.a. fordi arbejder med en strategi om brugerinddragelse, hvilket i min optik kan udgøre et særligt relevant eksempel på hvordan man kan udvikle og kvalificere velfærdsstatens institutioner.

Afhandlingens forskningsspørgsmål er derfor, *hvordan institutionerne Helsingung og U-turn organiserer, udvikler og kvalificerer deres arbejde på måder, der sætter dem i stand til at lede på de unges ledelse af sig selv, så de unge får øget magt over deres eget liv og betingelser og udvikler sig i mere produktive og foretrukne retninger*.

Denne afhandling bidrager empirisk til forskningsfeltet ved at undersøge, hvordan en strategi om brugerinddragelse og brugen af forståelser og metoder fra narrative, systemiske og løsningsfokuserede terapeutiske traditioner benyttes til at organisere socialt arbejde og skabe ledelse af selvledelse, herunder:

- Hvordan der udvikles nye måder at styre og lede på, som jeg betegner som affektiv subjektivering.
- Hvordan praksis organiseres, gennem hvad jeg kalder brugerdrevne standarder.
- Hvordan materielle og rumlige aspekter benyttes i behandlingsarbejdet på måder, der overskrider og transformerer de traditionelle standarder for terapeutiske samtaler.

Afhandlingen bidrager til en udvikling af governmentality studies gennem udforskning af vitalistiske og produktive former for ledelse og dannelse af subjektivitet, herunder:

- Udforskning af, hvordan governmentality studies bidrager til ledelse og dannelse af subjektivitet.
- Beskrivelser og analyser af affektive former for subjektivering.
- Udvikling af begreber til at analysere affektive former for subjektivering.

Afhandlingen bidrager bredere set endvidere til:

- Refleksion over og medproduktion af psykologiske begreber i praksis for herigennem at bidrage til den løbende produktion af et refleksivt grundlag for psykologien, jf. Brown og Stenner (2009) og deres begreb om 2. ordenspsykologi.
- Udviklingen af narrative, systemiske og løsningsfokuserede former for terapi ved at supplere dem med analyser af, hvordan rumlige og kropslige aspekter kan bidrage til forandring og udvikling.
- Udvikling af velfærdsstatslige praksisser som uddannelse, pædagogik, behandling og socialt arbejde ved at fremstille prototypiske beskrivelser og almene strategier for, hvordan man kan lede borgernes selvledelse igennem brugerinddragelse i velfærdsstatens institutioner.

Disposition

Afhandlingens 'kappe' har til formål at bidrage med en bredere situering og kontekstualisering af de behandlede problemstillinger. Kappen behandler som påkrævet de videnskabsteoretiske og metodologiske overvejelser, der ikke udfoldes i afhandlingens artikler, men er også skrevet med henblik på at give en indføring for de læsere, der ikke nødvendigvis er velbevandrede i de teoretiske perspektiver eller i feltet af socialt arbejde eller i arbejdet med unge og rusmidler.

Indledningsvist præsenteres den analytiske ramme governmentality studies, der leverer analytiske strategier til at undersøge dannelse af borgere gennem ledelse af selvledelse. Her defineres de centrale begreber subjektivering, ledelse, selvledelse og vitalisme. Efter denne brede skitsering zoomer jeg ind på det empiriske felt. Først defineres det, hvad socialt arbejde er, og dernæst skitseres den historiske baggrund for arbejde med unge og rusmidler i en dansk kontekst. Efter dette bruger jeg governmentality analytikken til at vise, hvordan brugen af traditionelle, individualpsykologiske begreber og evidensmetodologien kan give nogle problemer og paradokser i forhold til den form for ledelse, der er central i det sociale arbejde. Dernæst skitserer jeg hvordan institutionerne Helsingung og U-turn kan anskues som nogle særligt relevante alternativer. Endelig

præsenteres min metodologi og metode. Efter kappens første del følger afhandlingens tre artikler. Efter artiklerne er der en konklusion, hvor der opsummeres, reflekteres, konkluderes og perspektiveres.

Introduktion af artiklerne

I artiklen "*New Standards in Social Work: From Regimes of Visibility to Affective Subjectification*" fokuserer jeg primært på, hvordan institutionen Helsingung udvikler måder at arbejde brugerdrevet på ved at trække på særlige psykologiske begreber og teknikker. Dernæst analyserer jeg hvordan der også skabes forandring gennem energi, intensitet og begejstring – hvad jeg betegner som affektiv subjektivering. Denne artikel refererer jeg til som *"New standards"*.

I artiklen *"Tuning Governmentality studies through Heidegger: Analytical Strategies for Affective Subjectification"* giver jeg en mere dybtgående analyse af hvordan vi nærmere kan forstå affektive former for ledelse, som jeg analyserede i den foregående artikel. Her går jeg bl.a. i dialog med forskningsfeltet omkring affektivitet og foreslår Heideggers begreb om stemning som et analytisk begreb til at forstå og analysere hvordan der ledes og styres gennem intensiteter, energier, atmosfærer og stemninger. Denne artikel refererer jeg til som "*Tuning governmentality*".

Artiklen "*Beyond Spaces of Counseling*" er skrevet i samarbejde med min hovedvejleder og samarbejdspartner Morten Nissen. I denne artikel udforskes de mere socio-materielle aspekter af Helsingungs praksis, og vi analyserer hvordan de rumlige, kulturelle og materielle standarder i rådgivning og terapi kan virke begrænsende for nogle klienter. Med baggrund i en problematisering af det terapeutiske rum analyserer vi hvordan Helsingungs eksperimenter med rum overskrider de standarder, der er for både rum og terapi, og hvordan dette skaber nye handlemuligheder for både brugere og socialarbejdere. Denne artikel refererer jeg til som "*Beyond spaces"*.

Den analytiske ramme: Governmentality studies

Da Foucault introducerer begrebet 'governmentality' i en berømt forelæsning i 1977 trækker han på den brede betydning begreberne 'govern' eller 'government' [fr: gouvernement] havde i det 16. århundrede (Foucault, 2008, pp. 125-144). På dansk kan 'government' oversættes til 'ledelse', 'styring' eller 'regering' i en meget bred forstand. [4] Governmentality handler både om ledelse af staten og politiske strukturer, men i særdeleshed også om de måder, hvorpå man kan lede og styre individer og grupper, fx børn eller familier (Foucault, 2008).

En meget anvendt beskrivelse af governmentality er, at det er (studier af) en særlig form for ledelse eller ledelsesrationalitet, der kan betegnes som 'the conduct of conduct', hvilken bl.a. kan oversættes til 'ledelse af (selv)ledelse' (Dean, 2006, p. 43; Foucault, 1982c, p. 341; Gordon, 1991, p. 2). Foucault spiller med formuleringen "conduct of conduct" på flere betydninger af ordet 'conduct', der bl.a. kan betyde lede, føre, styre, dirigere, guide, men også at undersøge, behandle og foreskrive; fx at pålægge en livsførelse [régime] (Foucault, 2008, p. 131). Derudover er der også en række moralske betydninger af 'conduct': at opføre sig eller handle (på en bestemt måde). Vi kan sige "styr dig" som anmodning eller formaning og dette 'at styre sig' vil sige at udøve selvledelse eller regulering i forhold til nogle normative standarder for korrekt opførsel i en given situation. Foucault skriver at 'the conduct of conduct' "*henviser til et herredømme, man kan udvise overfor sig selv eller over for andre, overfor legeme, men også sjæl og handlemåde*" (Foucault, 2008, p. 132).

Når jeg i afhandlingen benytter begrebet ledelse, så henviser det i hovedreglen til sådanne former for ledelse af selvledelse, hvor refleksion og selvforhold er centrale for at personen – eller subjektet - kan udøve en kvalificeret ledelse af sig selv – eller hvad man med Mørch (1996) kan kalde kvalificeret selvbestemmelse. En måde at forstå en sådan (ledelse af) selvledelse på er, at vi leder os selv og hinanden med og gennem en række kulturelle normer, idealer eller standarder. Det kan være standarder fra offentlige myndigheder om at indtage maksimalt 7 eller 14 genstande alkohol om ugen[5], det kan være mere implicitte standarder om hvordan man opfører sig i forhold til sin partner eller som professionel socialarbejder, eller standarder i kammeratskabsgruppen om primært at ryge hash og tage stoffer i weekenden. Vi benytter løbende sådanne standarder, som vi overtager, modificerer eller skaber. Samtidigt leder, regulerer, former og skaber vi os selv med disse standarder, med ret forskelligartede effekter og resultater.

Den underliggende antagelse er at subjekter (personer) og subjektivitet (tanker, følelser, oplevelser, etc.) konstitueres, produceres og dannes i sociale processer, gennem diskurser, sprog- og symbolsystemer, institutioner, materielle betingelser, normer, idealer, standarder mv. Dette er et dobbelt forhold i og med at det også er mennesker, der skaber disse diskurser, symboler og

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[4] Governmentality og de relaterede begreber styring, ledelse mv. oversættes ikke med en fast vending, men jeg trækker på de danske standardoversættelser der anvendes i Dean (2006) og Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer, and Thaning (2008)og Foucault (2008). Jeg har fravalgt at benytte den foreslående oversættelse "guvernementalitet" (Foucault, 2008) og jeg bruger i stedet den engelske betegnelse *governmentality studies* i den danske tekst. Jeg beklager den manglende sproglige elegance disse valg medfører. I forlængelse af afhandlingens tematisering vil jeg oftest benytte begreberne ledelse og selvledelse fremfor den mere sociologiske betoning af styring, der ofte vælges af Dean (2006) og Villadsen (2004).

[5] http://sundhedsstyrelsen.dk/da/sundhed/alkohol

institutioner. Ian Hacking (2007) foreslår begrebet 'the looping effect' til at beskrive det produktive grundforhold, der består i at vi løbende skaber nye (kulturelt indlejrede) forståelser, begreber, praksisser og standarder, hvormed vi samtidigt skaber os selv på nye måder.

Centralt for en governmentality analyse af sådanne processer – særligt i en psykologisk sammenhæng – er begrebet *subjektivering*, der betegner den proces hvorved subjekter og subjektivitet skabes fx gennem produktionen af identitet, refleksivitet og selvforhold. Eksempelvis kan en skoleelev forstå sig selv og blive vurderet af andre i relation til nogle kulturelt skabte standarder for hvad det vil sige at være 'passende' eller 'normal' elev (Kofoed, 2003; Varenne & McDermott, 1998). Disse forståelser, vurderinger og kategorier virker *subjektiverende,* fordi personen nu disponeres for at forstå sig gennem sådanne standarder, kategorier og vurderinger. Eksempelvis som skoleelev, adfærdsvanskelig eller hash-misbruger, hvilket vil have indflydelse på og medskabe den enkeltes selvforhold og handlemuligheder fremadrettet (Foucault, 2002).

Med henblik på at analysere sådanne former for ledelse og subjektivering udvikles der i governmentality studies nogle analysestrategier, der benyttes til at undersøge hvorledes en række institutioner på forskellige tidspunkter har søgt at forme menneskers opførsel og handlinger ved hjælp af en række forskellige midler (diskurser, normer, standarder, teknikker) i forhold til en række forskellige mål og ved brug af en række forskellige strategier (Dean, 2006).

> *"My objective has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects."* (Foucault, 1982c, p. 326)

Her kan man ifølge Dean skelne mellem to analytiske greb, genealogien og praksisregimeanalysen. En hovedstrømning i governmentality studies er de genealogiske analyser, der eftersporer hvordan særlige ledelsesformer og tænkemåder opstår, forandres og forskydes historisk. De genealogiske analyser kan dermed synliggøre og analysere hvordan vi på bestemte tidspunkter benytter særlige strategier, teknologier eller teknikker til at styre, lede og skabe subjekter og subjektivitet i relationer af magt og viden (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1990, 1998).

Governmentality studies har særligt haft tradition for genealogiske analyser af hvordan der ledes og subjektiveres ved regulering af sundhed og afvigelse (Dean, 2006; Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 2002; Rose, 1998). Specifikke studier retter sig mod sindssyge (Foucault, 2003), kriminelle (Foucault, 2002), familien (Donzelot, 1979), alkoholikere (Valverde, 1998), andre afhængige (Keane, 2002), samt bredere studier af hvordan selvforhold og identitet produceres i interaktion med kulturelle standarder (Andersen, 2003; Foucault, 2000a; Rose, 1998). På den måde kan governmentality studies levere strategier, metoder og begreber til at analysere hvordan særlige måder at organisere og udvikle velfærdsstatens institutioner på samtidig disponerer for særlige former for ledelse og subjektivering. På den måde er governmentality studies et oplagt valg, når man ønsker at undersøge hvordan institutioner arbejder med unge og deres forbrug af rusmidler, og de danske genealogier om socialt arbejde (Villadsen, 2004) og regulering af stof(mis)brugere (Houborg, 2006; Winsløw, 1984) kan bidrage til at sætte denne afhandlings udforskning ind i en større kontekst.

Genealogien er en selvfølgelighedsopbrydende historieskrivning, der viser hvordan nye former for ledelse opstår og hvordan de fortsættes, indoptages eller benyttes i ændrede former. Genealogien

viser både kontinuitet og diskontinuitet og udgør en metode til anti-naturalisering og destabilisering af det dominerende og selvfølgelige. Den rummer dermed et potentielt samtidskritisk aspekt, fordi den kan pege på grænserne og betingelserne for hvordan vi kan tænke, forme og lede os selv og hinanden. Den udgør en modhukommelse, der fortæller hvilke (ledelses)rationaliteter, der på et givet tidspunkt kom til at fremstå som selvfølgelige og hvilke der blev usynlige eller utænkelige. (Foucault, 1996) Som Foucault skriver:

"Jeg søger at arbejde i retning af en 'begivenhedsnærværendegørelse'. Hvad vil begivenhedsnærværendegørelse sige? I første omgang et brud med det selvindlysende. Det drejer sig om at få en singularitet til at dukke frem dér hvor man ville være fristet til at henvise til en historisk konstant, et umiddelbart antropologisk grundtræk eller en kendsgerning der er lige tvingende for alle. Man må vise at det ikke var så nødvendigt som det så ud til; at det ikke var så indlysende at de gale skulle anerkendes og behandles som sindssyge; at det ikke var så indlysende at det eneste man kunne gøre med en forbryder var at indespærre ham [...]." (Foucault citeret i Raffnsøe et al., 2008, p. 70)

Her kommer vi ind på en anden grundlæggende pointe i governmentality studies, nemlig at ledelse og subjektivering virker igennem en række 'mentaliteter' forstået som de kollektive former for viden, tro, overbevisninger, normer, idealer eller standarder, som vi er indlejret i (Dean, 2006). Disse 'mentaliteter' eller 'styringsstrategier' er ikke umiddelbart fænomenalt tilgængelige, og et væsentligt kritisk potentiale i governmentality studies er at fremanalysere disse. Gennem genealogiske analyser af hvordan vi på bestemte tidspunkter styrer, leder og subjektiverer, kan man fremanalysere de diagrammatiske, abstrakte 'idealformer' hvormed disse styringsstrategier virker tværs af forskellige institutioner og praksisformer. Disse begrebssættes eksempelvis som styringsstrategier (Dean, 2006), institutionelle rationaliteter eller standarder (Rose, 1998) eller dispositiver (Bussolini, 2010).

Jeg vil nu præsentere disse styrings- eller ledelsesstrategier og benytte eksempler fra Villadsen (2004), som i 'Det sociale arbejdes genealogi' viser, hvordan der fra 1700-tallets fattigpolitik til 1990'ernes postmoderne sociale arbejde sker en række forskydninger og forandringer i, hvilke strategier der benyttes til at lede og subjektivere i det sociale arbejde.

Disciplinær styring

I 1700-tallets fattigpolitik ledes den fattige ved at man iagttager, vurderer og sanktionerer i forhold til den fattiges handlinger. Arbejder den fattige? Tigger han? Opfostrer han børn? Målet med fattigdomspolitikken er at de mennesker, der ikke vil arbejde eller er til gavn for samfundet, placeres i institutioner der styrer gennem overvågning, kontrol og forskellige tvangsmekanismer (Villadsen, 2004). Dette kan ses som en rudimentær disciplinær styring.

Den disciplinære styring undersøges i Foucaults (2002) klassiske 'Overvågning og straf' med genealogiske analyser af udviklingen af ledelse og subjektivering i skoler, hære, hospitaler, fængsler og fabrikker. Disciplinen er grundlæggende en individualiserings- og forbedringsteknologi, der gennem en 'cellulær' distribution af subjekter i rum og tid installerer en permanent refleksion i subjektet, der gør at denne leder sig selv ved at overvåge sine egne handlinger og vurdere dem i

forhold til en norm (Foucault, 2002). Et eksempel er det traditionelle klasselokale, hvor den spatiale fordeling af kroppe på hver sin plads og de afgrænsede tidsenheder med særlige opgaver muliggør en gennemgribende minutiøs overvågning, kontrol og regulering i detaljen. Overvågningen forbindes med en hierarkiserende vurdering og normaliserende sanktion, der installerer et refleksivt selvforhold i den enkelte, som vurderer sig selv i forhold til de givne kulturelle standarder, normer eller idealer. Foucault viser hvordan disciplinen udbredes som en generel styringsteknologi, der ikke blot virker i institutioner, men også installeres i byer og familier, hvilket omtales som en generel disciplinering af samfundet (Foucault, 2002).

Nutidige eksempler på disciplinær styring er, at den arbejdsløse skal søge et bestemt antal job per uge, registrere og afrapportere dette, samt møde op til obligatoriske kurser og møder. Et andet er at stofbrugere skal møde op for at få udleveret heroin eller metadon og aflægge blod eller urinprøver, der kontrolleres for sidemisbrug. Endelig er karaktersystemets vurdering og hierarkisering et eksempel på, hvordan der stadig findes disciplinære former for ledelse i hjertet af uddannelsessystemerne.

I denne afhandling analyseres forskellige aspekter af disciplinen som styringsteknolog, bl.a. hvordan henholdsvis evidensmetodologien og det at benytte et kontor til samtale med de unge disponerer for disciplinære former for ledelse og subjektivering, og jeg analyserer, hvordan Helsingung og U-turn udvikler alternativer for at imødegå nogle af de problemer, denne disciplinære styring kan skabe.

Pastoral styring

Op gennem 1800-tallet begynder man i stigende grad at fokusere på den fattiges moral og personlighed, og man forsøger at styre og lede ved at benytte samtaler til at skabe ansvarlighed hos den fattige (Villadsen, 2004). Dette kan forstås som en pastoral styringsteknologi, der får sit navn efter den kristne kirkes praksis med bekendelse til en præst (lat. Pastor). Den primære teknik i pastoral styring er 'bekendelsen', hvor subjektet artikulerer sandheder om indre tilstande eller handlinger og dermed etablerer et refleksivt forhold til sig selv, medieret af en række normative, kulturelle, etiske eller moralske standarder (Foucault, 1982a).

De moderne pastorale ledelsesteknikker, der benytter dialog og samtale som teknologi til ledelse og subjektivering, er næsten så selvfølgelige at vi ikke får blik for dem. På socialkontoret, arbejdet, i skolen, i terapilokalet og i en mangfoldighed af andre kontekster forholder vi os til os selv gennem samtaler og danner en række standarder for opførsel, tænkemåde, etik og livsstil, hvormed vi regulerer, danner og subjektiverer os selv. Foucault henleder vores opmærksomhed på at de pastorale teknikker, i modsætning til hvad nogle psykoterapeutiske traditioner kunne forlede os til at tro, ikke primært er epistemologiske værktøjer, der undersøger hvem, hvorfor eller hvordan vi er (Foucault, 1994). Derimod er de produktivt skabende (selv)dannelses eller selvledelses 'teknologier':

> *"which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so*

as to transform themselves in order to attain certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom,
perfection, or immortality" (Foucault, 2000c, pp. 225, min fremhævning)

Både de pastorale og de disciplinære former for ledelse kan betegnes som skabende og produktive. Ved at opøve vores færdigheder og vurdere og reflektere over os selv, skaber vi os selv på nye måder. Samtidig kan mange moderne pastorale former for ledelse (terapi, coaching, mindfulness) kritiseres for at have tendens til at fokusere på individet og for at fremstille problemer som stress, spiseforstyrrelser eller misbrug som individuelle, psykologiske problemer, som den enkelte både er årsagen til og har ansvaret for at løse (Brinkmann, 2010; Foucault, 1994; Gergen, 1990). I artiklen *"Beyond spaces"* analyserer vi hvorledes der i Helsingung eksperimenteres med at skabe terapeutiske rum, der er mere socialt, kulturelt og relationelt orienterede, og som disponerer for en produktiv pastoral ledelse, hvor de unge kan bevæge sig i retning af mere foretrukne måder at leve på.

Liberal styring

Villadsen (2004) beskriver, hvordan der i diskussioner om socialt arbejde til stadighed artikuleres en mistænksomhed eller en kritik af, hvordan det sociale arbejde 'hjælper for meget' eller på den forkerte måde ved at fratage borgeren ansvaret, viljen og incitamentet til at tage hånd om sin egen situation.

I governmentality studies kan dette ses som et udtryk for den liberale styreform eller ledelsesrationalitet, der gradvist får forrang i forhold til de disciplinære og pastorale styreformer i de vestlige liberale demokratier (Dean, 2006). Når man taler om liberale styreformer i governmentality studies, henviser det ikke til en teori, en form for politik eller en ideologi men nærmere som en praksis. En måde at gøre tingene på eller *"et princip og metode til rationalisere styringens udøvelse"*(Dean, 2006, p. 111; Foucault, 2000a, p. 74; 2009) Den grundlæggende ide er, at de genstande der skal styres (økonomier, stater, mennesker) har deres egen iboende logik og dynamik, og at man ved at tage hensyn til disse kan facilitere en række effektive ikke-centraliserede selvstyrende processer med en minimal udøvelse af magt og intervention. Liberal styring kan helt kort beskrives som en ledelse af selvledelse, der virker ved en tilrettelæggelse af et felt af mulige handlinger, hvor subjektet tilskyndes til aktivt at udfolde sig og træffe valg og dermed regulere, lede og subjektivere sig selv som et aktivt, frit, rationelt og nyttemaksimerende individ (Foucault, 2009).

Eksempelvis reformeres indsatser i forhold til arbejdsløse gennem konstruktionen af et marked, hvor økonomiske incitamenter (starthjælp, ungdomsydelse mv.) og en række ydelser (kurser, anden aktører) tilrettelægger et felt, hvor den jobsøgende tilskyndes til at agere som en proaktiv, vælgende og selvoptimerede forbruger (Dean, 2006). En sådan 'tilrettelæggelse' peger på liberalismens aktive side, der forsøger at frisætte, stimulere og realisere individets potentialer og at skabe aktive selvstyrende individer. Når jeg senere undersøger hvordan institutionerne Helsingung og U-turn udvikler deres indsatser gennem brugerinddragelse, kan det dermed også ses som en grundlæggende liberal styringsstrategi.

Liberal styring er dog ikke bare en emancipatorisk mulighed for frihed, men en grundlæggende forpligtigelse. Vi er med Niklas Rose (1998, p. 17) berømte formulering "forpligtet til frihed", og

liberal ledelse kan virke som et tveægget sværd, fordi vi overlades både mulighederne og ansvaret for at realisere og udfolde os selv – og dermed også skylden, hvis vi ikke lykkedes. En tendens i den liberale styreform er således en individualiseret frihed, der paradoksalt nok resulterer i en mere intensiveret og effektiv styring og ledelse. Som Dean (2010, p. 200) udtrykker det: *"Government (…) have become more multiple, diffuse, facilitative and empowering. It is also, however, strangely more disciplinary, stringent and punitive."*

Disciplinære, pastorale og liberale former for styring og ledelse er abstrakte, diagrammatiske beskrivelser af forskellige strategier, der sjældent findes i ren form. Begreberne kan anvendes som analysestrategiske redskaber til at analysere hvorledes vi i velfærdsstatens institutioner trækker på forskellige strategier, teknologier og teknikker, der indgår i et komplekst samspil, hvor de modulerer og omformer hinanden og skaber særlige måder at lede og subjektivere på.

Da sådanne analyser er ret komplekse, kan man fokusere analyserne ved at privilegere særlige iagttagelsesbærende begreber. I denne afhandling vil jeg bl.a. gøre dette ved at se, hvordan der i en given praksis benyttes eller produceres 'standarder' og hvordan særlige 'styringsobjekter' fremstilles som genstand for intervention.

Governmentality 2.0

Som nævnt er governmentality analyser ofte deskriptive analyser af, hvordan vi leder og subjektiverer og hvordan disse former og strategier har udviklet sig. Det kan dog problematiseres at selvom analyserne viser at det kunne være anderledes, så formulerer de sjældent en eksplicit normativ kritik eller peger i retning af mere hensigtsmæssige måder at styre og lede på.

Som jeg behandler mere indgående i *"Tuning governmentality"* hænger dette bl.a. sammen med at en del governmentality analyser har et sociologisk udgangspunkt (Dean, 2010; Rose, 1990, 1998; Villadsen, 2004), men også at de analysestrategier, der anvendes, og de empiriske felter, der undersøges, disponerer for analyser af hvordan subjekter ledes og subjektiveres på måder, hvor de underkastes en række standarder og tilpasser sig de krav, der stilles fra eksempelvis staten, institutionerne eller markedet (Sedgwick, 1997).

Der er derfor i feltet omkring governmentality studies en stigende interesse for at undersøge mere produktive, vitalistiske og fællesskabsbaserede former for selvledelse og subjektivering, hvor subjekterne selv aktivt skaber og modificerer både sig selv (Foucault, 1997, 2000c) og deres omgivelser (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Greco & Stenner, 2013), eksempelvis indenfor uddannelse (Staunæs, 2009), ledelse (Raffnsøe & Staunæs, 2014; Staunæs, 2011), medicin (Greco & Stenner, 2013) og socialt arbejde (Nissen, 2012a). I denne bestræbelse trækkes der i stigende grad på filosoffer og teoretikere som giver nogle vitalistiske og produktive opmærksomheder på, hvordan vi udfolder vores liv. Dette kan være en opmærksomhed på at livet skal forstås som en poesis, en kunstnerisk skaben, eksempelvis med Whiteheads 'art of living', der bl.a. handler om at opnå en øget oplevelse af tilfredshed og nydelse (Brown & Stenner, 2009) eller med Foucault, der i behandlingen af selvteknologierne fremhævede at vi med selvledelsen kan "*attain certain state of happiness, purity, wisdsom, perfection or immortality*" (Foucault, 2000, p. 225). I forhold til at påvirke og

forandre vores omgivelser kunne man fremhæve Canguilhems (1991) beskrivelse af, at sundhed ikke handler om at underkaste sig bestemte standarder og normer, men om at livet i sig selv er en normativ, kreativ og produktiv udfoldelse, hvor subjektet skal være adaptivt og respondere fleksibelt og foranderligt på det omgivende miljø. På lignende vis ville filosoffer som Spinoza, Deleuze og Nietzsche lægge vægt på at udfolde livet som en kunst, vilje eller etik, der indebærer at vi øger vores kapacitet til at påvirke og blive påvirket (Deleuze, 1994; Nietzsche, 1993; Spinoza, 1982) På forskellig vis peger disse inspirationskilder på hvordan udfoldelsen af liv er en kontinuerlig social og kollektivt proces, hvor vi aktivt modificerer og transformerer os selv og vores omgivelser (Brown & Stenner, 2009). Det er i denne brede betydning at jeg i afhandlingen bruger begreberne vitalistisk og produktiv, og det er denne tendens i governmentality studies jeg kobler mig på og bidrager til, bl.a. gennem en mere psykologisk og interventionistisk anvendelse af governmentality studies. Det betyder, at jeg vil opdyrke de produktive forbindelser der er mellem governmentality studies og det, man kan kalde en postpsykologi, med henblik på at udvikle begge dele.[6]

Postpsykologi og vitalisme

Når jeg fremhævede, at det kan kritiseres at governmentality studies ofte ikke har et eksplicit, normativt kritisk og produktivt sigte, er det i en forstand rigtigt. Samtidig kan man dog sige at governmentality studies har bidraget til kritik og udvikling af psykologiske teorier og metoder, hvilken udviklingen af narrativ terapi og narrativ praksis (White, 2008), som eksplicit er informeret af Foucault, er et tydeligt eksempel på.

Den bredere gruppe af psykologiske teorier og terapiformer, der er særligt relevante i denne sammenhæng, kan man med et begreb fra Staunæs and Juelskjær (2014) betegne som postpsykologiske. Postpsykologiske teorier og terapeutiske metoder er nogle, der på forskellig vis både inkluderer, gør op med og overskrider den traditionelle psykologi. Postpsykologien og governmentality studies deler præmissen om et grundlæggende produktivt konstituerende forhold mellem personer, subjektivitet, kultur og samfund[7]. Et relevant eksempel, der er velkendt i det sociale arbejde, er Jerome Bruner, der beskriver hvad man også kan betegne som en sociokulturel eller kontekstuel psykologisk forståelse på denne måde:

> *"… det er kulturen, ikke biologien der former menneskelivet og det menneskelige sjæleliv og giver handlingen mening ved at placere dens bagvedliggende bevidsthedstilstande i et fortolkningssystem. Dette gør den ved at gennemtvinge de mønstre, der er iboende i*

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[6] Dean fremhæver at governmentality i sig selv er en sammenblandet substans, som kun fungerer, når den blandes med andre ting (Dean, 2006). Jeg vil derfor benytte en selvstændig syntetiserede fortolkning (Raffnsøe et al., 2008) og selektivt fremdrage de aspekter, som jeg finder relevante for løbende at supplere og udvikle governmentality rammen.

[7] I denne afhandling går jeg i dialog med nogle post-moderne og sprogligt orienterede postpsykologiske retninger, der sætter os i stand til at forstå, hvordan subjektivitet dannes gennem historisk udviklede institutionelle magtrelationer, samtidigt med at vi får en psykologisk forståelse for disse dannelsesprocesser. Der findes en række relevante teorier op gennem psykologiens historie, der kan betragtes som postpsykologiske, eksempelvis Willam James (1950), Vygotsky (1978) og Gergen (1999), se Staunæs og Juelskjær(2014)

kulturens symbolsystemer – dens sprog og samtalemodeller, formerne for logisk og narrativ redegørelse og mønstrene for fællesskabsorienteret tilværelse i gensidig afhængighed"(Bruner, 1999, p. 45)

*"Erfaring i og erindring om den sociale verden er kraftigt struktureret ikke blot af dybt internaliserede og narrativiserede folkepsykologiske forestillinger, men også af de **historisk forankrede institutioner**, som en kultur udvikler for at understøtte og håndhæve dem." (Bruner, 1999, pp. 63, min fremhævning)*

Begrebet postpsykologisk kan i forlængelse af ovenstående benyttes som en samlebetegnelse for tilgange, der forstår psykologiske fænomener som noget, der produceres og omformes i diskursive, kropslige, materielle og affektive relationer. I en sådan forståelse er subjektet primært processuelt, permeabelt og præget af stadig tilblivelse, bevægelse og udvikling, eksempelvis i interaktion med de førnævnte kulturelle standarder (Staunæs & Juelskjær, 2014). Det betyder, at postpsykologien i lighed med governmentality studierne har et kritisk (selv)refleksivt forhold til videnskaberne og psykologien, fordi disse i særlig grad bidrager til at skabe de standarder, der indgår i ledelses- og subjektiveringsprocesser (Rose, 1990).

Dette betyder også, at der i nogle former for postpsykologi også artikuleres en eksplicit normativ og produktiv forpligtelse (fx Bruner, 1999; Polkinghorne, 1988; White, 2008) igennem eksplicitte kritikker af hvordan særlige former for styring, magtudøvelse og brug af særlige typer af viden – som governmentality studies analyserer som disciplinære, pastorale og liberale former - medfører at vi individualiserer, psykologiserer og essencialiserer menneskelige og samfundsmæssige problemer og at vi diagnosticerer, patologiserer og marginaliserer et stigende antal mennesker (Brinkmann, 2010; Gergen, 1990; White, 2008).

Den postpsykologiske forståelse betyder også at man søger at udvikle mere socialt, kulturelt og relationelt orienterede former for intervention. Eksempelvis i forhold til psykiatri (Seikkula, 2008), interventioner på gruppeniveau eller i lokalsamfundet (Alexander, 2008; Berliner, Refsby, & Hakesberg, 2005), og i de systemiske (H. Anderson & Goolishian, 2004), narrative (White, 2007) og løsningsfokuserede (De Shazer, 1985) terapiformer. Jeg vil i afhandlingen benytte betegnelsen postpsykologiske tilgange som samlebetegnelse for de systemiske, narrative og løsningsorienterede terapiformer. Dette behandles mere indgående i artiklen *'New standards'*.

Ved at undersøge postpsykologiske tilgange med governmentality studies skabes der er række muligheder for at udvikle begge traditioner, idet disse samtænkes i en vitalistisk og produktiv analysestrategi. For det første kan man sige at postpsykologien, eksempelvis Bruner, kan benyttes til at udvikle en mere psykologisk og fænomenologisk forståelse af ledelse, selvledelse og subjektivering ved eksempelvis at pege på, hvordan vores (muligheder for) selvledelse og selvforståelse bl.a. er afhængige af – og skabes gennem – institutionelt og kulturelt formidlede fortællinger.[8] For det andet kan vi ved at undersøge hvordan postpsykologiske tilgange benyttes i det sociale arbejde og undersøge hvordan governmentality studies også bidrager til at skabe nye måder at lede og subjektivere på, og dermed bringer os videre end en rent negativ kritik, hvilket åbner for at

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[8] For en personlighedspsykologisk forståelse af Jerome Bruner og narrativ psykologi, se Bank (2014).

undersøge mere produktive og vitalistiske former for ledelse og subjektivering. For det tredje kan governmentality analytikken få øje på de spatiale, materielle og affektive aspekter ved de postpsykologiske tilgange, og dermed bidrage til at udvikle de systemiske, narrative og løsningsorienterede terapiformer, som ellers ofte kritiseres for næsten udelukkende at fokusere på sproglig skabelse. For det fjerde kan koblingen med governmentality studies bidrage til, at de postpsykologiske tilgange i højere grad kommer til at indgå i bredere videnskabelige og politiske dialoger omkring styring, ledelse og subjektivering, der finder sted på tværs af velfærdsstatens institutioner.

Noget af det denne vitalistiske og produktive analysestrategi konkret kan give mig blik for er, hvordan socialarbejdere og unge i Helsingung ikke bare underkaster sig nogle standarder i et behandlingsregime, men aktivt skaber emergente standarder, der både forandrer den institutionelle praksis og bidrager til udvikle de unges mere foretrukne måder at leve på. Samtidigt foregik der noget i samtalen med Lise og Kevin, hvilket jeg betegnede som energi, intensitet, stemning eller affekt – en tematik, som hverken de postpsykologiske tilgange eller governmentality analysestrategierne har særligt gode begreber for og som jeg derfor vil forfølge.

Det empiriske felt: Socialt arbejde, unge og rusmidler

Socialt arbejde

Et centralt aspekt ved socialt arbejde er ifølge Philp (1979) en *helhedsorientering* hvor problemer og symptomer forstås som en del af et større problemkompleks og i relation til subjektets samlede livsførelse. Socialt arbejde kan dermed indledningsvist defineres negativt, ved eksempelvis ikke at være uddannelse eller behandling, fordi sådanne indsatser har relativt specifikke mål, fx et positivt mål om at skabe gode læsefærdigheder eller en negativt mål om at behandle depression (Nissen, 2012a; Philp, 1979).

Det er muligt at Jeppe drikker og nogle unge i Helsingør ryger meget hash, men det sociale arbejde fokuserer ikke (udelukkende) på sådanne klart definerede, udpegede og afgrænsede problemer (Nissen, 2012a; Philp, 1979; Villadsen, 2004), men benytter en række psykologiske og sociologiske diskurser og vidensformer, der gør det muligt at forstå de specifikke problemer som en del af en mere omfattende helhed. Et eksempel på dette kan vi finde i en international definition af socialt arbejde:

> *"Det sociale arbejde virker til fremme for social forandring og problemløsning i menneskelige forhold. Det støtter det enkelte menneske i at frigøre sig og blive i stand til at øge dets trivsel. Ved hjælp af teorier om menneskelig adfærd og sociale systemer griber socialt arbejde ind på de områder, hvor mennesker og miljø påvirker hinanden."[9]*

I den ovenstående formulering *"støtter det enkelte menneske i at frigøre sig og blive i stand til at øge dets trivsel"* ser vi forholdsvist tydeligt hvordan målet ikke kun er et fravær af problemer og symptomer, men at *subjektet selv skal blive i stand til* at frigøre sig fra de specifikke problemer og blive i stand til at øge sin almene (udefinerede) trivsel.[10]

Så på trods af at det sociale arbejde trækker på både disciplinære, pastorale og liberale styringsstrategier og har en særlig opmærksomhed på det afvigende, så interveneres der i modsætning til behandling, retsvæsen eller politi, ikke (primært) disciplinært, korrigerende og sanktionerende i forhold til det problematiske, afvigende eller patologiske. Det sociale arbejde benytter hovedsageligt forskellige former for liberal styring, og søger at påvirke og forandre ved at forebygge, skabe og lede gennem den enkeltes frihed. Det sociale arbejde kan dermed betegnes som en produktiv ledelse af selvledelse, der har til formål at skabe kompetente borgere i en almen forstand, eller som Villadsen (2004) definerer det, så kan det sociale arbejde siges at være en ledelse eller magtudøvelse, der optimerer klientens magtudøvelse over sig selv.

Det sociale arbejde synes dermed at unddrage sig en egentlig afgrænsning, fordi det retter sig mod den enkeltes hverdagsliv og samlede livsførelse, men også gør 'det sociale' til genstand for

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[9]Definition fra international federation of social workers. Kilde Dansk socialrådgiverforening
http://www.socialraadgiverne.dk/Default.aspx?ID=8547

[10] Man kan argumentere på lignende vis omkring sundhedsvæsenet, der før hed sygehusvæsenet, der også har til opgave at fremme sundheden for borgene, men dette gøres dog stadigt med fokus på sygdom og kun i meget begrænset omfang i forhold til bredere livsforhold som kost eller bolig.

intervention, da det sociale arbejdes mål er subjekters og fællesskabers selvledelse på tværs af kontekster (Nissen, 2012a; Philp, 1979). I analyserne af det sociale arbejde er der hos nogle forfattere en opmærksomhed på, hvordan subjektet ledes og tilpasses til de eksisterende former (Villadsen, 2004), mens andre også har mere produktive og vitalistiske analyser af hvordan det sociale arbejde skaber subjekter, der også omformer og forandrer de sociale, institutionelle og samfundsmæssige betingelser (Philp, 1979).

En af de grundliggende pointer i denne afhandling er, at der i det sociale arbejde (kan) udøves en særlig produktiv og vitalistisk form for ledelse, der styrker brugernes autonomi og udvikling af en (mere) kvalificeret individuel og kollektiv selvbestemmelse, og at det er væsentligt at undersøge, udvikle, kvalificere og udbrede netop sådanne strategier for ledelse og subjektivering.

Unge og rusmidler: Den historiske baggrund

Unge, der har et regelmæssigt og måske problematisk brug af ulovlige stoffer, har været et vanskeligt og omdiskuteret problem i Danmark siden midten af 1960erne. På det tidspunkt begyndte et stigende antal mennesker at eksperimentere med en række forskellige rusmidler, der blev tilgængelig som en almindelig del af ungdomskulturen. Dette førte til en stigning af unge i behandlingssystemet og der opstod en ny offentlig diskurs om 'ungdomsnarkomanen' eller 'den unge stofbruger', som blev genstand for forskelligartede styringsstrategiske overvejelser og lejlighedsvise epidemier af offentlig moralsk panik. (Houborg, 2006; Orbe, 2010; Winsløw, 1984).

Tidligere blev de primært lidt ældre opioid-brugere behandlet i hospitalsvæsenet, hvor styringsobjekterne var af somatisk-medicinsk karakter, men med den nye brugergruppe blev stofmisbrug i stigende grad forstået som et *ungdomsproblem.* Dette betød, at stofmisbrug blev forstået som et socialt problem, der skulle behandles i en række nye specialiserede institutioner, adskilt fra somatisk medicin, i den nyligt opfundet sociale sektor. Dette betød, at der skete et skift hvor epidemiologisk viden blev udgrænset og psykologiske og sociologiske former for viden (fx Bateson, 1977; Becker, 1953; Goffman, 2009) gradvist kom til at dominere (Houborg, 2006; Winsløw, 1984). På trods af denne generelle bevægelse mod anvendelse af psykologiske og sociologiske former for viden, kan der dog til stadighed spores en række medicinske og psykopatologiske forståelser og vidensformer i feltet (fx Ramström, 1979).

Med et styringsstrategisk blik kan man op gennem stofbehandlingens historie spore, hvordan medicinske, psykologiske og sociologiske vidensformer på forskellige tidspunkter favoriseres og kombineres med en række forskelligartede diskurser, institutioner, eksperter og teknikker, hvilket producerer særlige styringsobjekter og styringsstrategier. Skematisk set kan medicinske forståelser have en tendens til at fokusere på stoffet og benytte disciplinære styreformer – fx substitutionsbehandling, afrusning, afholdenhed og kontrol (Houborg, 2006). Psykologiske forståelser vil have en tendens til at favorisere pastorale teknikker – fx ved at bruge samtalen som middel til at skabe indsigt, erkendelse og motivation (Miller & Rollnick, 1991; Revstedt, 1994). Endelige vil de mere sociale og sociologiske forklaringer have en tendens til at fokusere på at intervenere i forhold til leveforhold og sociale omstændigheder omkring stofbruget.

Dansk stofbehandling kan dengang og nu betegnes som et meget heterogent felt med et fravær af fælles standarder, metoder, teorier eller definitioner på afhængighed eller stofrelaterede problemer. Der eksisterer en mangfoldighed af forskellige og til tider modsatrettede strategier, tilgange og indsatser, hvor commonsense forståelser, politiske dagsordener, forskelligartede videnskabelige teorier, meninger og forståelser fra professionelle, brugere og selvhjælpsorganisationer interagerer i konstante kampe om, hvad der er sandt og falsk på rusmiddelområdet (Orbe, 2010, p. 16).

Feltet kan siges at være notorisk for dets multiplicitet af sammenflettede problemer, udfordringer og paradokser, og de spændinger, der kan eksistere mellem forskellige strategier for ledelse og subjektivering, træder tydelige frem her. Dette forstærkes af de nuværende tendenser på området. For det første skal stofbehandlingsområdet levere standardiserede data til transnationale informations- og monitoreringsstrukturer[11]. For det andet er området udpeget af socialstyrelsen som et felt, hvor der er brug for mere viden om, hvad der virker. For det tredje er der en række vanskeligheder, eksempelvis at unge, der har et forbrug af (illegale) rusmidler, i meget lille udstrækning benytter de kommunale behandlingstilbud; de henvender sig sjældent og afbryder ofte deres behandlingsforløb. Dette problem er udbredt på tværs af rusmiddelområdet, men den manglede deltagelse er særligt udbredt hos unge, der ikke forstår sig selv som misbrugere og som (endnu) ikke er udstødte eller marginaliserede (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998; Nissen, 2000c; Orbe, 2010; Vinum, 2002). Derfor er det i et governmentality perspektiv naturligvis særligt interessant at institutioner som Helsingung og U-turn eksperimenterer med at udvikle liberale strategier, der kan anvendes i forhold til de unge, der i udgangspunktet ofte ikke har særligt meget lyst til at gå i behandling. (Orbe, 2010; U-Turn, 2011). Jeg vil i de følgende afsnit analysere nogle af de mulige årsager til, at unge ikke ønsker at deltage i behandlingsforløb, ved at se på, hvordan praksis organiseres omkring henholdsvis traditionelle, individualpsykologiske begreber og gennem standardisering og evidens.

Unge og rusmidler: Organisering gennem traditionelle, individualpsykologiske begreber

Motivationsbegrebet er et centralt eksempel på brugen af traditionelle, individualpsykologiske begreber, da en række diskurser om frivilligt behandlingsarbejde fremhæver, at motivation er helt central for at skabe udvikling og forandring (Revstedt, 1994). Jeg trækker her på Villadsen (2003), der analyserer motivation med udgangspunkt i en lærebog om motivationsarbejde (Revstedt, 1994), og på Christoffersen og Kousholt (1998) og Vinum (2002), som udforsker hvordan motivation benyttes i københavnske behandlingsinstitutioner.

Når der etableres en standard om, at motivation er afgørende for forandring, så betyder det at behandlingsarbejde i stor udstrækning er motivationsarbejde, hvor den professionelle socialarbejder må arbejde med klientens psyke for at skabe motivation eller for at gøre klientens 'latente' motivation bevidst eller 'manifest' (Revstedt, 1994; Villadsen, 2003). Christoffersen og Kousholt (1998) og Vinum (2002) kritiserer, hvordan en sådan traditionel psykologisk forståelse af motivation fører til, at der sker en indsnævring af problemforståelsen til klientens psyke, hvilket paradoksalt nok

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[11] http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/

muliggør en afvisning af en række af klientens ønsker og perspektiver. Dette skyldes, at ønsker om at have et fortsat forbrug af stoffer, at starte med at få hjælp til andre problemer, eller det at være utilfreds med behandlingen kan tolkes som udtryk for manglende motivation (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998; Vinum, 2002) eller som udtryk for at klienten ikke er i kontakt med sit sande indre selv (Villadsen, 2003).

Motivation kan på den måde benyttes om en standardforklaring på både succes og fiasko i behandlingen. Hvis brugeren deltager i behandlingsregimet og bliver stoffri, så er det fordi vedkommende var motiveret, og hvis brugeren fortsætter sit stofbrug eller afbryder behandlingen, så var brugeren ikke tilstrækkeligt motiveret (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998). Christoffersen og Kousholt (1998) påpeger også, at sådanne forståelser kan medføre at brugerne oplever en fremmedbestemmelse, umyndiggørelse og ufølsomhed overfor deres ønsker og situation, og at de kan opleve sig overladt til, hvad behandlerne mener, er godt for dem (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998, p. 9).

Med et governmentality blik producerer standarden om motivation brugerens psyke som styringsobjekt, hvilket betyder at ansvaret for og løsningen på stofproblemer placeres inde i individet samtidigt med at andre perspektiver, problemer og omstændigheder udgrænses, hvis de ikke passer med den institutionelt definerede (standardiserede) problembestemmelse. Sådanne paradokser beskrives også mere generelt i litteraturen om socialt arbejde, hvor det bl.a. fremhæves, at det er en generel problematik at brugernes problemforståelser 'oversættes', så de svarer til de problemforståelser og behandlingsindsatser, der i forvejen findes i det sociale system (Houborg, 2006; Järvinen & Mik-Meyer, 2003; Villadsen, 2003). Anlægger vi et organisatorisk perspektiv, så kan en arbitrær brug af individualpsykologiske begreber som motivation betyde, at alle slags vanskeligheder mellem hjælpeindsatsene og brugerne kan (bort)forklares ved at henvise til faktorer i brugerne. Dette betyder ifølge Christoffersen and Kousholt (1998) at de unge udstødes af institutionerne, der dermed fralægger sig ansvaret og immuniseres for kritik samtidig med at mulighederne for mere nuancerede forklaringer og udvikling af behandlingssystemet begrænses. I feltet omtales det endvidere at behandlingssystemets fokus på misbrug og psykologiske forståelser af dette medfører en stigmatisering, marginalisering og patologisering af de unge (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998; U-Turn, 2011).

Med en hurtig skitsering af de ledelsesformer, der er involveret, kan denne tilgang anskues som en disciplinær fastlæggelse af problemforståelsen, hvor den unge har begrænset indflydelse på rammerne for eller målet med behandlingen, og hvor de unges udvikling vurderes i forhold til en foreskrevet norm eller standard, fx stoffrihed. Gennem pastorale teknikker kan den unge bringes til yderligere at reflektere, evaluere og vurdere sig selv i forhold til disse normer, og ved at bruge de kulturelt fremherskende essentialiserende psykologiske diskurser kan de unge bringes til at forstå, at det er dem selv, der årsagen til de problemer, de oplever. Endelig kan en liberal diskurs om individets frie valg disponere for, at den unge overtager ikke bare ansvaret for sin situation, men også skyld og skam i forhold til ikke at leve op til de normer og standarder, der er for et ungdomsliv. Dermed subjektiveres den unge som eksempelvis 'problembarn', 'klient' eller 'misbruger' – som Järvinen and Mik-Meyer (2003) påpeger, så bidrager de institutionelle strukturer til 'at skabe en klient'. Med begreber fra den narrative psykologi kan man endvidere pege på at der skabes en række negative

identitetskonklusioner om de unge, der kan virke begrænsende på den unges handlemuligheder og meningsskabelse fremadrettet (Bruner, 1999; White, 2008).

Med governmentality studierne og de postpsykologiske tilgange kan der altså rejses en kritik af brugen af motivation som individualpsykologisk begreb, da det kan medføre, at der sker en psykologisering og individualisering af de unges problemer, og at dette disponerer for disciplinære og pastorale former for ledelse, der ikke bidrager til at brugerne udvikler kvalificeret selvbestemmelse og får større magt over sig selv og sine betingelser, men tværtimod subjektiverer de unge som problematiske, misbrugende eller afvigende.

Unge og rusmidler: Organisering gennem standardisering og evidens

I lyset at den foregående analyse forekommer behovet for at kvalificere velfærdsstatens indsatser indlysende, og her er standardisering i form af evidens som nævnt en fremherskende tendens. Fortalere for evidenstilgangen har væsentlige og vægtige argumenter, der endvidere forstærkes af evidenstilgangens næsten hegemoniske status som videnskabelig kvalificeringsdiskurs indenfor sundhed, behandling(Timmermans & Berg, 2003) uddannelse (Biesta, 2007)og i stigende grad også inden for socialt arbejde (Houston, 2005) og rusmiddelbehandling (Tucker & Roth, 2006)

I dette afsnit vil jeg primært skitsere nogle af de problemer, der kan være, når man søger at benytte evidensmetodologien til at reformere og udvikle det sociale arbejde, og dermed tydeliggøre hvorfor den er væsentligt at undersøge og udvikle alternative strategier til.

Formålet med evidensmetodologien[12] er helt overordnet at sammenligne effekten af forskellige indsatser på et videnskabeligt grundlag, og dermed at kunne allokere ressourcer til de mest virkningsfulde og omkostningseffektive interventioner (Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Trickett & Beehler, 2013). Evidensmetodologien er grundlæggende modelleret efter et klassisk naturvidenskabeligt eksperimentelt design, hvor en afgrænset og veldefineret genstand eller tilstand påvirkes med en veldefineret og standardiseret påvirkning, mens man forsøger at eliminere 'støj' fra andre variable, som man prøver at holde relativt stabile. Randomiserede eksperimenter og statistiske metoder gør det dermed muligt at finde statistisk signifikante forhold mellem en indsats og et (foruddefineret) resultat.

Evidensmetodologien arbejder dermed med positivistiske, individualistiske og universalistiske lineære antagelser, hvor fx behandling består i at bruge en veldefineret aktiv ingrediens eller teknik (medicinsk, terapeutisk) i forhold til en veldefineret sygdomsenhed i et relativt passivt individ, der ikke påvirkes at de øvrige sociale omstændigheder omkring behandlingen (Portney & Watkins, 2008). Evidensmetodologien fungerer tilsyneladende set relativt godt som et pragmatisk forskningsdesign til at sammenligne indsatser i forhold til veldefinerede og relativt kontekst uafhængige fænomener, og fremstår som en objektiv metode, der kan levere en neutral, objektiv eller teknisk viden og som kan få psykologiske og sociale fænomener til at fremstå i positiv form (Rose, 1998). Men ud fra et governmentality perspektiv er evidensmetodologien dog hverken neutral, objektiv eller uproblematisk, og der kan rejses en række indvendinger mod at anvende evidensmetodologien i forhold til de komplekse, multikausale og kontekstafhængige fænomener, som det sociale arbejde beskæftiger sig med (Tucker & Roth 2006). Jeg vil nu kort skitsere nogle af de væsentligste problemer.

Et grundlæggende problem i forhold til socialt arbejde er at evidensmetodologien arbejder med standardiserende, specifikke og afgrænsede *problemforståelser* og succesmål, der monitoreres ud fra institutionelt fastlagte kriterier. En vanskelighed med sådanne specificerede problemforståelser er, at der i socialt arbejde ikke nødvendigvis er enighed om problemer, årsag(er) og relevante løsninger (Orbe, 2010; U-Turn, 2011). Unge der ryger (meget) hash vil ofte se dette som uproblematisk, begrunde det med at det er sjovt og/eller måske begrunde det med at det hjælper dem til at

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[12] For et grundigt overblik af evidens baseret praksis se (Trickett & Beehler, 2013) For en uddybende behandling af evidens se eksempelvis (Thorgaard, 2010; Timmermans & Berg, 2003)

håndtere vanskeligheder i skolen, med kammerater eller forældre. Sådanne unge forstår sig ofte ikke som hverken 'misbrugere' eller 'udstødte', og de ønsker i særdeleshed ikke at benytte et tilbud, der har misbrug som overskrift; men de kan måske godt overtales til at deltage i (behandlings)tilbud, der (også) retter sig mod problemer, som de finder relevante (Orbe, 2010; U-Turn, 2011; Vinum, 2002). Omvendt vil forældre og professionelle ofte være tilbøjelige til at vende ligningen om og se rusmidlerne som problemet, og de vil være tilbøjelige til at tænke løsninger gennem pastorale og disciplinære modeller, hvor de unge skal tage ansvar, indse og vedkende sig rusmiddelproblemet for at forandre deres situation og evt. 'hjælpes' ud af deres 'afhængighed' gennem institutionelle regimer med kontrol og sanktioner.

Når man anvender evidens i socialt arbejde, betyder det, at der er en tendens til at reducere de forskellige perspektiver og komplekse problemstillinger til et specifikt, enkeltstående problem, fx misbrug, ADHD eller læsevanskeligheder. Det er for det første et helt grundlæggende problem, fordi det sociale arbejde typisk arbejder med komplekse og sammensatte problemer. Vi møder sjældent mennesker, der kun har ét problem; 99-problemer synes nærmere at være den kulturelle standard.[13] For det andet kan udpegningen af et specifikt problem skærpe og institutionalisere de modsætningsforhold og forskellige syn, der er på problemerne. En af forklaringerne på de vanskeligheder der er med at få unge – og alle mulige andre – til at deltage i interventioner på social- og sundhedsområdet, er simpelthen at de ikke deler de specifikke, afgrænsede problemforståelser, som evidensmetodologien disponerer for.

For det tredje er evidensmetodologiens ideal den eksperimentelle situation, hvor man forsøger at holde en række variable stabile, mens man benytter og undersøger virkningen af standardiserede metoder (Portney & Watkins, 2008; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). Det betyder at klienternes egne ideer, projekter samt kontekstuelle faktorer kun i meget begrænset omfang kan få indflydelses på behandlingens udformning, metode, forløb og mål, med mindre disse ligger indenfor de institutionelt definerede problemforståelser og metoder. Dermed privilegeres de institutionelle ekspertforståelser og brugerens perspektiver marginaliseres og udelukkes (Dehue, 2002; Houborg, 2012; Järvinen & Mik-Meyer, 2003). De standardiserede og foruddefinerede problemforståelser, mål og metoder udgør et grundlæggende problem i det sociale arbejde, fordi en vigtig del af interventionen netop er at facilitere *at borgeren gradvist udvikler emergente mål og standarder for sin livsførelse over tid.* Dermed stiller evidensmetodologien det sociale arbejde i en paradoksal situation, fordi målet med det sociale arbejde er at udvikle borgerens autonome og kvalificerede ledelse af sig selv, samtidig med at borgeren i de evidensbaserede velfærdsstatslige hjælpeforanstaltninger skal tilpasse sig rammerne for behandlingen og kun i meget begrænset omfang kan udøve en sådan kvalificeret og autonom selvbestemmelse (Jarvinen & Mik-Meyer, 2003).

For det fjerde er det et problem at evidensmetodologien konceptualiserer vanskeligheder og afvigelser som noget individuelt. Når evidensmetodologien søger at undersøge virkningen af indsatser, så sker det ved at specificere, definere og monitorere problemer, succeskriterier og en række andre variable. På stofområdet foregår dette foregår eksempelvis ved brug af tilsyneladende neutrale måleinstrumenter som interviews og spørgeskemaer, der omhandler emner som stofbrug, stofinjektion, skoleforløb, erfaringer med det psykiatriske system, og vold og seksuelle overgreb

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[13] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/99_Problems).

(Orbe, 2010).[14] På den måde kobler evidensregimets diskursive, metodiske og tekniske aspekter sig til en foruddefineret problemforståelse bestående af individualpsykologiske, psykiatriske eller biologiske faktorer og synliggør særligt disse, hvilket disponerer for at klienten subjektiveres og positioneres som eksempelvis misbruger, offer eller psykisk syg (Davies & Harré, 1990).

Så fuldstændigt parallelt med de problemer, som jeg fremhævede i forhold til organiseringen gennem traditionelle individualpsykologiske begreber, så har evidensmetodologien også en tendens til at individualisere og stigmatisere. Worrall (2010) argumenterer eksempelvis for, at evidensmetodologien disponerer for interventioner, som er mindre komplekse, som har en kort tidshorisont og som er mere medikaliserende og mere patologiserende. Dette bidrager til at de unge subjektiveres som problematiske, og der etableres negative selvforståelser der kan vedligeholde eller forværre problemerne ved at de unges skubbes bort fra behandlingstilbuddene. I artiklen *"New standards"* analyserer jeg hvordan den implicitte ontologi, der findes i evidensmetodologien og de individualpsykologiske begreber, disponerer for disciplinære og pastorale former for ledelse.

Et femte problem med evidensmetodologien er at det er vanskeligt at inddrage den sociale og samfundsmæssige kontekst på en relevant måde. Man kan lave epidemiologiske undersøgelser og surveys, men at tilpasse indsatsen ud fra meget specifik og kvalitativ viden er som anført ovenfor vanskeligt. Dette er særligt et problem fordi det sociale arbejdes genstande, hvad enten det er unge der ryger hash, 'vilde unge' på Blågårds Plads (Mørck, 2006) aggressive unge mænd i Grønland (Berliner et al., 2005), ikke kan forstås ahistorisk og a-kontekstuelt (Järvinen & Mik-Meyer, 2003). De er hvad Hacking (2007) kalder 'moving targets' eller 'interactive kinds', og en central måde at skabe (varig) forandring hos disse subjekter er at sætte dem i stand til at indgå i de sociale fællesskaber på nye og mere kvalificerede måder og at forandre deres livsbetingelser. Interventionerne må derfor delvist være rettet mod den samfundsmæssige sammenhæng. Dette argument fremføres af Trickett and Beehler (2013, p. 26), der også fremhæver at *"the lived experience of community members is a critical source of knowledge in the development and implementation of interventions."*

Men, kunne man indvende, er evidens programmerne ikke netop en sikkerhed for at behandlingsindsatserne virker? Der er jo netop evidens for dem? De kritiske modspørgsmål er her: Virker for hvem? Hvad betyder det at noget virker? Taler vi om løsning af relativt isolerede problemer omkring stofbrug eller om skabelsen af selvledende borgere, der kan løse deres egne problemer på tværs af kontekster? I hvor lang tid holder forandringen? Hvor mange gange skal vi sende den samme borger i behandling og på afrusning, og erklære at behandlingen var succesfuld, blot for at se borgeren med de samme slags problemer seks måneder senere?   Kan de evidensbaserede programmer opnå empirisk dokumenterbare resultater, fordi dem, der gennemfører behandlingsprogrammerne, er de 'nemme' brugere, der måske slet ikke behøvede så omfattende indsats, hvorimod de mere vanskelige brugere udstødes? (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998)

I et governmentality perspektiv disponerer evidensmetodologien for disciplinære former for ledelse, og jeg har vist, hvordan en ukritisk brug af evidens kan give en række vanskeligheder, fordi det sociale arbejde har et gøre med 'interaktive slags' (Hacking, 2007) og komplekse problemer, der løses

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[14] http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/

gennem ikke-lineær udvikling (Valsiner, 1997) og udvikling af emergente mål (Sanderson, 2006), hvor subjekterne aktivt transformerer sig selv, deres levemåder og deres omgivelser i interaktion med personlig og kulturel viden, normer, standarder og diskurser med henblik på at skabe nye og mere foretrukne måder at leve på. På paradoksal vis kan en ukritisk og ureflekteret anvendelse af både evidens og individualpsykologiske begreber medføre en række fundamentale vanskeligheder i forhold til socialt arbejde og andre velfærdsstatslige tiltag, der arbejder med produktivt at udvikle borgerens selvbestemmelse og ledelse af sig selv.

Mere generelt formuleret kan man argumentere for at der er en række indbyggede paradokser i organiseringen af velfærdsstatens hjælpeforanstaltninger, som hænger sammen med en almen styringsproblematik, der er grundlæggende i pædagogik, ledelse og socialt arbejde, nemlig hvordan styring og ledelse 'udefra' står i forhold til og kan styrke den enkeltes selvledelse og autonomi (Järvinen & Mik-Meyer, 2003).

Disse spørgsmål har en lang forhistorie, men viser sig grundet de nuværende tendenser nu meget tydeligt i det sociale arbejde. Med en parafrasering af Paul Valéry (1971) er *der to farer, der bestandigt truer det sociale arbejde: orden og uorden*. Der er enten for meget orden, standardisering og specificering, hvilket er problematisk i forhold til den særlige form for ledelse og subjektivering, som er det sociale arbejdes mål. På den anden side kan indsatser, der organiserer praksis gennem forholdsvis udefinerede og fleksible begreber som motivation, ende i en række lignende problemer, hvor der ikke er tilstrækkelig retning og mål for indsatserne. Det er min formodning at mange, som har beskæftiget sig med socialt arbejde, kan nikke genkendende til begge disse former og jeg vil nu præsentere hvordan en analytisk opmærksomhed på a udvikle brugerdrevne standarder i socialt arbejde kan være en mulig måde at overkomme disse problemer på.

Unge og rusmidler: Organisering gennem brugerinddragelse

I denne afhandling undersøger jeg hvordan institutionerne Helsingung og U-turn benytter brugerinddragelse og postpsykologisk tilgange til at organisere og kvalificere deres praksis. Dette kan som nævnt ses som en del af en bredere tendens til at udvikle velfærdsstatens institutioner gennem stigende brugerinddragelse, brugerorientering og medbestemmelse(Houborg, 2012; Pedersen, 2003). Denne tendens kan udmøntes og analyseres både som en 'socialliberal' styringsstrategier, der skaber empowerment, og som en neoliberal strategi, der reducerer borgeren til en kunde, som kan tilvælge velfærdsstatslige ydelser som om der var tale om et frit marked, men med begrænset indflydelse på at omforme de institutionelle betingelser (Asmussen, 2003; Cruikshank, 1999; Dean, 2010).

Den konkrete baggrund for U-turn og Helsingung er bl.a. et policydokument fra 1999, hvor der lægges op til en ny strategi i forhold til at arbejde med unge og rusmidler i Københavns Kommune (Ege, Rothenberg, & Madsen, 1999). Strategien lægger op til at man skal undgå specialiserede misbrugsinstitutioner og arbejde med at forstå rusmiddelbrug både i et alment perspektiv, som en normal del af ungdomslivet, og som noget særligt, der kan adresseres som en del af de øvrige sociale problemer, som den enkelte unge har. Der er altså tale om en helhedsforståelse og ud fra den

tidligere definition dermed tale om socialt arbejde. Ifølge strategien skal de basale principper for de fremtidige indsatser være "selvhjælpsorganisering, frivillighedsprincippet, medbestemmelse/ brugerinddragelse" (Ege et al., 1999, p. 9). Af forskellige årsager var det ikke muligt helt at undgå en specialiseret behandlingsinstitution, og i 2004 åbner Københavns kommune U-turn, som er "et gratis og frivilligt tilbud til kommunens unge, der har et bekymrende eller problemgivende forbrug af rusmidler" (U-Turn, 2011, p. 2).

Som en del af socialstyrelsens projekt om at udvikle og kvalificere arbejdet med unge og rusmidler udpeges U-turn i 2010 som model og den nyetablerede institution Helsingung begynder at implementere model U-turn i 2011 (U-Turn, 2010, 2011). [15] Arbejdet i Helsingung og implementeringen af model U-turn har været dette projekts hovedfokus, og jeg vil benytte 'model U-turn' som generisk term, for den tilgang, der anvendes, når det ikke er afgørende at skelne mellem Helsingung, U-turn og modellen. Jeg vil nu anføre en række grunde til at Helsingung, U-turn og U-turn-modellen udgør et særligt relevant og interessant genstandsfelt for denne afhandling.

Helt overordnet kan U-turn-modellen ses som en bestræbelse på at undgå en række af de problemer, som jeg skitserede tidligere, ved at arbejde aktivt med brugerinddragelse og fleksibilitet i indsatserne således at de kan tilpasses brugernes behov og ønsker. Dette sker eksempelvis gennem en fleksibel problembestemmelse, hvor man kan tage udgangspunkt i det, som den unge oplever som problematisk og er motiveret for at forandre (U-Turn, 2011, p. 15).

I forbindelse med brugerinddragelse i socialt arbejde rejser Asmussen (2003) en række kritikker, bl.a. af at brugerstudier og processer for brugerinddragelse ofte kun fokuserer på brugeren som fx stofbrugere, og dermed ikke har forståelse for relationelle processer og bredere sociale og samfundsmæssige omstændigheder. Her udgør U-turn-modellen en interessant alternativ, fordi "U-turn ikke er en *egentlig* metode eller model (!)" (U-Turn, 2010, p. 2), men at det er en eksplicit del af selve modellen at der sker en løbende udvikling af indsatsen ud fra brugernes oplevelser og feedback. For det andet medtænker U-turn-modellen relationelle og samfundsmæssige aspekter af indsatsen og arbejder ikke kun med de unge, men er også et tilbud til forældre, pårørende og professionelle aktører omkring de unge – lærere, sagsbehandlere, pædagoger m.fl. (U-Turn, 2011, p. 2).

> *"I model U-turn er det desuden et vigtigt mål at lære af erfaringerne med indsatserne – bygge ovenpå – og give viden videre til andre, der arbejder med målgruppen eller som på anden vis er involveret i de unges liv og hverdag."*(U-Turn, 2011, p. 2)

For det tredje udvikles indsatserne ikke kun ud fra et brugerperspektiv i form af de unge, der henvises til tilbuddet, men også ud fra de professionelles løbende erfaringer og gennem en refleksiv postpsykologisk faglighed informeret af systemiske, løsningsfokuserede, anerkendende og narrative tilgange (Dahl & Granhof Juhl, 2010). Dette er særligt relevant, da disse tilgange netop forsøger at skabe positiv udvikling ved at privilegere brugernes perspektiver og forståelser, men samtidigt har en teoretisk og normativ opmærksomhed på selektivt at forstærke særlige perspektiver og forståelser (U-Turn, 2011, p. 2).

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[15] For en uddybende beskrivelser af U-turn, se bilag 1 samt (Bank, 2010; Orbe, 2010)

For det fjerde undersøges model U-turn som en del af socialstyrelsens "Projekt Misbrugsbehandling", hvor det sammenlignes med andre behandlingsformer [16], primært gennem kvantitative (evidenstilnærmede) metoder. Men da det skaber en række paradokser at undersøge postpsykologiske tilgange med metoder fra evidensparadigmet, er det relevant at foretage en kvalitativ udforskning af model U-turn, der er ontologisk, epistemologisk og metodologisk mere i overensstemmelse med de videnskabstraditioner, teoretiske antagelser og psykologiske teorier og tilgange, som benyttes i modellen.

I mit perspektiv er Helsingung og U-turn dermed særligt relevante genstande for udforskning, fordi de kan udgøre prototyper på, hvordan man kan kvalificere og udvikle socialt arbejde, ved 1) at have fleksibilitet, tilpasning og udvikling i forhold til både de specifikke brugere og de lokale og samfundsmæssige betingelser, 2) at benytte postpsykologiske tilgange til at reflektere og kvalificere denne udvikling, og 3) at benytte og udvikle produktive, vitalistiske former for ledelse og subjektivering, der kan siges at være karakteristiske for det sociale arbejde.

I et bredere samfundsmæssigt og socialpolitisk perspektiv er en sådan udforskning også relevant, når man tager de nuværende spændinger og tendenser i organiseringen af velfærdstatens institutioner i betragtning. Brugerinddragelse og de narrative, systemiske og løsningsorienterede metoder er forholdsvist udbredte og anerkendte inden for undervisning, behandling og i en række indsatser i forhold til børn, unge og familier. Men det er uklart hvad det betyder når postpsykologiske tilgange og metoder, der er udviklet i en terapeutisk sammenhæng, benyttes indenfor andre felter.

Samtidig er disse tilgange under et stigende pres for at kunne dokumentere deres effekter ud fra de standarder og kriterier, som evidensmetodologien benytter, hvilket er delvist uforenelige med tilgangene, og denne udforskning kan dermed bidrage med andre måder at dokumentere og legitimere arbejde på (jf. Orbe, 2010).

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[16] Model U-turn afprøves i Horsens kommune og Helsingør kommune og sammenlignes med den Multisystemiske Terapimodel, der afprøves i Århus Kommune og Herning Kommune, samt Århus Kommune Model (ÅKM) der afprøves i Aalborg Kommune og Odense Kommune. Se fx http://www.socialstyrelsen.dk/born-og-unge/misbrug-og-psykisk-sygdom/mere-effektiv-behandling-til-unge-med-misbrug-1

Metodologi

Praksisregimeanalysen

Hvor governmentality traditionens genealogier leverede begreber og strategier til at analysere de overordnede tendenser i forhold til ledelse og subjektivering i det sociale arbejde, så vil jeg nu præsentere governmentality traditionens praksisregimeanalyse[17], som jeg anvender som det metodologiske afsæt for den empiriske udforskning. Kombinationen af disse to analytiske strategier betyder, at man kan fastholde en specificitet i analysen af en konkret praksis og samtidig overskride det partikulære ved at forbinde analysen med mere almene begreber og strategier.

Et praksisregime kan grundlæggende defineres som relativt sammenhængende måder, hvorpå vi til bestemte tider og i bestemte sammenhænge tænker, organiserer, praktiserer og reformerer aktiviteter som fx behandling, uddannelse, pædagogik, omsorg, administration, afstraffelse og socialt arbejde (Dean, 2006). Et praksisregime består af heterogene elementer - diskurser, kategorier, institutioner, eksperter, materialiteter, teknikker, teknologier, procedurer og arkitektoniske arrangementer - og den specifikke sammensætning af disse elementer disponerer for særlige måder at lede og subjektivere på.

Praksisregimeanalysen er et analysestrategisk greb, som kan benyttes til at fremanalysere de strategier for ledelse og subjektivering, der anvendes i et givet praksisregime (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1977; Hacking, 2007; Rose, 1990, 1998), og praksisregimeanalysen kan fokuseres ved at stille en række 'hvordan' spørgsmål. I Mitchell Deans (2006: 61f) version[18] vil en praksisregimeanalyse typisk fokusere på:

1. Iagttagelsesmåder: Hvilke former for iagttagelse – måder at se og erkende på – er på spil? Hvilke problematiseringer finder sted, hvordan og med baggrund i hvilke forståelser eller forklaringer?

2. Vidensformer: Hvilke begreber og procedurer for skabelse af sandhed er på spil? Hvordan konstitueres autoritet og ekspertise inden for det konkrete praksisregime?

3. Teknikker/praksisser: Hvilke måder interveneres og styres der på – igennem hvilke mekanismer, teknikker og teknologier?

4. Subjektivitet: Hvilke former for subjektivitet søges etableret? Hvordan defineres og skabes subjektivitet, subjekter og identiteter?

Praksisregimeanalysen er ikke en fast metode, men en bevægelig, kulturelt sensitiv analytik, der må kalibreres til det felt og anliggende, der undersøges, hvilket kan forklare at analysestrategien formuleres en smule forskelligt hos henholdsvis Dean (2006: 61f) og Rose (1999a: xi). I forhold til dette projekt er Nikolas Roses undersøgelser af hvordan psykologien benyttes til at lede og

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[17] Praksisregimeanalyse er Michell Deans begreb (Dean, 2010). Hos andre centrale forfattere hedder det 'study of apparatuses (Rose, 1990), 'regimes of the person' (Rose, 1998, p. 25), or 'regimes and practices' (Foucault, 1977; 1991, p. 75).

subjektivere særligt relevante, da vi deler en grundlæggende interesse for at undersøge den rolle, som psykologiens viden og praksisser spiller i konstitueringen af personer som særlige subjekter med bestemte kompetencer og kapaciteter (Rose, 1990, 1998).

Det kan endvidere være fordelagtigt at specificere analysen af ledelse og subjektivering yderligere gennem nogle iagttagelsesbærende begreber. I forlængelse af den sproglige vending har der i postpsykologien været stor opmærksomhed på, hvordan vi benytter sproget til skabe mening og konstruere verdener, eksempelvis i poststrukturalisme (Davies & Harré, 1990), socialkonstruktionisme (Gergen, 1999), narrativ psykologi (Bruner, 1999; Polkinghorne, 1988) og postpsykologisk terapi (H. Anderson & Goolishian, 2004; White & Epston, 1990).

Selvom sproglig skabelse er central og væsentlig, så advarer Rose mod at sproglige analyser afkobles fra magtforhold og materialitet, som det kan være tilfældet hos nogle socialkonstruktionister (Gergen, 1999; Haslebo, 2010). I de postpsykologiske praksisser, som jeg undersøger, er det i høj grad sproget, der benyttes til at lede og subjektivere med, og for at analysere dette som noget organisatorisk, der hænger sammen med magt, viden og materialitet, fokuserer jeg på hvordan der benyttes og udvikles standarder, metoder eller teknikker til at iagttage, tale, tænke om og lede på subjekter og subjektivitet (Rose, 1998).

Når jeg benytter standard som iagttagelsesbærende analytisk begreb er det bl.a. fordi det kan forbinde eller mediere mellem psykologiske, samfundsmæssige og organisatoriske processer, og dermed benyttes til at undersøge produktive og vitalistiske former for ledelse og subjektivering. Dels kan det give et blik for, hvordan det sociale arbejde løbende organiseres, udvikles og kvalificeres ved at inddrage brugerne, og hvordan praksis stabiliseres ved at der i disse processer dannes emergente, brugerdrevne og fleksible standarder, der er informeret af postpsykologiske tilgange. Dels kan det give blik for, hvordan liberale former for ledelse virker gennem standarder, som vi løbende udvikler, producerer, overtager, modificerer og leder og subjektiverer os selv med. Karaktergennemsnit, skønhedsidealer, intelligenskvotient, eller tommefingerregler for, hvor mange joints man skal ryge i weekenden, er alle eksempler på standarder, der kan benyttes til ledelse og selvledelse. Vores omgang med standarder kan grundlæggende betegnes som en kreativ og produktiv proces, der skaber nye måder at være, opleve, tænke og føle på, og som skaber nye kulturelt specifikke måder at være subjekt på, som virker medkonstituerende ind på det sociale fællesskab (jf. Raffnsøe et al., 2008, p. 292). Som Nikolas Rose skriver om den liberale ledelsesform:

> "Within this new rationality of government, a space has opened within which the precise **standards of conduct**, routines of life, values, and aspirations of any particular family or individual can vary. To use Jacques Donzelot's metaphor, their conduct is enabled to 'float in relation to social norms. Rather than being tied rigidly into publicly espoused forms of conduct imposed through legislation or coercive intervention into personal conduct, a range of **possible standards of conduct**, forms of life, types of 'lifestyle' are on offer, bounded by law only at the margins." (Rose, 1990, pp. 230, min fremhævning)

Standarder kan dermed benyttes analytisk til at give et blik for, hvordan organisering af praksis, ledelse og subjektivering er gensidige sammenhængende processer. Denne tilgang til standarder i praksis er dermed et forsøg på analysere og konceptualisere, hvordan man kan konkretisere,

kvalificere og objektivere de former for socialt arbejde hvor brugerinddragelse er en central ledelses- og subjektiveringsstrategi.

Afhandlingens analysespørgsmål er derfor følgende:

- Hvordan, i forhold til hvem og med hvilke standarder, metoder og teknikker ledes og subjektiveres der i Helsingung?
- Hvordan benytter socialarbejderne fra Helsingung standarder fra U-turn-modellen?
- Hvordan modificeres og forandres disse standarder i Helsingung?
- Hvordan udvikles og etableres der standarder for inddragelse af brugerperspektiver?
- Hvordan kvalificeres og udvikles praksis ved at inddrage brugernes perspektiver?
- Hvordan benyttes psykologiske begreber, teknikker og standarder til organisering af praksis og til ledelse og subjektivering?
- Hvordan overkommer Helsingung og U-turn paradokset med at være en specialiseret behandlingsinstitution, for unge der har problemer med rusmidler, og samtidig ikke at stigmatisere de unge?

For at forfølge min bestræbelse på at udfolde en produktiv, vitalistisk og normativt forpligtet analyse, er min anvendelse af governmentality studies justeret på primært tre områder: 1) ved at anvende en produktiv vitalistisk analysestrategi, 2) ved at studere et særligt felt og 3) ved at etablere en produktiv dialog med det empiriske felt.

1) Analysestrategien: Den produktive og vitalistisk analysestrategi kommer til udtryk gennem anvendelse af brugerdrevne standarder som iagttagelsesbærende begreb. Derudover har jeg en åben og afsøgende tilgang til at udforske hvilke former for ledelse og subjektivering, der benyttes. Dette resulterer i en række analyser af det, som jeg betegner som affektiv ledelse og subjektivering. Det produktive og vitalistiske fokus i analyserne betyder, at mere kompleksitetssøgende og kritiske læsninger af det empiriske materiale bevidst er nedprioriteret.

2) Feltet: Jeg har også beskrevet hvordan afhandlingen fokuserer på et empirisk felt, der er udvalgt med henblik på at kunne få blik for særlige strategier for ledelse og subjektivering. Som beskrevet analyserer Nikolas Rose hvordan psy-videnskaberne ikke bare er deskriptive, men leverer en række teknikker og teknologier, der anvendes til styre, subjektivere og forme vores selvforhold og selvforståelse (Rose, 1990, 1998). Denne grundforståelse betyder, at den kritiske refleksion i - og over - psykologien, som governmentality studies har bidraget med, nu selv er blevet en del af postpsykologien. Ved at gøre model U-turn og postpsykologiske metoder til genstand for udforskning og refleksion, åbner vi dermed for analyser af, hvordan govermentality studies nu selv er en del af det 'vidensregime', der producerer begreber, metoder og teknikker, der kan anvendes til at styre, lede og subjektivere. Samtidigt er intentionen at vi med dette refleksive loop kan skabe mere produktive og vitalistiske former for subjektivering, hvor subjekterne selv indgår aktivt og omformer de institutionelle praksisser.

3) Produktiv dialog: I min læsning af governmentality studies er formålet hverken en ren deskriptiv, negativ kritik eller et utopisk emancipatorisk projekt om at frisætte individet. Derimod mener jeg, at man kan anvende governmentality studies som en dobbelt strategi, der kombinerer analyser af, hvordan subjektivitet produceres institutionelt i relationer af magt og viden med analyser af hvordan subjekter (aktuelt og potentielt) udfolder sig normativt og skabende, og forandrer magtrelationer, institutioner og samfundsmæssige betingelser. Som Foucault skriver:

> "A society without power relations can only be an abstraction. …. Which, …, makes all the more politically necessary the **analysis of power relations** in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions which are necessary to **transform some or to abolish others**." (Foucault, 1982c, pp. 343, min fremhævning)

Foucault samtænker dog i ringe grad de disciplinære, pastorale og liberale strategier, der særligt udfoldes (Foucault, 1973, 1977, 1978), med det mere produktive og vitalistiske blik på selvledelse, som hans senere værker om selvdannelse i antikken åbner for (Foucault, 1984, 2004), hvilket jeg fremfører nogle mulige grunde til i artiklen *"Tuning governmentality".* For at forfølge dette spor og bidrage til psykologiens normative forpligtelse om produktivt at bidrage til at skabe nye handlemuligheder, suppleres de analytiske greb fra governmentality studies med nogle metodologiske tilgange fra deltagende aktionsforskning (participatory action reseach) (Noffke & Somekh, 2005) og i særdeleshed fra kritisk psykologisk praksisforskning (Mørck & Nissen, 2005; Nissen, 2009). Jeg vil nu præsentere den konkrete tilrettelæggelse af forskningen.

Praksisforskning

Forskningsprojektets kundskabsambition, og kombinationen af governmentality studies og en normativt produktiv bestræbelse, giver forskningsprojektet nogle indbyggede udfordringer. I projektet anvendes en række analysestrategier og greb fra governmentality studies, som også fungerer som en metateoretisk ramme, indenfor hvilke analyserne skal være teoretisk og metodologisk konsistente. De teoretisk funderede governmentality analyser kan dog i lighed med mange andre videnskabelige traditioner have den udfordring, at de ikke altid er umiddelbart anvendelige i og relevante for praksis. Argyris and Schön (1974) betegner dette som 'dilemmaet mellem konsistens og relevans'. I både praksisforskning (Mørck & Nissen, 2005), deltagende aktionsforskning (Noffke & Somekh, 2005) og institutionel etnografi (Smith, 2005) forsøger man at sikre relevans ved at udforske en problemstilling eller problematik, der har relevans for deltagerne i den udforskede praksis eller institution.

I forskningsprojektet "brugerdrevne standarder i socialt arbejde", som denne afhandling er en del af, har vi for at gøre forskningen relevant tilrettelagt projektet som emergent (Mattingly, 1998), dialogisk og refleksiv praksisforskning, hvor deltagere fra praksis inviteres til at være *medforskere* (Mørck & Nissen, 2005). Praksisforskning er karakteriseret ved en dobbelt udviklingsbestræbelse: dels sigtes der på at bidrage til lokal udvikling af den praksis, der er genstand for forskningen, og dels sigtes der på at bidrage til en udvikling af nogle teoretiske forståelser. Begge disse

udviklingsbestræbelser kan så igen bidrage mere alment til udvikling og kvalificering af et bredere felt, som fx socialt arbejde eller forskning (Nissen, 2009).

Metodologisk har vi tilrettelagt den konkrete udforskning således, at den bliver informeret af både forskernes kundskabsambitioner og forskningsspørgsmål og af socialarbejdernes spørgsmål, udfordringer og interesser, samt af de emergente opmærksomheder og tematikker, der opstår i løbet af processen. Et eksempel på dette er artiklen *"Beyond spaces"*, hvor vi udforsker spatiale aspekter af Helsingungs praksis. Denne interesse havde både jeg og Morten Nissen før den konkrete udforskning af Helsingung, bl.a. på baggrund af min tidligere udforskning af U-turn (Bank, 2010). Samtidig er spatialitet tematiseret i U-turn-modellen, og praktikerne i Helsingung eksperimenterede med at udforme et (samtale)rum på alternative måder. Endvidere er opmærksomheden på spatialitet klassisk og central for governmentality studies (Elden, 2002; Foucault, 1977, 1986) Med baggrund i disse interesser planlagde vi derfor i fælleskab hvordan dette kunne udforskes, bl.a. gennem interviews, feltarbejde, videoanalyser og løbende samtaler med socialarbejderne.

Gennem forskningsprocessen har vi løbende udviklet, specificeret og justeret forskningsprocessens mål og retning gennem løbende dialog mellem deltagerne og en række teoretiske opmærksomheder for at sikre at forskningen er relevant for både socialarbejderne og forskerne (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2005; Alvesson & Skjöldberg, 2009). Dette har også givet en intersubjektiv validering af forskningens relevans. Disse dialoger har bl.a. fundet sted på en række udviklingsdage og møder, hvor forskerne har præsenteret deres ideer og grundlæggende opmærksomheder. Disse er blevet diskuteret og har dannet grundlag for konkrete aftaler om udforskning af særlige aspekter ved praksis. Længere henne i forskningsprocessen har vi på disse udviklingsdage og møder præsenteret foreløbige analyser og færdigt materiale, som derefter er blevet gjort til genstand for dialog og refleksion. Disse dialoger og udvekslinger har ført til justering, forandring og udvikling af både praksis og forskning, ligesom diskussionerne i sig selv har indgået som empirisk materiale.

Nissen (2000c) betegner denne proces som et 'referencetransformerende joint venture', fordi der sker en gensidig udveksling af referencer, forstået som forskningens teoretiske begreber og forståelser og de teoretiske og erfaringsbaserede begreber, der findes i praksis. Gennem denne udveksling og transformation sker der en objektivering af praksis, og der fremstilles en række analyser, som åbner for (teoretisk informerede) måder at udvikle praksis på. Som det hedder hos Mørck & Nissen er *"disse objektiveringer og udvekslinger [en] del af en stadig subjektivering, hvor såvel forskningen som praksis fortsat bliver til på nye måder"* (Mørck & Nissen, 2005, p. 133).

Men hvorledes bliver forskningen relevant bredere set? Et svar i forhold til denne afhandling er selvfølgeligt, at forskningen bidrager til den teoretiske udvikling af governmentality studies og dermed har en relevans i forhold til en bredere forskningspraksis, og at afhandlingen bidrager med analytiske begreber til postpsykologien. Men, kunne man spørge, hvorledes bliver den empiriske udforskning og de teoretiske analyser relevante for andre behandlingsindsatser?

En måde at forstå dette på – og overskride den tilsyneladende adskillelse mellem teori og praksis - er gennem begrebet om *prototyper* som Nissen (2009) foreslår i forlængelse af U. Jensen (1992) og Wartofsky (1979). Ideen er, at vi i forhold til både industriel produktion, forskning og socialt arbejde kan forstå udvikling af *nye løsninger* som et samspil mellem en model og en prototype. En prototype

er en ny slags løsning på et problem. Både socialstyrelsen og forskningsprojektet 'brugerdrevne standarder i socialt arbejde' har udvalgt U-turn som prototypisk praksis, der kan fungere som model for, hvordan man kan arbejde med unge og rusmidler. Når man bygger en prototype gør man det ud fra en ide eller en model. Det kan være tekniske tegninger af en bil, en model af et hus i mindre format, eller som i U-turn en række erfaringer og ideer fra professionelle, input fra og viden om brugerne, samt en række postpsykologiske teorier og metoder, hvoraf nogle af disse skitseres i det omtalte policy dokument, der lagde op til en ny strategi for området (Ege et al., 1999).

Med baggrund i disse ikke fuldstændigt sammenhængende ideer etablerede man i 2006 U-turn, som løbende blev og bliver udviklet ud fra de konkrete erfaringer med de unge og med inspiration fra postpsykologiske ideer og metoder. Henover 2010-11 blev relevante aspekter af prototypiske praksisser i U-turn beskrevet og objektiveret i U-turn-modellen. Denne model er lavet ud fra den konkrete praksis, men er netop fremstillet som model, bl.a. ved hjælp at teoretiske referencer, således at den potentielt set kan få en bredere relevans. På samme vis er denne afhandlings udforskning af Helsingungs praksis både en beskrivelse og en fremstilling af Helsingung som en prototypisk praksis, men det er også en fremstilling af en mere teoretisk model for, hvordan man i Helsingung organiserer denne praksis. Dels ved at artikulere de brugerdrevne *standarder,* der udvikles i praksis, og dels gennem en fremstilling af de styringsstrategier, der benyttes til at lede og subjektivere. Ved at fremstille prototypiske beskrivelser af praksis og udvikle teoretiske forståelser for eller modeller af praksis, muliggør vi udvikling og kvalificering af praksis. Samtidig teoretiske modeller af den prototypiske praksis, som rummer almene træk og som derfor kan benyttes til at fremstille, reflektere, eller kvalificere andre praksisser (Alvesson & Skjöldberg, 2009; Valsiner, 1997). Denne metodologi kan forstås i forlængelse af, hvad praksisforskningen kalder 'referencetransformation'(Nissen, 2009) og i overensstemmelse med en poststrukturalistisk forskningsstrategi om at foretage teoretiske genbeskrivelser (Stormhøj, 2006).

En af bestræbelserne i denne afhandling er, at disse prototypiske beskrivelser og teoretiske modeller er relevante i forhold til det almene anliggende om, hvordan man kan styre, kvalificere og udvikle socialt arbejde gennem brugerinddragelse, men også potentielt set har en bredere relevans i forhold til organisering og ledelse i velfærdstatens institutioner (U. Jensen, 1992; Nissen, 2000a, 2009).

Tilrettelæggelse og metode

I udforskningen benyttes praksisregimeanalysen og praksisforskningen som den generelle ramme, og i forbindelse med den konkrete udforskning er jeg særligt opmærksom på de tilgange, der anvendes i praxiologisk etnografi (Mol, 2005), institutionel etnografi (Smith, 2005), videnssociologi (Latour, 1987), aktørnetværksteori (Latour, 2005) og etnografi (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011; Spradley & McCurdy, 1988).

Min kundskabsambition og mine analysespørgsmål betyder, at jeg i høj grad har undersøgt praksis som den formes og skabes i de konkrete interaktioner mellem aktører, og kun i mindre grad har trukket på skriftlige materialer. Da jeg er interesseret i at analysere praksis på et institutionelt niveau, der rækker ud over den enkelte situation og den enkelte medarbejders forståelse, har jeg trukket på Latour (2005), Smith (2005) og Mol (2005), der argumenterer for at udforske institutionelle knudepunkter, hvor der sker brud, skift, udvikling, oversættelse eller læring, hvor praksis bliver synlig (Latour, 2005) eller hvor der med Mols (2005) begreb sker en 'unbracketing' af praksis.

 Derfor har jeg særligt fokuseret på de steder, hvor medarbejderne reflekterer over, taler om og danner standarder for deres praksis, eksempelvis på møder, undervisningsdage og i den faglige supervision. Ved at deltage disse steder tilstræbte jeg at etablere et blik på, hvordan ledelse og subjektivering tænkes i (model) U-turn, hvordan medarbejderne fra Helsingung tilegner sig standarder fra model U-turn og hvordan de benytter og modificerer dem, og skaber nye standarder i deres arbejde. Denne strategi sigter samtidigt på at få et empirisk blik for, hvordan socialt arbejde kan udvikles og kvalificeres i praksis på en måde, der er anderledes end i evidensbaserede praksisser, som i høj grad specificeres gennem (meget omfangsrige) manualer eller guidelines (Timmermans & Berg, 2003).

For at undersøge, hvorledes U-turn-modellen overskrider et individuelt fokus, er der foretaget deltagerobservationer af arrangementer for forældre og venner, foretaget interviews med forældre, undersøgt Helsingungs arbejde med forældregrupper, og foretaget deltagerobservation af samarbejdet med andre aktører (kommunen, socialrådgivere, kriminalforsorgen, andre institutioner).

 Denne afhandling er som nævnt en del af forskningscenteret SUBSTANces forskningsprojekt om brugerdrevne standarder i socialt arbejde. Den empiriske del af projektet har været en kollektiv udforskning, hvor et forskningsteam bestående af Morten Nissen, Jasmin Jawa, Frederikke S. Knage, Lisa Tahara, Katrine Barington og undertegnede fra januar 2012 og frem til medio 2014 har produceret fælles empirisk materiale ved at undersøge forskellige aspekter af praksis i og omkring Helsingung og U-turn.

Denne fælles udforskning skaber en bredde, der muliggør, at jeg kan fokusere på de produktive og vitalistiske aspekter, og i mindre grad foretage problematiserende analyser, fordi jeg samtidigt er del af og forbundet med de bredere dialoger og kritiske, problematiserende analyser (Barington, 2015; Halberg, 2013; Høgsbro & Nissen, 2014; Larsen & Wiese, 2013; Nissen, 2012f, 2014a, 2014c; Nissen &

Barington, In press ; Tahara Christensen, 2014). Forskningsteamets materialer har været genstand for fælles diskussion, således at man har kunnet spore tematikker og opmærksomheder på tværs af forskernes interesser og det empiriske materiale.

Der er i alt i perioden 2011-2014 foretaget cirka 285 timers deltagerobservation med feltnoter, fordelt på 89 begivenheder, hvoraf de cirka 230 timer er optaget som lydfiler. Disse fordeler sig cirka på:

- Udforskning af interaktion mellem Helsingung, U-turn og U-turn-modellen: Deltagerobservation med lydoptagelse og feltnoter af 6 supervisioner (21 timer), 9 undervisningsdage/seminarer (72 timer) samt 3 andre arrangementer (7 timer).
- Udforskning af den interne udvikling af Helsingung, hvor forskere fra forskningsprojektet Brugerdrevne standarder i socialt arbejde i særlig grad er aktivt deltagende (oplæg, diskussioner mm.): Deltagerobservation med lydoptagelse og feltnoter af 8 udviklingsdage (44 timer), 9 møder (13 timer) og 20 interview med medarbejdere (27 timer).
- Udforskning af Helsingungs praksis: Deltagerobservation med feltnoter og delvise lydoptagelser af 15 observationer af praksis med de unge (55 timer), herunder 8 dages observation af dagteamet (40 timer). Derudover 6 interviews med de unge (4 timer), 9 observationer af møder og interaktioner med andre aktører (20 timer), 8 interne personalemøder (10 timer) og 4 planlægningsmøder (6 timer). Derudover er der løbende blevet indsamlet en mængde dokumenter, PowerPoint-slides, billeder, videoer og andet materiale.

Alt materiale er gennemlyttet ud fra feltnoter og kodet tematisk i programmet Nvivo, og udvalgt materiale er transskriberet.

Afhandlingens artikler

Nu følger afhandlingens tre artikler, der kort opsummeres herunder. Efter artiklerne er der en konklusion med en videnskabelig refleksion, selvkritik og perspektivering. Rigtig god fornøjelse.

I artiklen "*New Standards in Social Work: From Regimes of Visibility to Affective Subjectification*" fokuserer jeg primært på, hvordan institutionen Helsingung udvikler måder at arbejde brugerdrevet på ved at trække på særlige psykologiske begreber og teknikker, og hvordan de overskrider de gængse forståelser i systemiske, narrative og løsningsorienterede tilgange ved at skabe forandring gennem energi, intensitet og begejstring – hvilket jeg betegner som affektiv subjektivering.

Artiklen er submittet til: Theory & Psychology.

I artiklen *"Tuning Governmentality studies through Heidegger: Analytical Strategies for Affective Subjectification"* giver jeg en mere dybtgående analyse af hvordan vi nærmere kan forstå affektive former for ledelse, som jeg analyserede i den foregående artikel. Her går jeg bl.a. i dialog med forskningsfeltet omkring affektivitet og foreslår Heideggers begreb om stemning som et analytisk begreb til at forstå og analysere, hvordan der ledes og subjektiveres gennem intensiteter, energier, atmosfærer og stemninger, og hvordan dette ikke kun er i forhold til de unge, men også i forhold til pårørende og professionelle.

Artiklen er submittet til: Subjectivity

Artiklen "*Beyond Spaces of Counselling*" er skrevet i samarbejde med min hovedvejleder og samarbejdspartner Morten Nissen. I denne artikel udforskes de mere socio-materielle aspekter af Helsingungs praksis, og vi analyserer hvordan de rumlige, kulturelle og materielle standarder i rådgivning og terapi kan virke begrænsende for nogle klienter. Med baggrund i en problematisering af det terapeutiske rum analyserer vi hvorledes rum og samtaler kan produceres og performes, samt hvordan affektive aspekter kan benyttes produktivt, og hvordan traditionelle antagelser i og om psykoterapi overskrides.

Artiklen er submittet til: British Journal of Guidance and Counselling

New standards in social work:

From regimes of visibility to affective subjectification

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Abstract

This article intends to contribute to the general theme on standards and subjectivity, by analyzing how different traditions in psychology are used to produce different standards for subjectification and different ontologies in social work practices.

The empirical materiel is from a 'post-psychological' drug treatment center, where professionals have a critical, reflexive awareness about how standards derived from 20th century psychology, subjectify and organize social work practices. The article will develop a governmental strategy, using standards and ontology to articulate and extend this criticism.

On this background the article will analyze how professionals in these practices draw on post-modern and critical traditions in psychology in order to develop 'post-psychological' 'user-driven' '2nd order' and 'affective' standards. These standards organize practices in ways that are different from standards from mainstream psychology and produce subjectivity through other logics and registers. This enacts a 'post-psychological' ontology where transgression, development, movement and becoming are at the forefront. An interesting aspect of these standards is that they expand the field of intervention as the social workers in these practices themselves become material for change.

Keywords: *Standards, governmentality, post-psychology, affect, social work, drug-treatment, subjectivity*

Introduction

This article contributes to the general theme of how subjects establish standards and how standards form subjects by analyzing how different traditions in psychology, when applied in social work and drug-treatment, produce different standards for subjectification that enacts different ontologies (Mol, 2002).

Drug-treatment, deviance and social work are classical areas for studying a culturally mediated production of subjectivity (Donzelot, 1979; M Foucault, 1977; Valverde, 1998). At the same time, the different traditions and current developments in Danish drug treatment make this a particular interesting empirical field for studying the co-construction of subjects and standards. Before the mid-sixties, drug treatment in Denmark primarily targeted 'older' individuals and their problematic use of opioids. This was handled by clinical practitioners as somatic-medical problems. But in the mid-sixties and onwards there was a cultural shift as there appeared an increase in younger users, using new types of drugs to 'get experience' as part of the youth culture. This created an increase in young people being referred to the treatment system, and young people and their use of (illegal) substances became a precarious, controversial and disputed topic among professionals and in public discourses (Winsløw, 1984).

In order to understand, articulate and manage drug-problems and young drug-users, professionals in the emerging social sector were drawing on a plethora of sociological, psychological, pedagogical and medical theories, technologies and techniques. Danish drug-treatment can, from the sixties and to the present, thus be characterized as a very heterogeneous field, with a multiplicity of discourses, concepts, institutions, experts, technologies, techniques, procedures and standards (Houborg, 2006; Winsløw, 1984). Currently one tradition can be identified that is developing treatment practices on the basis of traditional psychological theories, using revised humanistic (Revstedt, 1994) or cognitive approaches (Marlatt & Donovan, 2005; Miller & Rollnick, 1991). Another tradition – from which the empirical materiel in this article is taken - is developing treatments on the basis of post-modern psychological theories and therapeutic traditions (Anderson, 2008; De Shazer, 1985; White, 2007). In order to analyze how practices in traditions produce standards and subjectivity, I will draw on Governmentality studies as my methodology.

One of the main traditions within Governmentality studies is the analysis of how subjects are produced and governed in institutional practices (Dean, 2010; M Foucault, 1977; Hacking, 2007; Rose, 1990, 1998). In this article I will analyze how institutions are organized and produce subjectivity through 'standards' from different traditions in psychology. A standard may be conceptualized as an abstract reproduction of certain aspects of practice and being, used as a tool as well as an ideal (Bowker & Star, 1999; Busch, 2011). A basic function of a standard, is that it provides order by regulating certain aspects of the world (Busch, 2011) which enables things and people to work together (Bowker & Star, 1999; Busch, 2011; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). Standards can span from immanent, implicit, flexible standards developed in a local practice to imposed standards that are highly stabilized through external references. Using standards both as an analytical strategy and object of study makes it possible to analyze how institutions produce and use different kinds of standards to guide their practice and produce subjectivity.

In relation to psychology, Governmentality studies have primarily been occupied with how (discursive, technical, statistical, normative) standards from 19th-20th century psychology have been dispersed throughout disciplinary institutions, such as the factory, the school, the military and the hospital and contribute to processes of subjectification (M Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1990). Drawing on the work of (Rose, 1990, 1998) and using examples from discussions in contemporary drug-treatment, I will argue that the standards from 19th-20th century psychology subjectify by 'Ordering' subjectivity and making the psychological an object of knowledge. This is, for instance, done by standards that make subjectivity visible through prescribing, controlling, demanding, measuring and norming. These standards can be said to enact a particular ontology of a psychological, individual, liberal, rational, humanistic subject (Davies, 2000; Rose, 1998).

In my interpretation of the literature these psychological standards and the implicit or explicit psychological-ontology have been extensively criticized theoretically (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Rose, 1998) and for contributing to marginalizing and stigmatizing subjects (Davies, 1990; Davies & Hunt, 1994). Such criticisms have, in combination with the broader linguistic turn, served as fuel for an accelerated development and dissemination of alternative (psychological) theories, techniques and standards for understanding and producing subjects and subjectivity in different practices. According to (Staunæs & Juelskjær, 2014, this issue)we can use 'post-psychological' as a common term for these new heterogeneous

theories, techniques and practices. Post-psy does not entail a definitive break with psychology, but has a critical reflexivity about how (standards from) psychology are normative, intertwined with power and produce subjectivity. This means that post-psychology transforms, incorporates and changes certain elements of psychology and evokes a new kind of psychology where subjects are seen as relational, distributed, multiple and contextual and that uses standards that initiate development, movement becoming (Juelskjær, Staunæs, & Ratner, 2013; Staunæs & Juelskjær, 2014).

The broader argument and analytical scope is that these post-psychological standards for producing subjectivity are currently being invented and dispersed, across sectors and disciplines. This has for instance been analyzed in relation to education (Juelskjær & Staunæs, 2014; Juelskjær et al., 2013) and management (Raffnsøe, 2013). This article will use empirical material from studies in social work and drug-treatment facilities and engage in a detailed analysis of how post-psychology is used to create standards for organizing practices and producing subjectivity. The use of post-psychology makes it possible for professionals in the field to move beyond the criticisms of practices that use psy-standards of 'ordering', and develop alternative post-psychological standards for subjectification.

As I will present in the analysis, post-psy standards expand the field of intervention to include systems around the 'identified client' which allow for subjects to develop their own standards (for life, drug-use etc.). This aspect will be described as '2nd order', 'user-driven' or 'flexible' standards. These standards are at the same time stabilizing practices by giving them a certain 'strategic disposition' towards particular ways of forming subjects (Bussolini, 2010; Dean, 2010). An interesting aspect of the post-psy standards is that they subjectify 'affectively' as they modulate subjectivity through intensities and energies. Professionals, in effect, subjectify themselves through these standards and thereby become material for change. Research question. In this article I will analyze how post-psychological standards are developed in response to the criticism of standards and ontologies from the 20th century psy-sciences. I will analyze how these standards subjectify and enact ontology and how this is connected to the more general ontological disposition in the practices.

Disposition. In order to analyze the different standards and ontologies in Danish drug-treatment I will start by introducing Governmentality studies as my analytical framework, and develop this with a focus on standards and ontologies. In the first analytical section I will use

the theoretical framework to articulate and theoretically expand on prevalent criticisms of psychological standards in drug-treatment. In the main analytical section I will analyze how post-psychological standards are produced and used to subjectify and organize practices. Finally, I will present a few possible critiques of post-psychological standards.

Methodology

Governmentality studies can very broadly be defined as studies of how subjects in liberal societies are governed through "conduct of conduct" "*in terms of their freedom" (Rose, 1998, p. 16)* in relations of power and knowledge(Dean, 2010; M Foucault, 2009, 2010; Rose, 1990). A central tradition within Governmentality studies is, according to (Dean, 2010), the study of how subjects and subjectivity are created in institutional practices by forming and modulating knowledge, action, reflection and relations to self. These studies are labeled: practice regime analysis (Dean, 2010), the study of apparatuses (Rose, 1990), 'regimes of the person' (Rose, 1998, p. 25), or 'regimes and practices' (M Foucault, 1977; 1991, p. 75). The strategy for analyzing the production of subjectivity in such regimes, is to analyze how the heterogeneous assemblages of discourses, materialities, techniques and technologies, articulates and makes subjectivity visible as an object of knowledge (Dean, 2010; M Foucault, 1977; Hacking, 2007; Rose, 1990, 1998). For example(Dean, 2010) proposes to analyze practice regimes by looking at their:

> "1 Characteristic forms of visibility, ways of seeing and perceiving 2 Distinctive ways of thinking and questioning, relying on definite vocabulary, and procedures for the production of truth 3 Specific ways of acting, intervening and directing, made up of particular types of practical rationality ('expertise' and 'know-how') and relying upon definite mechanisms, techniques and technologies 4 characteristic ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents." (Dean, 2010, p. 33)

Scholars have recently criticized Governmentality studies and post-structuralist theory for being a purely epistemological affair and arguing for an ontological or affective turn (Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick & Frank, 2003). As a counter argument (Hemmings, 2005) emphasizes that such a critique is only possible through a mock reading of Foucault and a separation of epistemology from ontology. Following (Hemmings, 2005) I would argue that a

more loyal and productive interpretation is that Governmentality studies are concerned with the production of ontology or what M Foucault (1983) terms an historical ontology. In this reading, Governmentality studies and ANT, have a similar view on the interdependence between epistemology, ontology, and practice for instance in the words of Annemarie Mol:

> "… *ontology* is not given in the order of things […], *ontologies* are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, socio-material practices; medical practices among them. Investigating and questioning ontologies are therefore not old-fashioned philosophical pastimes, to be relegated to those who write nineteenth-century history. Ontologies [...] are highly topical matters. They inform and are informed by our bodies, the organization of our health care systems, the rhythms and pains of our diseases, and the shape of our technologies. All of these, all at once, all intertwined, all in tension."(Mol, 2002, pp. 6-7).

Governmentality and ANT share, according to the literature, the view that ontology is constantly produced or 'enacted' (Mol, 2002) and focuses, contrary to social constructivists, not exclusively on discourse, language, theory or ideas, but on how this is a practical and technical matter, that must be investigated within specific practices (Rose, 1998).

The strategy in this article is to develop this analytical framework and use 'standards' as both an analytical tool and an object of study. This will allow me to analyze how different traditions in psychology become resources for developing standards that are used to produce subjectivity, organize social work and enact ontologies. I will now define the concept of standard and then show how standard and ontology can be used to expand a governmental analysis.

A standard may be conceptualized as an abstract reproduction of certain aspects of practice and being, used as a tool as well as an ideal (Bowker & Star, 1999; Busch, 2011). One basic function of a standard, is that it enables things and people to work together (Bowker & Star, 1999) by providing order (Busch, 2011). One tradition for studying standards focuses primarily on material, technical or classificatory standards, such as container sizes, gun parts (Busch, 2011) diagnostic classification systems (Bowker & Star, 1999), or research protocols (Timmermans & Berg, 2003). In this tradition standards provide

order by being explicit "*agreed upon rules for the production of (textual or materiel) objects*"(Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 13) and these standards are often enforced, for instance by legal bodies, or organizations (Bowker & Star, 1999).

Another approach is to study standards as being immanent to practices (Jensen, 1987, 1992; Nissen, this volume). In this tradition, standards can be understood as immanent, emergent properties that are developed in practices and used to guide and regulate professional practice in a flexible way, for instance in health care (Jensen, 1987). Understanding standards as immanent and flexible might sound like a contradiction in terms, but think of a counseling practice operating with an immanent standard about "listening to the client". This standard is not explicitly defined, but continually developed depending on the situation and the specific encounter between counselor and client. If the counselor encounters a mute person, or decides to take a walk with a client, this could probably still be recognized as good professional practice meeting the standard about listening, even if no words where articulated.

Immanent standards are to a certain extend publicly accessible as you can watch the patterns in how professionals act, learn and even articulate these as standards. Further, as opposed to classificatory standards, the immanent standards are developed in relation to the normative goals or ethics in a given practice which implies standpoints.(Thorgaard, 2010) Drawing on Foucault's (1990) considerations on ethical self-government, we could think of these as ethical standards for professional conduct. This means that when professionals face difficulties they can articulate and reflect on the immanent standards in their practices - what they are aimed at, how they are used, for what ends - and conduct them-selves in relation to, or develop these standards in order to attain certain goals implying a certain ethos. In this process they subject themselves to these standards and become a certain kind of (professional) subjects.

Conceptualizing standards as immanent could mean that standards are not just 'given' and then 'tinkered with' to fit a situation (Timmermans & Berg, 2003), but that both standards and subjects are produced during ongoing reciprocal processes. In this way novelty can occur as subjects and standards are constantly produced and co-constitute each other. In other words, ontologies are enacted. I will now connect my use of standards to a governmental analysis of practice regimes and psychology.

Governmentality studies have analyzed how technologies and techniques from the psy-sciences (psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy etc.) are used to govern subjects. The works of (Rose, 1990, 1998) have in particular analyzed how technologies and techniques from 19-20th century psychology have dispersed and been used to make subjectivity an object of knowledge in multiple practices. Expanding on (Rose, 1998) and (Dean, 2010) we could say that when practice regimes draw on 19-20th century psychology they develop a range of *psychological standards* for seeing, thinking, and questioning that guide their practices and produce subjectivity.

I will term these as 'psy-standards' because they 'standardize' and 'order' subjects by making subjectivity visible as an object of *psychological* knowledge. This is done by measuring, observing, prescribing, controlling, restricting, demanding or evaluating 'the psychological' through a range of technical, discursive and normative standards that further facilitates (self)-reflection, inspection and subjectification. Many post-structuralist scholars have problematized how (standards from) the psy-sciences 'order' subjectivity and have analyzed this using concepts such as positioning, subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1990), institutional categories(Varenne & McDermott, 1998) social categories (Davies & Hunt, 1994), ethnicity (Staunæs, 2004), gender (Søndergaard, 1996), or psychiatric categories (Hacking, 1995).

One advantage using standards as an analytical tool, is that it specifies a governmental analysis by bringing attention to the fact that practices do not only have "Characteristic […] ways of seeing and perceiving"" and "ways of forming subjects"(Dean, 2010, p. 33), but uses standards, that draw on different psychologies and enacts different ontologies. These standards can span from imposed, procedural or regulative standards to immanent, implicit, flexible standards that are produced and developed in local practices. In my interpretation standards are both part of and enact ontology. In the case of psy-standards we could follow Rose and say that they produce a humanistic self-enclosed "unified, fixed, interiorized, and individualized" subject (Rose, 1998, p. 9). Standards are in this way both 'technical' (Rose, 1998), normative (Nissen, this volume), and ontological.

I will be extending this analysis to describe the more general patterns that are produced by the psy-standards, and that make these standards imaginable, probable and usable in specific practice regimes. This more general level of analysis can be described as institutional rationalities (Rose, 1998) or institutional logics (Mol, 2008) or as a dispositive

(Bussolini, 2010; Deleuze, 1992; M Foucault, 1980). A dispositive consists of "discourses , institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions, morality, philanthropy – In short the said as much as the unsaid" (M Foucault, 1980, p. 194). The general idea is the heterogeneous elements in the dispositive structures vision, talk, thinking and practices in a specific way. Thinking through the dispositive, makes it possible to analyze how spaces, relations social domains and the self-relations of individuals have a certain 'strategic disposition' (Villadsen, 2008). I will use the dispositive to analyze the interdependent and mutual constituting processes where standards, subjectify, and enact ontology and installs a strategic disposition in practices. This strategic disposition can on the level of the dispositive be analyzed as an particular (psy- or post-psy) ontology. In this way standards can be analyzed as both technical, strategic and ontological (Bussolini, 2010) and that new practices or techniques for producing subjectivity can be regarded as standards if they are in 'ontological alignment' with the strategic disposition in the specific practice, as this makes it possible for persons, things, and standards to work together according to the same 'strategic logic' - enacting the same ontology. In this way we can think of standards as being standardized and stabilized by the dispositional ontology, without assuming an homogeneity (jf. Timmermans & Berg, 2003). These aspects will become much clearer in the analysis.

I have, so far, made an analytical reconstruction of Governmentality studies, and it is my interpretation that many post-structuralist scholars implicitly have analyzed and criticized how psy-standards subjectify and how these standards produce subjects according to a psy-ontology and install a certain (psycho-ontological) strategic disposition in these practices.

This article contributes to this tradition by investigating how critical or postmodern traditions, such as Governmentality studies itself, are used as resources for developing 'post-psychological' standards for subjectification that enacts a 'post-psychological' ontology, and install a post-psychological strategic disposition in practices. I borrow the term post-psychological from (Staunæs & Juelskjær, 2014) and use the term to designate the range of heterogeneous discourses, theories, technologies, techniques, that in many instances are invented as criticisms or develop out of traditional psychology and share one or more of the characteristics below. 1: a critical reflexivity of how (standards from) psychology produce subjectivity 2: use standards that perceive, handle and produce subjectivity as relational, distributed, multiple and permeable 3: enacts an ontology where subjects are "*constituted*

through social, cultural, semiotic, materiel, neural, affective relations." (Staunæs & Juelskjær, this issue, p. xx) and where transgression, development, movement becoming and process is emphasized.

Using the term post-psychological is not to assert a definitive break with psychology or an epochal shift between clear cut, homogeneous, distinct standards and ontologies. Post-psy does not relinquish psychology, but is doing (performing, carrying out) psychology in a new way, what (Brown & Stenner, 2009) would call a 2nd order psychology. It produces subjectivity through 'post-psy standards' and enacts post-psychological ontologies, configured according to another 'strategic logic'. Post-psychology is not a coherent set of theories or practices, and post-psychology can be said to have been a part of psychology all along, (Staunæs & Juelskjær, 2014) for instance in (Bateson, 1977; James, 2011; Vygotsky, 1978) but the post-psychological aspects are being accentuated and further developed in 'psychologies' (e.g. Gergen, 1999) and therapeutic traditions that have taken a linguistic turn.

I will now use Danish Drug treatment as an example for analyzing, how practices draw on post-psychology - in particular systemic (Anderson & Goolishian, 2004), narrative (White, 2007) and solutions focused (De Shazer, 1985) forms of therapy – and use this to create standards for organizing practices, producing subjectivity and enacting post-psy ontology. I will start by orienting the reader in the field by presenting some of the post-psychological criticisms against how psy-standards articulate, understand, handle and subjectify drug-using subjects in Denmark.

Standards and ontologies in drug-treatment

As previously mentioned, Danish drug-treatment is a heterogeneous field, with a multiplicity of discourses, concepts, institutions, experts, technologies, techniques and procedures for understanding, managing and articulating drugs, drug-problems and young drug-users (Houborg, 2006; Winsløw, 1984). Using standards and ontologies we can analytically distinguish between two traditions in drug-treatment in Copenhagen.

The 'psy-tradition' develops practices by drawing on standards from traditional psychological theories, for instance humanistic and cognitive approaches (Marlatt & Donovan, 2005; Miller & Rollnick, 1991). A Danish example of this is (Villadsen, 2003) who

analyses how (Revstedt, 1994) uses a broadly humanistic vocabulary, and argues that working on and bringing to the surface the clients 'latent' motivation is pivotal for treatment to be effective. This is an example of how psy-standards are used to articulate and produce the psyche of the user as the object of intervention according to - and enacting - a psy-ontology.

The post-psychological (or progressive, psycho-social, holistic, systemic) 'tradition' draws broadly on interactionistic (Bateson, 1977; Becker, 1953; Goffman, 2009), post-structuralist (M Foucault, 1977), social-constructivist (Gergen, 1990), and postmodern therapeutic traditions (Anderson & Goolishian, 1992; De Shazer, 1985; White, 2007). These theories have a reflexive awareness about how theories and practices produce knowledge and subjectivity, and are used to criticize the standards in the above mentioned tradition and to develop alternative standards for working with youth and drugs. This work however is precarious and difficult. Prevalent and recurring problems, when working with youth and drug-use across practices and traditions, is no-shows - lack of attendance - and difficulties in engaging youth in dialogue or therapeutic sessions (Holmgren, 2006; Riber, 2005) modeled on the standard psy-technology: the talking cure (Freud & Breuer, 1895) that often form the backbone of the treatment.

In order to understand the primary analysis of post-psy standards in social work practices, I will now sketch a background to the development of post-psy drug-treatment for youth in Copenhagen. Initially I will explain the problems with practices that use psy-standards, from the perspective of the post-psy tradition. This account is partial and draws primarily and selectively on material that can be used to illustrate and analyze some of the problems in using psy-standards in social work and drug treatment. This will then be the background for analyzing how post-psychological standards are developed and how they produce subjectivity.

In the late nineties policymakers, social workers, and scholars, as a part of the post-psy tradition in Copenhagen, recognized (again) significant barriers in the existent treatment system in relation to young drug-users (Ege, Rothenberg, & Madsen, 1999; Orbe, 2010). A qualitative user-survey (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998) points out that existing treatment regimes stigmatized the users (as drug-users or addicts) and neglected their perspectives by focusing almost exclusively on problems related to drug-use. The same rapport problematized that the youth did not receive reliable and believable discourses on drugs nor were offered relevant activities that could increase their future possibilities for action. Along the same lines

Nissen (2000) problematizes that youths were met with binary restrictive demands for demonstration of motivation by abstinence from drugs and subjection to the treatment regimes.. These and several other related problems were used to explain why young drug-users did not attend or were excluded from, treatment institutions (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998; Nissen, 2012c; Orbe, 2010; Vinum, 2002).

I will now analyze how these problems can be understood as a consequence of how standards imported from the psy-sciences, installs a certain 'strategic disposition' in these practices. This will allow me to articulate a broader critique of how psy-standards and standards from evidence based paradigms configure contemporary drug-treatment.

Motivation as a psy-standard

I will use the concept of 'motivation' as a prototypical example of how the above mentioned problems can be understood as a consequence of how psy-standards organize drug treatment practices and produce ontology.

As mentioned, one standard in 'traditional' drug treatment and social work is to make motivation the object of intervention and change (Revstedt, 1994). The use of motivation as a standard in drug treatment is also described in the earlier mentioned rapports on user perspectives on drug treatment in Copenhagen. Here it is described that motivation is often used in an incoherent, ad-hoc way as a 'floating signifier' that can explain both success and failure in drug treatment across practices (Christoffersen & Kousholt, 1998; Vinum, 2002). If the treatment works, it is because the user is motivated, if treatment is unsuccessful it is conversely explained that there was a lack of motivation. In some versions (e.g. Revstedt, 1994), this standard psychological motivational explanation entails a distinction between manifest and latent motivation. This means that an important part of treatment is motivational work, where experts 'work on' the clients psyche to make the presumed latent motivation for treatment, manifest , for instance through techniques such as motivational interviewing (Miller & Rollnick, 1991) or other forms of dialogue (Villadsen, 2003).

When motivation is used as a psy-standard that predisposes the (psy) experts to disregard the clients wishes and perspectives, because wishes for e.g. continuing drug-use are interpreted as a symptom illustrating that the client is not in contact with his true inner self (Revstedt, 1994; Villadsen, 2003). In this way the user is caught in a catch-22 because

abstinence from drug-use becomes the only action that proves that the user *really* is motivated for treatment.

Motivation is a prototypical example of how psy-standards are used to enact a psy-ontology and individualize and psychologize complex social problems by locating both the problems and the site for change in the subject. Paradoxically, this delegitimizes the users' own perspectives and definition of problems, marginalizes their preferred way of living, excludes contextual factors and stigmatizes the users. Furthermore when psy-standards individualize and psychologize they carry negative 'systemic consequences' as they draw users, relatives, and professionals into vicious circles of control, blame, guilt and marginalization, and contribute to the production of problematic subjectivities.

Standards from the evidence based methodology

Another major trend that is problematized by social workers in the post-psychological tradition (Orbe, 2010) and scholars (Tucker & Roth, 2006) is the move towards evidence based methods and practices in drug treatment (Orbe, 2010; Tucker & Roth, 2006), social work (Houston, 2005), and medical practices (Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Trickett & Beehler, 2013). The evidence based methodology does not have any explicit theory on subjectivity or causation, and this supposedly makes it possible to produce and organize value free scientific knowledge across disciplines, and use this knowledge to develop practices (Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Trickett & Beehler, 2013).

But when analyzed through a governmental framework the standards embedded in evidence based methodology do not produce a neutral, technical knowledge (Rose, 1998). An example of this is mandatory diagnostic assessment interviews, standardized by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug addiction[1] that focuses on drugs, social and medical problems and for instance includes questions about needle injection practices and sexual abuse. Analyzing the instruments as standards that subjectify, it is reasonable to claim that they stigmatize as they *"render individuals into knowledge as objects of a hierarchical and normative gaze, making it possible to qualify, to classify, and to punish"* (Rose, 1998, p. 90). Moreover these standards are implicitly configured on - and enact a - psy-ontology of a world of self-contained, context independent and relatively passive, discrete entities or what

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[1] http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/

(Hacking, 2007) would call indifferent kinds. According to such an ontology, treatment consists of using a well-defined active agent (medical, surgical, therapeutic) in order to decrease entities in the subject (Juul Jensen, 1986). This is problematized by (Tucker & Roth 2006) which suggest that there are important constraints in using evidence based methods on contextual social and cultural phenomena where both the 'condition' and the 'treatment' are highly complex, multi-causal and context dependent phenomena (Houston, 2005) and by (Minkler & Wallerstein, 2003 in Tricket & Behler 2013; Schulz et al., 2011) that highlight *"the lived experience of community members is a critical source of knowledge in the development and implementation of interventions.*" (Trickett & Beehler, 2013, p. 26). Further (Worrall, 2010) argues that evidence based methods push interventions in a less complex and more short term direction and individualized interventions that depend more on medicalization.

The standards in the evidence based information structures, are on an ontological level compatible with the psy-standards and psy-ontology and can, to some extent, be said to stabilize and legitimize the use of psy-standards, by lending scientific credibility and power to psy-experts, through a range of technologies and techniques and by equipping them with a pre-defined institutional understanding of problems, and criteria for success. The standards of evidence based regimes restricts furthermore the flexibility and development of local practices and thus immunizes practices for critique, as contextual factors, individual differences and local knowledge, from practitioners, clients and communities (Lambert, 2006) are seen as a bias that must be excluded (Trickett & Beehler, 2013, p. 26).

In alignment with these criticisms, the social workers criticize the evidence based methodology and the monitoring of problems and drug-use as being unhelpful and counterproductive because it marginalizes, stigmatizes or expels the youth from the institutions. Furthermore they see the pre-defined goals in the evidence based methodology as an obstacle for favoring the youths own perspectives in their development of more positive productive practices and valued ways of living (Orbe, 2010).

I have now outlined two dominant trends in contemporary drug-treatment through a governmental analysis using standards and ontologies[2]. Psy-standards and standards in the

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[2] Governmentality studies would typically describe these forms of subjectification as disciplinary; using institutional definitions of problems, imposing norms, surveillance and

evidence based methodology, although different in terms of discourse, methods, technologies and techniques, can be said to both modulate and stabilize each other. First their standards become - boundary objects - that make it possible for people to work together across practices. Secondly and most importantly, they both enact a psy-ontology and predispose practices to standards that produce the psyche of the user as the object of intervention and site for change, stigmatize and pathologize users that are positioned and subjectified as drug-users or addicts. This marginalizes their perspectives, restricts their agency and produces negative subjectification. Following the above analysis, it becomes clearer why it is difficult, troublesome and problematic to engage youth in drug treatment practices that use psy-standards according to a psy-ontology.

Post-psychological standards in drug-treatment, The U-turn model.

The problems just analyzed were the background for a new strategy on youth and drug-use in Copenhagen (Ege et al., 1999) that maintain what I have termed the post-psychological tradition in drug-treatment. To avoid stigmatization the work with youth that had drug problems should be integrated in existing institutions and drug-use should be understood as part of youth life and broader social problems. Basic principles for the interventions should, according to the strategy, be self-help, volunteers, user-involvement, and participation in decision making (Ege et al., 1999). The strategy of favoring a 'youth's perspective' on drugs has in some aspects been difficult as it is at odds with the above mentioned trends towards evidence based methods. On the other hand it obtains socio-political legitimacy by being in alignment with the trend towards user-involvement across sectors and institutions in the Scandinavian welfare states[3] (Asmussen, 2003).

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exclusion - and pastoral; using confession, telling about inner feelings to experts to establish certain relations to self (M Foucault, 1977, 1982a, 1986)

[3] This trend towards user-involvement opens for a shift in the standards for understanding the prototypical user. The subject is not only someone in need of help, but also and more importantly a citizen with resources, that are (qualified) to enter dialogue(Karlsen & Villadsen, 2008). This can be understood both as a potential for empowerment of the users,

For different reasons the aim of avoiding specialized treatment institutions was not feasible, and in 2004 the municipality of Copenhagen opened the institution 'U-turn' for youths age 15-25, that have a "concerning or problematic use substances"(U-Turn, 2011, p. 2). U-turn, and later the U-turn model (2011) and Helsingung (2011-) are in this way based on a paradox of being a specialized drug-treatment institution and at the same time striving to develop practices that are non-stigmatizing, attractive, and helpful in relation to the youths own perceived problems and concerns.

In these interesting developments and paradoxical tensions, a community of scholars have contributed to the ongoing development of the field (see Nissen, 2003a, 2012a; Nissen, 2012c). This article is based on the project 'user-driven standards in social work' where our research team has conducted ethnographical fieldwork in the institutions U-turn and Helsingung in 2011-14. The empirical focus in this article is on the 'Dayteam' in the institution Helsingung. The Dayteam works with, *"youth between the ages of 14-17 who have a problematic use of substances and who are not involved in any other meaningful daytime activity -"(U-Turn, 2011, p. 22)*. The 'Dayteam' in Helsingung is developed on the basis of descriptions of the 'Daygroup' in the U-turn model and from ongoing dialogues among social workers. The excerpts from this article mirror this development and draw on both general written descriptions of the 'Daygroup' in model U-turn, and specific discussions about how to organize the Dayteam among social workers in Helsingung.

In the description of the U-turn Model it is stated that the 'daygroup' should be organized so it becomes "so attractive that the youths want to participate" " (U-Turn, 2011, p. 5) that " The daygroup's different activities give the opportunity for new experiences and new pastime interests which contribute to making the treatment period attractive and challenging for the youths" (U-Turn, 2011, p. 25). It is emphasized that the intervention should *"be in accordance with the youths and their self understanding" (U-Turn, 2011, p. 6)*. "In the U-turn model it is important that the youths, first and foremost, are viewed as youths and not like substance abusers, criminals, or mentally ill. " (U-Turn, 2011, p. 4). To accomplish this and resolve the previously mentioned problems, the 'Daygroup' includes main elements such as the opportunity to finish (secondary) school, good food, fitness or workout, new experiences,

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and as neo-liberal strategy, (Cruikshank, 1999) based on individualistic assumptions about the rationalistic free-choosing citizen in an open marked. (Dean 2006)

fun and cultural activities. There are also adults that the youths can trust and talk to and the opportunity to participate in 'group conversations' to help the youths with their problems. Further drug-use is allowed outside the institution while they are participating in the 'Daygroup' treatment program (U-Turn, 2011). To establish such a non-stigmatizing regime, the institution draws on post-psy and develops their practices with " inspiration from narrative, systemic and solution focused approaches"(U-Turn, 2011, p. 2) and work:

> "With a background in a systemic understanding, where the problems of the youth are not perceived as an "inner core" within the youth, but dependent on the relations and contexts the youth is involved in. Here in the U-turn model we work with a holistic approach. Substances are seen primarily as a symptom of the additional problems the youth is facing in their life. Simultaneously, substances will often worsen the already existing problems. Causes can be effects and the other way around. In a holistic perspective, problems with drugs are understood as complex problems, which require complex solutions. Solutions which are based on the entire life of the youths and what the youth experiences as being problematic and is motivated to change." (U-Turn, 2011, pp. 14-15)

In the above we see a post-psychological ontology being evoked, with the explicit denunciation of a psy-subject with an "inner core" and there is an explicit strategic reflexivity about how subjectivity is produced, through institutional standards for seeing. The post-psy ontology is enacted by - and predisposed towards – relational, systemic, normalizing institutional standards for seeing, articulating and understanding and subjecting the youth as youth. These post-psychological standards are composed - and stabilized - by heterogeneous materials. For example the mundane institutional language, where 'youth' and 'intoxicants'[4] are normalizing linguistic standards that accentuate the pleasurable effects of drugs and enrolls the youth in semantic networks about youth life. The strategy of using youth/adolescence as a leaver for a post-psychological approach can also be recognized as a recurring standard in social work (Nissen, 2003c).

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[4] Drugs, substances, intoxicants ; the Danish word is 'rus-midler' literally: "means for getting high"

If we analyze the 'strategic logic' in institutions through the post-psy-ontology as a dispositive, it 'installs' standards and tendencies that make it difficult to use psy-standards, such as motivation or drugs to explain difficulties in working with the youth. This predisposes or 'forces' the social workers to – favor and acknowledge the youths own perspectives and to develop holistic, complex and contextual 'user-driven' understanding of youth and their drug use. Contrary to traditional psy-regimes, where the psyche becomes the object of intervention, and the user has to articulate, confess or recognize that "I am an addict" - and thus stigmatize and pathologize - are striking.

But when difficulties cannot be located in the psyche of the user through psy-standards, they re-appear in new forms. As mentioned it is a basic premise of the institutions that the youth voluntarily 'want to participate'. But the youth in 'Dayteam' are under 18 and it is often the case that parents and caseworkers, backed by the legal system, twists their arm to get them to participate in some kind of educational or treatment regime. This means that their 'voluntary' participation is based on that they perceive the institution as a lesser evil or (in some instances) the only available option. The youth are often not inclined to participate in the activities or engage in change as they do not see their use of drugs as problematic. I will now analyze how this 'motivational' problem is handled through post-psy standards. One way, the U-turn model, tries to accommodate to these problems is a user-driven approach. The 'subjective criteria' for inclusion in the 'Dayteam' are that the youths want to create a change in their life. What this change consists of is not pre-defined, but is part of the user-driven approach. The U-turn model "focuses on the youth's life as a whole and on what the youth experiences as problematic and are motivated to change.*" (U-Turn, 2011, p. 15 my emphasis)*. Let us have a look at how this is handled in practice. The excerpt is from a seminar with social workers from Helsingung and U-turn.

Tony: (Social worker, Helsingung) the last I had under 18, there for example, uh… he wanted to have help to his… to get along better with his family, with his mother especially. Umm… there was an abuse or use or whatever we should choose to call it, that wasn't the big problem. Umm he thought. That's what the parents thought. So that problem…

Woman: [laughs]

Woman 2: Hmm

Tony: … he wanted to be more in control… it was to get keep the mother in check.

Woman 3: [unclear]

Several people: [laugh]

Tony: yea yea yea yea.

Woman 3: can we get more control over mom, right?

Tony: which has worked out really well, right?

Several people: [laugh]

Distribution of User-driven standards on drugs and youth life

That the social workers laugh indicates how their common approach can be experienced as provoking and paradoxical, because they, as social workers in municipal drug-treatment institutions, make it easier for a youth to smoke hash by reducing the conflicts that this causes in relation to the parent.

The social workers do this by producing, articulating and distributing post-psychological standards for understanding and relating to drug-using youth, for instance standards about favoring the youth's perspectives, avoiding pressure, scolding and disciplinary and restrictive measures in relation to their drug use. The social workers distribute these standards to parents (in counseling and parent groups), professionals (in day-to-day interaction, in seminars, meetings, network activities), and the wider community (feature articles in the local newspaper, popular television programs, and on their webpage). This is done on a miniscule day to day basis, for instance by opposing, commenting, or

correcting people if they have too great an emphasis on drugs or talk about the youths as addicts, and by distributing more positive images and narratives about the youth (Bank, In prep). This figure, with the transformation and production of positive knowledge of subjects, is a well known theme in the social work literature. (Philp, 1979) describes how social work mediates between the deviant and normal society by ascribing them, for instance, potential and positive intentions.

There are obvious advantages to this approach. It is a pleasant surprise for many of the youth that the social workers do not advertise any particular stance on drugs[5], and are helpful in relation to their perceived problems making it possible for them to see the social workers as attentive, relevant adults, that have some kind of street credibility. This legitimizes treatment both for the youth and in relation to their peer-groups and parents and creates a space for movement and systemic change in the relations around the youths.

Institutionally the user-driven standards for recognizing the youths (reasons for) drug use and the relatively easy and non-committing standards that the youth should 'want some kind of change' allows the youth to continue their use of drugs and still be included in the treatment regime. In comparison to psy-practices where motivation and abstinence are used to regulate users and is practiced by distinguishing between subjects ready for treatment and those who have to be excluded, this drastically expands the possibilities for working with 'difficult' youths**.** But as mentioned the youth are often not particularly inclined to participate in the activities or interested in reducing their drug use and 'motivation' now reappears as pedagogical or therapeutic problems inside the institution. I will now analyze how the social workers handle this through post-psychological standards for understanding the youth's relation to school activities. According to the U-turn model, a core element in the 'Daygroup' is that the School functions as 'a bridge to the normal'. Getting the youth to participate in school activities can however be difficult, as many of the youths have bad experiences with being expelled, bullied or have 'dropped out' of school (U-Turn, 2011).

The first excerpts are from a 'development day' in Helsingung, January 2011 where the social workers are preparing for the startup of the 'Dayteam'. Flemming, a social worker who is also the local project manager in Helsingung, is talking about the fact that the youth

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[5] In the institution there is no explicit standards on drug use – apart from the youth in order to be respectful to the other youth, should not be under the influence when they are at the institution.

that soon will start in the Dayteam are not currently part of the educational system. He then states: *"I mean, they do want to go to school, it's just that they think the teachers are idiots and they are not allowed to do the things they want to and so on."* The sentence "they *do* want to go to school" does not seem to be referring to any particular youth or opening for a discussion about how the social workers *could* understand the youth. I understand this as a performative action, where Flemming produces and articulates a local standard for *seeing* the youth. I term this a standard because it is in alignment with – and producing - a post-psy ontology of always-already participating, pro-active learning, developing subjects in process of becoming. But how is this standard and ontology handled in practice?

The next excerpt is from a session where the social workers are getting supervision on their work 10 months later, where the 'Dayteam' has been running for 3 months (121116). The case the social workers have chosen to discuss is regarding the youth Tom who has been part of the Dayteam for 2 months. Tom attends the 'Dayteam' but shows no obvious signs of actively engaging in any of the activities. The social workers have difficulty in understanding and dealing with this, as this does not fit with the standard about a pro-active subject that wants to go to school. They ask each other whether there is a way to intervene and if they can than how? During the session, the supervisor Lotte uses Signs of safety as methodology. 'Signs of safety[6]' is implemented as a standard in social services in the municipalities of Copenhagen and Elsinore and is described as a tool for collaborative problem solving (Turnell & Edwards, 1999). 'Signs of safety' consists of a rudimentary framework, with four columns, where the persons involved in a structured manner can investigate and note: "what are we worried about" "what works well" "what needs to happen" and "what should we do more of".

Lotte: (supervisor) what are the worries?

Morten: (social worker) are we reaching him? I know that's a cliché, but I doubt whether I'm getting through to him, because I experience… He is neglecting anything positive is emphasized, answers no, doesn't know, or it doesn't matter.

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[6] http://www.signsofsafety.net/ https://www.kk.dk/da/om-kommunen/indsatsomraader-og-politikker/boern-unge-og-familier/socialfaglige-metoder-og-redskaber/signs-of-safety

Lotte: Does that mean that it is difficult to have a conversation with him…?

Nanet: (Teacher) during class, he rejects much of what is going on.

Didda: (Social worker) at the same time, he is very polite which is actually a bit worrying… Can that be a way to deal with it? Has he found a way so he doesn't need to be engaged and slips through the cracks?

In the above the social workers articulate their concerns and observations about Tom. The sentence: "are we reaching him? I know that's a cliché but..." indicates that they are reflexively aware of the difficulties they are having in making sense of Tom's actions, and how this, in other practices, could be understood through psy-standards. In the suggestion: "Can that be a way to deal with it? … "has he *found* a way…" the social worker Didda tentatively tries to attribute subjective reasons and agency to Toms actions, but the suggestions are not satisfying as Toms actions are understood 'negatively' in that he tries to avoid to be engaged. This understanding cannot be used as a standard as it does not fit with a post-psy ontology and social work discourse (Philp, 1979). So let us see how the social workers proceed:

Morten: I had, by the way, […] a thought or an idea which.. um.. which actually helped me to understand or think about this thing with Tom, a bit different […] I got this thought that one can also be… or that learning can also happen through the way one participates. And I think that for Tom, in many ways he participates as a, uh, what's it called, a valid participant. Uh, like a bit from the sidelines. So I think in reality, when he is in math class or when he is in group or down at the house, I think in reality there is actually a lot of learning going on as far as how he has to behave and what he has to do and what is happening. And I think he absorbs a whole lot, and he becomes in a way um…[…] But he needs to be a bit in the periphery because he hasn't mastered all those things yet. Um and there are a few small signs, like you say, so when he is sitting watching a film. I think it's a VERY difficult situation for him.

Nanet: Mm

Morten: Because there are so many feelings and things, and that it [the film] is in English and he has to read [subtitles]. So I think he has to be a bit on the periphery…

Nanet: Mm

Morten: In that way he participates in his own fine way. And I really think we should also keep an eye on that he actually is learning, so we don't go um and challenge him too quickly or too much. But really pay attention also to that he learns sort of at his own tempo. Just being in group, that, that is a HUGE step for him.

Didda: Mm

Morten: And just that he is sitting there and listening behind his cap, and sometimes there is a little comment or sometimes just nods to what one has said. In other words, it's a huge sign that he actually, uh participates and learns through his way of participating. And I think he really needs that, also that like uh that there is an openness where there is uh, where it is possible for him to participate and sort of check in and out.

Over these few lines, it looks like the social worker performs an epistemological breakthrough, by drawing on concepts from post-psychology. When Morten says "I think that for Tom, in many ways he participates as a, uh, what's it called, a valid participant. Uh, like a bit from the sidelines." He is explicitly, although imperfectly, referring to the concept of legitimate peripheral participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991).This standard allows him to interpret the minutiae details of Tom's movements and gestures as active participation and signs of desire, movement and becoming and recognizing that Tom *is* already participating "in his own fine way". This standard makes it possible for the social workers to modulate Toms' potentials for participation and development, by recognizing his active participation

and by paying attention to and actively modifying environmental factors and creating an openness where Tom can be a legitimate peripherally participating subject and have the possibility to "sort of check in and out."

A particular interesting aspect of how the post-psy ontology structures practice is that if the social workers do not view Tom, according to a post-psy ontology; as an already participating, pro-actively learning subject, they have to produce new standards that allow them to see and recognize this. And when the social workers manufacture post-psy standards for seeing Tom that emphasize relational, contextual and environmental factors, this turns the object of intervention around, as the social workers themselves become a part of the relational conditions and limitations for Toms potentials to unfold. This means that it is the social workers subjectivity – and not Toms' - that have to be worked upon. This work is often precarious and difficult and the social workers describe how their abilities for 'inclusiveness', their own ambitions for the youth to develop or their own personal views on drugs are challenging to *them*. So the social workers continually have to work on their subjectivity and modulate their own abilities and ways of being and subjecting themselves by continually developing post-psy standards for seeing, articulating and acting in relation to the youth.

So far the post-psychological standards that are developed in the Dayteam can be described as 'second order' or 'user-driven' standards. In contrast to psy-standards, they do not subjectify by producing the psychological as an object of intervention and by prescribing, appropriating defining, categorizing and positioning subjects and subjectivity.

Instead the user-driven standards expand the field of intervention and alleviate the youth for some of the (neo-liberal) pressure for so-called rational choice, and abstinence from drugs, from relatives and professionals (Rose, 1998). The post-psy standards are subjecting and cultivating a post-psy social worker that can be a de-centered (White, 2007) not-knowing expert (Anderson & Goolishian, 1992) that abstains from normative judgments, and employs a coaching approach in working with the youths (U-Turn, 2011). This favors the youths own perspectives and produces a space for potential movement and allows for the youth to develop and subject themselves to their own standards for life, drug-use etc.

Aspects of this approach have roots all the way back to client centered therapy (Rogers, 1951) and this is accentuated and developed further in the post-psy therapeutic literature (Anderson & Goolishian, 1992; De Shazer, 2005; White, 2007). This literature focuses however primarily on subjects who seek therapy voluntarily and are 'motivated' for

change. But as this is not necessarily the case for the youth in Helsingung, how do the workers use their own subjectivity to work on the youths potential for movement, change and becoming, when they cannot do 'motivational work' based on psy-standards? To answer this I will draw on a final empirical excerpt from a team meeting in Helsingung, where statistics depicting the flow of youth through the institution was discussed. All the social workers seemed very pleased by the results, which prompted me to ask them about their own explanations for their results.

> Dorte:… Well, ah…[…], I think that some of the success rate of the treatment, in this type of treatment also has to do with our ability to become excited on their behalf.

> Toni: Mm

> Dorte: That we are really good at saying "well done" or well like give them a belief that this can be done. That we give them strength and power, um and I think that our personalities play a big part there as well.

> Toni: Mm

> Dorte: Because it's not everyone that can produce such a contagious enthusiasm.

> Toni: Mm mm

> Dorte: I mean so it still seems authentic and. And I think that we really all do that. […]

> Dorte: I mean, I, I think that there is a connection there, as far as our success rate. Because this, this requires a hell of a lot of energy to keep up and inspire for a change. It requires that one invests a lot of energy into it. (Team meeting, Helsingung)

In the above example the social workers talk about how they use their own energy, and produce a contagious enthusiasm that affects and modulates the youth's potentials for change. I articulate this as a post-psychological standard for working with change or 'motivation'. This can be theorized as affective subjectification (Bank, In prep)

As an example, a social worker energetically exclaims "WOW – you haven't smoked for 3 DAYS, that's AMAZING!". This is an expression of enthusiasm, on behalf of the youth, that is transferred affectively to the youth. The relational flows of energy modulate the youths subjectivity and potential and energizes their potential for becoming by "giving them some strength and some power". This way of working with change is not mediated by psy-standards using appropriation, signification and cognition as a relay for reflexivity and change, but can be read as a 'selective modulation', 'affective boosting' 'energizing' or 'amplification' of already existing processes. This selective amplification of positive valued processes, changes and movements – extends, prolongs and affirms the youths - perhaps minimal, indiscriminate - movements. The affective subjectification that the social workers express, works through both bodily/affective and cognitive forms of communication and knowledge, and depends on the social workers capacities and ways of being (Blackman, 2012). As Dorthe says: *"not everyone that has this contagious enthusiasm… I mean so it still seems authentic… It requires that one invests a lot of energy into it."* Perhaps what is described as authenticity, can be described as a successful performance (Martin, 2007)where affective and contagious energies that travel between bodies, and that allows signification to become believable as it broadens the horizon for understanding (Bank, In prep ; Heidegger, 1962).

In a post-psy ontology, subjectivity does not stop at the skin, but is profoundly relational. Configured on post-psychology, 'motivation' is not something inside individual bodies or minds but distributed relational energies that can be produced socially and flow in and between bodies – human bodies, discursive bodies and all other sorts of bodies (Blackman, 2012). In this way the (presumed psychological) distinction between separate subjects and bodies are dissolved as subjectivity and experiences are constantly performed and produced relationally. In the practices I have studied this affective subjecification is an aspect of, mediated and made possible by the 2nd order standards that opens up a virtual space of becoming.

The critical perspectives

In the analysis I have tried to positively articulate how post-psy standards produce subjectivity in social work. But of course, these are forms of power that call for new kinds of criticism.

One possible and radical criticism that could be put forward is that 'empowering' through user-driven standards are yet another form of neo-liberal governance (Cruikshank, 1999). In post-industrial, liberal democracies, the most pertinent threat to the state is not that masses gather for a violent revolt, but that subjects are depressed (Ehrenberg, 2009) or unproductive. In the age of depression (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2005) Governance is to a much lesser extend about disciplinary control, but about mobilizing subjects and producing movement. In a neo-liberal competitive state, this means that the former marginal subjectivities, the drug-user, the artist, the communist, the homosexual and the queer are no longer patrolling the boundaries of normality through disciplinary exclusion, confinement or death (Mbembe & Meintjes, 2003). Even the drug-user constitutes normality from inside and are allowed to *choose* drugs but also 'obliged to be free' (Rose, 1998) and to choose development and change to be recognized as a legitimate subject. The neo-liberal post-psychological standards for subjectivity are not identity, sameness but constant movement, development and becoming of self-governing enterprising individuals (Martin, 2007; Rose, 1998)

When the youths in the treatment facilities we have studied are asked what *they* want, they often answer 'I don't know'. Perhaps it is because they really do not know. Or perhaps it is a way to be outside the normative demands for desire? Or perhaps because answering '' smoking hash, and doing nothing in particular'' are not valid according to the neo-liberal standard of change, movement and desire – and are very difficult to differ from, if one still wants to be recognized as a legitimate subject, whose perspectives and standards for the good life are recognized.

Another criticism that could be raised is that post psychological standards are double standards that are blind for the implicit norms and mechanisms of power they are part of. Discursively, the user-driven standards favor the youth's own perspectives, according to therapeutic standards about client-centeredness (Anderson & Goolishian, 2004; Rogers, 1951) and transparence(White, 2007). But affective energies are used to mobilize, recruit, energize

and selectively amplify normative valued processes and specific ways of being a person. As the affective subjectification does not use signification as a primary mechanism it is hard to recognize, resist and criticize. If the youths, after some time, "decide" to cut down their use of drugs, this is normalization and a reflection of the social worker's and the larger society's standards on drugs, that could be said to be smuggled affectively in through the body.

Criticisms that are more in line with my argument in this article are a problematization of the pitfalls in relation to post-psy social workers and practices. In order to use post-psychological standards to modulate and enhance the 'becoming' of the youths, professionals must attain a post-psychological expertise. They have to cultivate both their abilities to abstain from certain normative judgments and mobilize their capabilities to affect the youth energetically. The social worker must relentlessly produce this affective energy. As the social worker Dorthe says:"it requires a hell of a lot of energy to be able to inspire to bring about a change. It requires that one puts energy into it." This affective work is demanding, but also difficult and precarious as the potentials and processes they are trying to modulate are processes of becoming, though not yet recognizable, something virtual to be actualized. The affective subjectification can fail at any instant as energy extended to the youth in affective articulations, such as "WOW – you haven't smoked for 3 DAYS, that's AMAZING!" can be put down instantly, if it is not valued by the youth, for instance if the youth replies that it was just because he was broke. A critical perspective on these practices is that there is an immanent danger of new individualizing tendencies, as the social workers are the materiel for change. As social worker Dorthe says *"I really think it is our personalities that play a part as well" " and this means* that when change is not produced it can be understood as the social worker – as an individual- who has failed. This is also a problem on an organizational level, as post-psy practices require more resources compared to other practices that expel difficult users, and thus can document 'cheaper' and apparently 'better' results.

In this way there is an inherent danger for 'self-marginalization' as difficulties, conflicts and problems are re-located either in the social worker or attributed to the post-psychological practice. This also means that difficulties and conflicts that could be attributed to more 'structural aspects' (the mandatory educational system, the problems in public schools, difficulties on the job market, criminalization of drugs) are individualized and made a-political. This may instigate more radical criticisms and make the potential for change, on a larger scale, difficult. This is of course especially a problem in relation to practices that are

informed by a psy-ontological dispositive, as many institutions in the welfare state are, as mentioned before, accentuated by the trends toward New Public management, evidence based methods, and positivistic ideals for science that have standards that seamlessly merge with and stabilize psy-standards.

Conclusion

The analysis of post-psychological standards and ontologies in social work could lead us to theorize more generally about standards and strategies for subjectification. I am not suggesting that (psy) standards of ordering – or what governmentality studies analyze as disciplinary or neo-liberal strategies of government - are not involved in the practices I have analyzed. Rather they are modulated by post-psychological standards and strategies that function through other logics and registers. Thinking with a post-psy ontology, enables us to analyze how post-psy standards are affecting or energizing subjects, and how the use of such standards enable movement from problematic subject positions, discourses and narratives and enable and predispose subjects to develop their 'own' standards and more preferred subjectivities. This could be thought of as an affective production of agency (Davies, 1991) and shows a way out of theories where the subject is trapped in the relentless play of discourse and language.

The 2nd order and affective standards for subjectification, I have analyzed, can be seen as a general strategy for subjectification, that can be used for different purposes - malign or benign - in different regimes, combined with different forms of power. These standards, tactics and strategies for organizing practices and subjectivity, could be used for building relations, practices, and communities that are not 'motivated' or 'energized' by competition or economic exchanges, but by mobilizing flows of energy which connect subjects and communities that open for novel enactments of new types of subjects and standards.

As I have analyzed in this article, this could be a way for contemporary social work to be critical, productive, and reformist in relation to existing power relations, by empowering and enrolling subjects in the production of subjectivity through user-driven standards. These standards facilitate a way of living that are more in accordance with the subjects own values, wishes and beliefs(M Foucault, 1982c) and can be used to transform or modulate dominant

forms of power and develop new standards for (social work practices in) the welfare state (Nissen, 2012a).

Proposing post-psychological standards for subjectification is precarious and risky. The standards and analytical strategies we develop can be used for many different purposes, but rather than having a merely 'negative' critique of power, standards, and institutional practices perhaps the time is due for us, as critical scholars, to engage more directly with power and produce vital and productive theoretical concepts and standards in – and for - the practices we study. In our ongoing dialogues with social workers, we contribute to a post-psychological reflexivity about their practices through concepts such as affective and user-driven standards that also problematizes and open for a development of how post-psy standards are normative and intertwined with power. Our modest hope is that we attempt to follow Foucault's dream of a productive criticism (M Foucault, 1997) by contributing to the production of user-driven standards *"which permits individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality"* (Foucault, 2000, p. 225)

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Tuning Governmentality studies through Heidegger:

Analytical Strategies for Affective Subjectification

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Abstract

This article proposes to use Heidegger's concept of 'Stimmung' (attunement, mood) as a psychological, theoretical and analytical concept - or what might be termed an analytical strategy of affect - in Governmentality studies.

The empirical triggers driving the theoretical development are processes of affective subjectification in a social work with young people who use illegal drugs and who are outside the ordinary education system.

The methodology is to review the major developments in Governmentality studies and to engage with some of the criticisms that have been raised by scholars of affect, and to use this to point to how a phenomenological strategy for analyzing affect might expand our analysis of subjectification processes.

The concept 'Stimmung' will then be proposed and used to analyze how affects as energies, intensities and atmospheres are part of subjectification processes, without separating the analysis from the important insights developed in post-structuralist theory and governmentality studies.

Keywords: Governmentality, affect, attunement, post-structuralism, Heidegger, social work

Introduction

This article contributes to the Governmentality studies by using the so-called 'affective turn' to introduce Heidegger's concept of Stimmung as an analytical concept that makes it possible to analyze how the modulation and production of affect are an integrated part of contemporary forms of government.

The empirical triggers that have drawn me towards an interest in affect stem from two closely related participatory action research projects on two drug treatment institutions' in 2010 and 2012-2014[1]. In these projects our research teams did ethnographic fieldwork, primarily focusing on the voluntary 'outpatient' group-treatment regimes for youths aged from 15 to 18. The institutions described this treatment, called the day-group/day-team respectively, as a core part of their services. The inclusion criteria are that the youth has an illegal drug usage, is outside the normal school system and wishes for a change in his or her life (U-Turn, 2011). The treatment regimes consist of group activities including school, physical training, cultural activities, common meals and 'group-talk' sessions for four days a week typically for six to nine months. In addition to the common activities the youths have individual therapy sessions with their social workers on a weekly basis. The institutions do not only focus on the youths but they also work with their friends, partners, families, professionals in the field and the larger community.

The institutions are informed by a range of post-modern therapeutic traditions especially systemic therapy (H. Anderson & Goolishian, 2004) narrative practice (White, 2007) and solution-focused therapy (De Shazer, 2005). The institutions draw on therapeutic traditions that are heavily influenced by the linguistic turn, and much attention is this given to how language, categories and institutional regimes are active in the production of subjectivity. In our research and dialogue with practitioners we experienced another recurrent theme that is not described in the therapeutic literature, namely how it is crucial to create what the social workers term as 'intensity' 'energy' or 'atmosphere' to get things going (Bank, 2010). It is this attention to the affective phenomena referred to as energy, intensity or atmosphere that is a central part of - or a prerequisite for engaging in - treatment and subjectification, that this paper will take as its subject matter. This interest in 'affect' and the subsequent use of what we, following Foucault (2000), could call 'affective

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[1] The author did ethnographical fieldwork in one institution in 2010, (U-Turn) and our research group has done ethnographic fieldwork in and across two institutions during 2012-1014. (www.uturn.dk and www.helsingung.nu)

technologies' is a unspecified phenomenon in the post-modern therapeutic traditions that the social work practices are drawing upon, and I will argue that it is also an underdeveloped area in governmentality studies.

In this article I will start by reviewing the analytical strategies developed and used in Governmentality studies, and show how they mainly have analyzed subjectification through processes of ordering. I will then consider theories of affect in order to show how they raise relevant critiques of governmentality studies and I will use these critiques to develop criteria for a concept or strategy for analyzing affect within Governmentality studies. I will then engage with Heidegger and his concept Stimmung [attunement/mood] and propose this as a theoretical concept that also can be used as a strategy for analyzing affect.

By using Stimmung as an analytical concept on empirical material from the practices we study, I will demonstrate how this expands Governmentality studies possibilities for analyzing affective forms of subjectification in a way that are compatible with the understandings of subjectivity that we find in post-structuralist theory. Lastly, I will reflect on some of the implications of using Stimmung as an analytical concept.

Governmentality studies and the production of subjectivity

Governmentality studies are interested in how subjects and subjectivity are produced though heterogeneous assemblages of discourses, institutions, materialities, techniques and technologies: or, in short, how subjectivity is produced in relations of power and knowledge. (Dean, 2006; Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 2002; Rose, 1998). According to(Dean, 2006) governmentality studies use two analytical strategies, the genealogic method and the practice regime analysis.

The Genealogical approach analyses different strategies for government and subjectification, by tracing how they develop historically by using, combining and modifying multiple and heterogeneous discourses, materialities, techniques and technologies from a range of different fields (Foucault, 1973, 1977a, 2009, 2010). This makes it possible to analyze the historical continuities and transformations in how subjects are governed in and across different institutions (Foucault, 1977a) and to engage in broader discussions about power, (bio)politics, and government of the population (Agamben, 2011; Dean, 2012; Foucault, 2009, 2010). The genealogical method makes a critical reflection of contemporary practices and governmental strategies possible. First of all, by

showing how these forms are historically developed, and thus contingent. Second, by producing concepts and analytical strategies that make it possible to analyze how human beings are made subjects in different practices. Third, by using the analytical strategies to point to the more general strategies for how human beings are made subjects and how such strategies or dispositives modulate and transform each other and install certain dispositional tendencies in and across practices (Bussolini, 2010; G Deleuze, 1992; Foucault, 1980a, 1983).

In the practice regime analysis the analytical strategies and concepts developed in genealogical studies are utilized to conduct more situated studies of subjectification processes in specific practice regimes. Studies on education (Davies & Bansel, 2007; Staunæs, 2011) sports,(Markula & Pringle, 2006) leadership (Raffnsøe & Staunæs, 2014), child psychology, work, the army, psychological practices (Rose, 1990) social work (Villadsen, 2004, 2008) alcoholics (Valverde, 1998) and addiction (Keane, 2002) have analyzed how different governmental strategies or dispositives install certain 'strategic dispositions' in specific practices across sectors and institutions.

The analytical strategies developed in Governmentality studies - especially as outlined by (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1990) in particular on the basis of (Foucault, 1977a, 2009, 2010) - can be said to have had the effect that there has been a preoccupation with how subjectivity is produced by processes of 'ordering' (Rose, 1998). The analytical strategies are thus predisposing towards analysis of how subjectivity is produced and subjects governed by making subjectivity an object for knowledge in 'lines of light' and 'lines of articulation' (G Deleuze, 1992) through a range of different standards (norms, ideals, techniques etc.) by distinctive ways of thinking and questioning and through certain practical rationalities and technologies (Dean, 1999). Let me in brief, point to some examples of how Governmentality studies can be said to be preoccupied with such 'strategies of ordering'.

Following the linguistic turn, many studies have investigated subjectification processes with a focus on how subjectivity is produced as an object of knowledge through appropriation or 'ordering' by *discourse*. This has been analyzed with concepts such as positioning, subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harre, 2005) institutional categories (Varenne & McDermott, 1998) social categories (Davies & Hunt, 1994), racialized ethnicity (Staunæs, 2004) gender (Butler, 2006) or psychiatric categories (Hacking, 1995). Some studies have paid more attention to the entanglement of *materiality*, power and discourse by focusing on how institutional architecture (Foucault, 1977a) or artifacts (Elgaard Jensen, 2011; Juelskjær, Staunæs, & Ratner, 2013) participate in the production of subjectivity by making it visible and comparable in regimes of ordering. A range of other studies

have looked closer at the use of different *techniques or technologies,* such as dialogue (Villadsen, 2008) writing (Foucault, 2000) or bodily exercises (Foucault, 1980c; Markula & Pringle, 2006). In this way it is convincingly shown how subjects are engaging in certain practices or technologies that establish normative relations to the self, or produce specific individual feelings or emotions such as shame and guilt (Bjerg & Staunæs, 2011; Butler, 1997; Laws & Davies, 2000). Yet other studies on the periphery of Governmentality studies have looked at how institutional structures or technologies, such as information structures (Bowker & Star, 1999), institutional concepts (Järvinen & Mik-Meyer, 2003), institutional forms (Hviid & Lima, 2012) or new public management (Pedersen, 2005) are playing an active part in institutional ordering and subjectification processes.[2]

Governmentality studies and strategies of ordering

Governmentality studies can be said to have mainly developed strategies for analyzing how subjectivity is produced through different forms of 'ordering'. This allows us to analyze how discourses, materialities, techniques and technologies enables the 'appropriation' of subjectivity through processes of observing, articulating, knowing, judging, evaluation and norming and how this produces identity, relations to the self and self-governance (Foucault, 1982). On the basis of this we can point to some underdeveloped areas in Governmentality studies.

First of all, there has been a lack of analytical concepts and strategies for analyzing how intensities, affects or atmospheres are a part of subjectification processes, in a way that is compatible with post-structuralist theories of subjectivity. Secondly, Governmentality studies have been preoccupied either with how practice regimes produce subjectivity, in particular with important studies on the production of troubled or marginalized subjectivities (Davies & Hunt, 1994; Foucault, 1977a, 1988; Staunæs, 2005) or with how subjects themselves are engaged in productive subjectification mediated by different technologies of the self (jf. Foucault, 1982; Foucault, 1986, 2000). However, few studies have combined these interests and analyzed how subjects are not only subjectifed in institutions, but also engage in subjectification in ways that transform both themselves and the institutional practices they participate in. See (Staunæs, 2011) and (Bank, In prep) for an exception.

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[2] As might be clear from the references, the boundary between governmentality studies and feminist theory and Actor-Network-Theory are permeable and a matter of focus, when we are dealing with how discourse, material and technologies intersects in the production of subjectivity and government of subjects.

We can point to some obvious reasons for these 'blind spots'. They can partly be explained by Foucault's studies of disciplinary institutions and corrective practices (Foucault, 1973, 1977a) and the subsequent Governmentality lectures (Foucault, 2009, 2010) that were seminal in developing Governmentality as a research strategy. The analytical strategies developed in these studies predispose subsequent studies toward analyzing the relations between power, knowledge and subjectivity as processes of ordering.

Secondly, we can point to the very influential English reception of Foucault and the 'programmatic outlines' of the strategies of Governmentality studies (Dean, 1999) and (Rose, 1990) that have been developed mainly from Foucault's books from the seventies (Foucault, 1973, 1977a, 1988) and the governmentality lectures (Foucault, 2009, 2010). Conversely, governmentality studies have given less attention to the interviews and material published after the crisis following The History of Sexuality 1 (Foucault, 1978). This could partly explain why governmentality studies have not developed strategies that focus on the subject's proactive becoming and more 'vital', 'affective' or 'ephemeral' forms of subjectification (Gilles Deleuze, 1992; Foucault, 1982).

A third reason for the lack of affective strategies in governmentality studies, can be ascribed to the fact that many governmentality studies have a historical distance to their subject matter and they rely on written empirical material. Here, studies on contemporary practice regimes, where we have the opportunity to be situated bodily and socially, open up for including (descriptions of) sound, taste, smell, feelings, atmospheres and intensities in our analysis. These aspects have traditionally been marginalized as scientific material and can only with difficulty be translated into writing (Henriques, 2011).

So far I have referred to the aspects that I want to analyze by using the social workers words; intensity', 'affect', 'energy' or 'atmospheres' or the theoretical concept 'affect'. This is an inherent difficulty in conveying what these words refer to, and this is exactly one of the reasons why we need new analytical concepts. I have chosen to present the empirical material after the theoretical argument, but to give a preliminary idea about what I am aiming at, one could think about entering a room where one experiences an unpleasant atmosphere or think about being in a place with a 'good vibe', or being with people where one experiences an energizing intensity, for instance when discussing new concepts or planning to go to a conference abroad. The primary aim of this article is to develop and argue for an analytical concept that allow us to analyze how such affective, multi-

sensorial, ephemeral phenomena are a part of subjectification processes, but without entrenching us in dichotomies between mind and body or discourse and materiality, a point I will return to shortly.

In the next section I will selectively draw on central ideas and empirical preoccupations in affect studies, and use some of their critiques of post-structuralist theory as a 'box of tools' (Foucault, 1977i, p. 207) for developing and explicating the criteria for a theoretical and analytical concept of affect that is compatible with governmentality studies and post-structuralist theory. This approach is concordant with Deleuze (1988) and (Foucault, 1977i, 1980e) who encourage us to judge a concept not by what it is, but by what it will enable us to do when plugged into other theories and texts.[3]

In this way the two main criteria for the concept and strategy I propose will be both its theoretical compatibility and what it makes us able to see and do in the analysis and beyond. This can also be thought of as a circular movement of 'good hermeneutics' (Gadamer, 1989). The intention is not to dismiss the important strategies for analyzing subjectification through discourses, institutions, materialities', techniques and technologies, but rather to expand the scope of governmentality studies by proposing a concept and a strategy for analyzing how intensities, or the 'affective', play a crucial role in modern and contemporary forms of government. In this I intend to follow what I will designate Foucault's vital dream, and engage in *".....a kind of criticism that would: ... [...] multiply not judgments but signs of experience: it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invent them sometimes – all the better. All the better."* (Foucault, 1997, p. 323)

The challenge from affect studies

Affect studies and the so called 'affective turn' is a hot topic across the social sciences and humanities (Kim, Bianco, Clough, & Halley, 2007; Koivunen, 2010; Wetherell, 2012) and can be seen as range of different criticisms of the consequences of the linguistic turn, and the preoccupation with language and epistemology in post-structuralist and social-constructivist theory (Koivunen, 2010). The 'turn to affect' can be seen as a renewed interest in materiality, space, bodies and ontology and a critique that can be said to work *"both against and within post-structuralist, social constructivist theories of subject and power."* (Koivunen, 2010, p. 9; Wetherell, 2012).

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[3] Deleuze refers to a concept as a 'box of tools' in his conversation with Foucault (Foucault, 1977i) see also (Deleuze, 1988; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Foucault, 1980e)

A main point in affect theories, according to Massumi (2002), is that affect is central in the emergence of novelty, processes of becoming and new ways of being and relating (Wetherell, 2012). The scope and possible consequences of this claim are heavily debated, but many scholars agree that affect has been underdeveloped within post-structuralist theory (B. Anderson, 2006; Hemmings, 2005; Stewart, 2007; Wetherell, 2012). A main empirical preoccupation in affect studies is, according to Anderson, to "*attune to the prepersonal or transpersonal dimensions of affective life in everyday experience*" (B. Anderson, 2009, p. 78) and to offer concepts, methods or cultivate sensibilities "*that are equal to the ambiguity of affective and emotive life"* (B. Anderson, 2009, p. 77). Stewart (2007) develops some empirical strategies to analyze and describe these affective dimensions of everyday experience with her term 'everyday affects'. It is exactly such a strategy for analyzing experiences that the social workers from our research projects vaguely describe as 'intensities ' 'energies ' or 'affects' or 'atmospheres', that I want to develop here.

An important and much debated theme among scholars of affect is how to conceive the relationship between affect, emotions and discourse. Massumi (2002) tries to depart from post-structuralist theory by emphasizing that affects are fundamentally different from emotions, feelings or cognitions, but can give rise to these (Brennan, 2004) and that the transmission and circulation of affect is an a-social and often a pre-conscious phenomenon. A range of other scholars (Blackman, 2012; Hemmings, 2005; Wetherell, 2012) criticize Massumi for this separation between a-social, subconscious affects and social, conscious phenomena such as individual emotions, discourse and cognition. Hemmings (2005) claims that Massumi has a overstated critique of the role of discourse and language in post-structuralism, and Wetherell (2012) criticizes Massumi for overemphasizing the role of affect in his effort to break away from post-structuralist theory and thereby mistakenly "*split discourse and affect in to two tracks and privilege the track of the body…"* (Wetherell, 2012, p. 19). As an alternative, Wetherell (2012) proposes the concept of 'affective practice' as this enables us to understand and analyze how 'affective practices' are situated, related to and resonate with "wider ' institutions of intelligibility'" (Wetherell, 2012, p. 79), the main point being that affective practices are connected to other practices, emotions, language, discourse and meaning. In accordance with these kind of critiques by scholars such as (Blackman, 2012; Hemmings, 2005; Wetherell, 2012), B. Anderson (2009) proposes 'affective atmosphere' as a more viable concept, exactly because it unsettles the distinction between affect and emotion. Finally the concepts 'affective atmospheres' (B. Anderson, 2009) or 'affective attunements' (Stewart, 2011) point to a widely-shared view among scholars of affect that a strategy or theory of affect must allow us to

analyze elusive, uncertain, disordered, shifting and contingent phenomena of everyday life that can be central to change and novelty. Here we should note that although affects are praised for bringing about novelty, excess and change, other scholars draw attention to how affects can be used to close down hope, change and becoming. (Berlant, 2011; Blackman, 2012)

Demands for an affective analytical concept

In order to develop an analytical concept that allows me to analyze the 'intensities ', 'energies ', 'affects' or 'atmospheres' that the social workers we collaborate with describe as an important part of their work, I align with affect scholars' preoccupation with developing tools for theorizing the social in new ways (Kim et al., 2007). I share the view that we must develop strategies for analyzing how elusive, uncertain, disordered, shifting, pre-personal, transpersonal (B. Anderson, 2009, p. 77) or trans-subjective (Blackman, 2012) dimensions and affective experiences can be transmitted and circulated in and between human bodies, discursive bodies and non-human bodies (B. Anderson, 2009; Blackman, 2012; Stewart, 2007) and how this gives rise to novelty, becoming and new forms of subjectivity. I also follow Massumi (2002) and others in pointing out that affect cannot be reduced to, or be appropriated as, specific individual emotions, feelings or cognitions, but can give rise to those (Brennan, 2004). However, as the social workers and I can experience and talk about these 'affective phenomena' this means that the affective concept I am searching for should allow us to analyze and theorize about these intensities ', 'energies' 'affects' or 'atmospheres' as social phenomenon that are not totally outside our conscious experience or separated from discourse. In this aspect I follow (Blackman, 2012; Hemmings, 2005; Wetherell, 2012) who, in opposition to Massumi, try to avoid a separation between non-narrative, asignifying, impersonal, objective affects and narrative semiotic, personal and subjective emotions (B. Anderson, 2009).

As a researcher interested in subjectivity and psychology, I agree with the very relevant critiques of (Hemmings, 2005; Wetherell, 2012) who point out how it is quite surprising and problematic the way in which scholars of affect are seemingly uncritical and selectively draw on methods and theories from individualistic mainstream psychology, such as cognitive psychology and positivistic research methodologies (Massumi, 2002) or
individualistic theories of emotions (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995) These approaches seems like a retrograde step, as they pull apart our phenomenological everyday lived experiences, separating

'psychological' from the body, materiality and the discursive and societal structures in which we are embedded. This is, in my view, incompatible with Governmentality studies and it lures us into false dichotomies.

In this article I will suggest a more adequate and relevant psychological concept for theorizing and analyzing affect. This concept shares important similarities with 'affective atmospheres' (B. Anderson, 2009) or 'atmospheric attunements' (Stewart, 2011) ephemeral phenomena that are "*indeterminate…[and] are resources that become elements within sense experience*" (B. Anderson, 2009, p. 79) and include quasi-phenomenological subjective aspects. But even though (Stewart, 2011) draws explicitly on phenomenology and Heidegger, I find that the atmospheric concepts from (B. Anderson, 2009; Stewart, 2011) lack a 'tactical polyvalence' that would allow it to connect quasi-phenomenological affective experiences with governmental strategies for analyzing subjectification processes.

Another problem with 'atmospheric concepts' (B. Anderson, 2009; Stewart, 2011) is that they could easily be comprehended as something imposed on the individual. Here I find that the concept of 'affective practice' (Wetherell, 2012) is interesting because it points to collective inter-subjective phenomena that are *"a joint, coordinated, relational activity"* where an "*affective pattern is in fact distributed across the relational field and each partner's part becomes meaningful only in relation to the whole affective dance*" (Wetherell, 2012, p. 83). The co-createdness is important, as this enables us to analyze how subjects plays an active – vital, productive and affective - role in processes of subjectification. I also follow (Wetherell, 2012) in that we must be able to understand and analyze how different 'affective practices' are situated, embedded with meaning and related to, or resonate with, other practices. How this exactly should be understood seems on the other hand to be rather vague. Wetherell (2012) most often describes that some 'patterns' from other places or 'relational matrices' inform the situated affective practices. Although I agree in many aspects with Wetherell, I think her solution has some conceptual problems. First of all, if these relations between practices are understood as 'patterns' how can it be that different subjects are able to have quite diverse experiences within the same affective practice? And were 'is' this pattern? How does it 'move' from one context to another? By engaging with the metaphor of 'pattern' or 'relational matrices', it seems that Wetherell runs two risks. The first risk is that using 'pattern' or 'relational matrices' as that which connects separate events and subjects is very close to the discursive

understandings, ('discursive framings' 'cultural understandings') that affect studies exactly try to move beyond. To me it further seems to suggest something rather too ratio-structuralist, stable and enduring, in opposition to the more elusive and contingent character we wish to analyze. (B. Anderson, 2009).

The other risk is that Wetherell's use and reading of affect could drift towards more narrow individualistic, functionalistic and dualistic understandings of the relationship between subjectivity and sociality where affect are 'social feelings' and emotions are the individual experienced counterpart. Such dualistic models, assuming an atomistic individual subject that subsequently needs to connect with the world, are the basic assumptions in contemporary mainstream psychology. For instance, in theories that conceptualize emotions as part of information-processing systems regulating behavior, such as in Cognitive-affective processing systems theory (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) or in mirror neuron-invoking theory-of-mind conceptualizations of how individual subjects are 'connected to the social' (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004)

To sum up, the strategy need for analyzing affect must enable us to analyze the elusive , uncertain, disordered, shifting and contingent "*pre-personal or transpersonal dimensions of affective life in everyday experience*" (B. Anderson, 2009, p. 77) that can give rise to novel experiences, cognitions and emotions and open for processes of becoming. The affective strategy must make it possible to analyze and conceptualize these as social processes that are not are outside our conscious experience and that interact with subjective phenomenological experiences, discourse, institutional orders and other cultural 'matrices' but are not appropriated as specific emotions or cognitions.

I will now propose an analytical concept that enables analyzing how affects are modulated, moved and changed, and that are interdependent with discourse, meaning, materiality and subjectivity. Here we will turn away from structure, language, discourse, as merely *signs* that can be seen, and read and leave the visual and essentialistic metaphors that since en-*lig*ht-ment have been the privileged and dominant epistemology in western science and society. We must change our registers toward sonic metaphors of resonances, rhythms, vibrations, oscillations, fluctuations and movements, in and between bodies. I will argue for a metaphor of sound-waves that carries both intensities and meanings, that can attune us to more affective and embodied ways of knowing, feeling and becoming (Blackman, 2012; Henriques, 2011)

The concept of 'Stimmung'

I will now turn to Heidegger's concept of 'Stimmung' (Heidegger, 1962, 1977, 1995, 2001) and argue that this is a promising adequate analytical concept that can mediate between affect studies, post-structuralism and governmentality studies and help us straddle the divide between body and mind, between reason and passion (Hardt, 2007). This might seem a queer move, but Foucault's thinking and post-structuralist theory are deeply inspired by Heidegger (Foucault, 1984) [4]

Stimmung is usually translated to English as "attunement" or "mood" (Ash, 2013; Heidegger, 1962, 1995; Stewart, 2011) but neither of these translations are able to convey a sense of the richness, complexity, multiple connotations and bodily experiences of the concept. So allow me I will use the experiment of retaining the German concept and in the remainder of the article use the German 'Stimmung' and guide the reader by offering some possible English translations in parentheses. A second function of using 'Stimmung' is that it has a 'Verfremdungseffekt' [distancing effect] (Brecht, 1964). Stimmung might be able to disrupt our reliance on ENGLISH as the hegemonic language in academia and create tension and distance to language that enable us to more embodied, affective relational approaches to analyzing affective experiences (B. Anderson, 2009; Henriques, 2011). Heidegger explicates that our subjectivity is fundamentally characterized by Stimmung:

> "Attunement [Stimmung] is a way, not merely a form or mode, but a way [Weize] – in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-called proper being at hand of man, but that sets the *tone* for such being, i.e., attunes [Stimt] and determines the manner and **way** [Art und Wie] **of his being**." (Heidegger, 1995, p. 67)

> Stimmungs "are the fundamental ways in which we find ourselves *disposed* in such and such a way. Attunements [Stimmungs] are the '*how*' [Wie] according to which one is in such and such a way.[...] And yet this 'one is in such and such a way' is not – is never – simply a consequence or side effect or our thinking doing and acting" (Heidegger, 1995, p. 67) (my italics, concepts in parentheses added from German original (Heidegger, 2004, p. 100))

In German Stimmung has roots and connotations from; voice (Stimme) mood (Stimmung) atmosphere (Stimmung) and to tune (into) something, e.g. a musical instrument, social situation

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[4] For a similar approach to affect and technology, see (Ash, 2013, p. 21) for reading on Heidegger and Foucault on space see (Elden, 2002)

(stimme, stimt) or that something balances or 'fits' as in an account (Stimmt). I will encourage the reader to try to SENSE Stimmung, which is not meant metaphorically. Try to pronounce the word slowly. I know the pronouncing could be difficult for non-German speakers, but the experience could be rather like when pronouncing the word '*moodish*' slowly. Try to let it resonate in/with your body. Experience it not merely as a concept or sign, but also as a resonance that pervades your whole being, or think of/listen to/tune into Muddy Waters singing the BLUES, or the sound and resonance of a Tibetan singing bowl and the associated Stimmungs [atmospheres, moods, feelings, emotions] bodily movements and resonances. Perhaps 'the blues' for some can be experienced as an adequate culturally recognizable example of a Stimmung [mood] that can be expressed and shared, without being described or appropriated as a particular emotion, but instead as a more general relation to the world, a 'color' that sets the "tone for such being, … and determines the manner and way of his being. "(Heidegger, 1995, p. 67)

When Heidegger uses the concept of Stimmung he tries phenomenologically to describe how our Being-in-the-world is always fundamentally Stimt [attuned, tuned] and resonates in a processual dynamic relation with-the-world. To understand the implications of this we must bring attention to the fact that the hyphens in 'Being-in-the-world' indicates an ontology, different from both mainstream psychology and classical phenomenology, where the subject and the world are connected through the subject's intentionality or *consciousness* (e.g. early Husserl, 1980). Instead Heidegger's existential-phenomenology can be regarded as a post-modern model of subjectivity. Here, subjectivity is relational, processual non-dualistic phenomena that never can be abstracted from the fact that we are situated spatially and temporarily with our bodies in-the-world. Connecting this to affect scholars' preoccupation with how we have 'the capacity to affect and be affected' (Deleuze, 1990; Massumi, 1992, p. 10) we can point out that this capacity is a consequence of our fundamental ontology. Our whole being is, according to Heidegger, always-already in an understanding-resonating-relation-with-the-world. Subjectivity and understanding of our lifeworld are thus fundamental, pre-reflexive always-already there, and generally not something that only subsequently must be established through acts of perception, cognition or reflexivity.

It is this fundamental, ontological 'affective intra-dependence', to use Barad's (2007) term, that Heidegger describes with the concept of Stimmung. Stimmung is experienced by the subject as 'our' Stimmung,[mood, attunement] and is how we resonates with, and are connected affectively, with the Stimmung [atmosphere, ambience] in the 'environment'. Stimmungs are intra-dependent

resonating in and between human bodies, discursive bodies and non-human bodies (B. Anderson, 2009; Blackman, 2012; Stewart, 2007)and are dynamically modified by those and vice versa. When Heidegger (1995, p. 67) states that Stimmung "determines the manner and way of his[or hers] being" he points to Stimmung as a basic form of subjectivity, or a fundamental way of being, that affects our whole being, including thoughts, emotions and actions. Depression, melancholia or euphoria could be examples how Stimmungs pervades the being of subjects, social settings and whole societies (Andrews, 2013) and shapes the possibilities for, or gives rise to, particular cognitions, emotions, and ways of relating to and being-in-the-world. Heidegger emphasizes that extreme cases such as grief or depression tend to disguise the fact that less intense Stimmungs are everyday phenomena, that are fundamental for an understanding of the modes or ways in which we are-in-the-world.(Heidegger, 2001).

Stimmungs are not only sensual, or bodily, they are a basic form of *understanding*, embedded with meaning and significance that are distributed across the whole relational field and across time. This means that Stimmung is a form of understanding that in a way that is 'deeper' 'wiser' or more 'extensive' than appropriated reason, cognition or emotion. Different Stimmungs can in this way modulate, open or close potentials, possibilities, 'horizons of understanding' (Gadamer, 1989) and relational ways of being and relating. 'With' different Stimmungs we are connected-relationally-to-the-word in ways that can be more or less restrictive or expansive, and enable different subjectivities or ways of being to unfold and become. This is the phenomenological experience we express in everyday language, as being more or less 'open' towards someone or something, and this openness is a Stimmt relation to or with-the-world that is opened by Stimmung. Take a breath and try to experience this in relation to this text you are reading now, and the wider Lebenswelt [lifeworld] in which you are.

Stimmungs are a part of a non-dualistic ontology and way of thinking, and although the in-the world could lead us astray, Stimmungs are relational and not *in* the subject or *in* the environment, because the bodies and spaces we inhabit are not containers, and there is no inside/outside, but rather Stimmungs that re(a)sonate and unfold 'in' time. The use of Stimmung does not separate affect from discourse or emotions from cognitions, but includes the whole relational field, subjects, objects, bodies, materiality and meaning. All these aspects are multi-directional and connected, so when we enter a social situation certain Stimmungs can modulate 'our' Stimmung and give rise to

specific emotions and meanings that in turn can feedback into and modify 'our' Stimmung and vice versa.

The concept of Stimmung has, in my view, considerable practical and theoretical advantages. It is a common phenomenological word, with parallel use, meaning and connotation in Danish and German [5] that are/can be used in everyday language by the social workers we collaborate with. When we interview the 'young users' at the drug treatment facility, about why they find it easier to talk about their problems in this institution in comparison with other contexts, they are among other things referring to the Stimmung (Danish; stemming; [atmosphere, 'vibe'] in the institution. As Stimmung also is a theoretical concept, this allows for translations, transformations and connections between theory and practice. Further because of the tactical polyvalence and ontological compatibility, Stimmung can be plugged into poststructuralist theory and connect and mediate between language, symbols, knowledge, power, meanings, spaces, affects, emotions and phenomenological experiences, and thus have the potential for including all the recent turns in post-structuralism, and be used to develop a theoretical understandings of subjectivity and affective subjectification in social work practices.

Let us now return to the primary argument and not judge the concept of Stimmung according to it precision in representation or extension, but on what it can do, when plugged into or assembled with other concepts, texts, theories and social practices (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). I will now analyze an example of how the modulation of Stimmung is a central part of subjectification and government in contemporary Danish social work.

The empirical example is taken from the Day-team in the institution Helsingung, introduced earlier. In the Day-team the youths have been working with so-called 'pocket movies' as a part of their Danish classes. A pocket movie is a short 1-3 minutes low-tech movie or a series of pictures, sometimes with a voice-over or background music, that the youths in cooperation with their peers and social workers have made about themselves. Apart from giving them the experience of working with media technologies, a main idea in working with pocket movies is that the youths get an opportunity to produce more preferred stories about their identity, and that this can counter some of the many problem-saturated accounts of life (White, 2007) that they are subjected to as they circulate among themselves and their peers, teachers, parents and caseworkers.

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[5] In Danish language: stemming, in German Stimmung.

Initially it was the plan, that the youths should show the pocket movies to their friends and family, but during the last weeks of the project, they gradually transformed this to the idea that they should have a 'gala-premiere' or a release party. The following is a rather long excerpt from field notes about this event that the youths in collaboration with the social workers have planned. This is both to give the reader an idea about what is going on, and most importantly to try to convey a sense of how the Stimmung [intensities, energies, affects or atmospheres] and subjectivities are modulated, changed and transformed during the event.

The 'gala-premiere' – adapted from field notes

"It is a dark and cold, late afternoon in November. I am walking the short distance from the train station to the institution. The institution is located in an old villa, and as I turn into the front yard, I am surprised by the cozy atmosphere. The worn-down concrete stairs that lead up to the front door is covered by a red carpet, some purple balloons are attached to the banister, and a garden torch lights up in the dark. I experience this as cozy Christmas-like atmosphere that makes a pleasant contrast to the dark, cold November afternoon.

I enter the house and walk into what normally serves as the dining room. The dining room is decorated with balloons and candles, and it is almost filled up with chairs standing in rows facing a big screen. Around the kitchen table, three social workers are preparing and decorating non-alcoholic cocktails in tall champagne glasses.

There are bowls candy and chips on the kitchen table, and I can hear and smell the popping of popcorn, from the microwave-oven. The social workers are more or less dressed up. It is clear that they have made something special of their appearance today.

There are ten minutes until the event is supposed to start. Only the social workers are present. None of the youths or their relatives have arrived yet. One of the social workers is looking at the clock on the wall, and asks out of the blue - half-jokingly, half seriously[?] "I wonder if anyone will show up?"

There is an atmosphere of preparation. It reminds me of preparation for a party with family or friends. There is the same kind of uplifted, excited and a little nervous, unresolved mood or atmosphere.

At 4 o-clock, the youths and their relatives begin to arrive, they circulate, shakes hands and introduce themselves to each other. Most of them are dressed up, especially some of the girls with cocktail dresses in glittery fabric. This support the idea that this is a gala-premiere.

In comparison to what we are used to in this institution, people act a rather more formally and at the same time are more friendly. People are shaking hands and are engaging in small talk in groups.

The atmosphere reminds me of what it is like to arrive to a party where you do not know the other guests so well.

Didda, one of the social workers, stands up in front of the screen and says welcome. She tells us about the background for the work with movies. One element is that we 'become' through the stories other people tell about us. These young people are used to a lot of different stories about themselves, so sometimes it can be nice that they are able to tell their own stories. And here the movies can be a good weapon.

She highlights the great work they have put into the movies and how they've been helpful and supportive to each other in the process."

Analysis part one: Why this is (not just) a governmentality analysis.

Let us start in a well-known landscape, and briefly sketch how a governmentality analysis could analyze the processes of subjectification in this example. Next I will show how Stimmung as an affective analytical strategy can be used to expand that analysis. First of all we must take the background of this into account. We are in a municipal treatment facility to which young people are referred because they are having some difficulties in their lives. Most visible to parents, caseworkers and 'the system' is the fact that the adolescents are not part of the normal - or even specialized - education system and that they have a known consumption of illegal drugs. The parents often have a long history of concerns about their children's behavior and well-being, which

are amplified by the fact that they smoke hash. The parents are often both troubled or embarrassed by this, and this predisposes them to have a strained, troubled or ambivalent relationship to their children and their drug use. A sentence such as 'if they just would stop smoking hash, and do what other normal youths do' could be a prototypical for the parents understanding of problems. This furthermore leads to self-doubts about their abilities as parents and feelings of incompetence or personal failure (White, 2002).

A governmentality analysis could typically approach this as a consequence of how the disciplinary, pastoral and neo-liberal dispositives, install certain tendencies in practices, both in schools and families and in more specialized institutions regulating health and deviance; social work, the penal system, welfare offices. Through heterogeneous discourses, institutions, materialities', techniques and technologies, there are established 'ways of seeing' and produced knowledge about deviance and problems that makes drug-use, school drop-out and crime visible as individual and often psychological problems. The analysis could show how these complex webs of knowledge/power produce deviant subjectivities and subjectify the youths as problematic and how they stigmatize, marginalize and individualize problems in a way that locates the responsibility for, and perhaps the solution to, these problems in the individuals - or in their families. This in turn contributes to further tension, conflict, and marginalization, between youths, parents and the representatives of the welfare state. Against this background it is no big surprise that many of the youths and their parents are disinclined to cooperate with the municipality or the social workers, as they have had bad experiences with representatives of the welfare state. Many vicious circles could be in play here.

Some of these critiques are raised and shared by the social workers we collaborate with, as they to some extend are informed by post-structuralist and social-constructivist thinking. They think that many caseworkers, psychiatrists, teachers, and institutions preserve or even amplify the young peoples' difficulties by focusing on drugs and problems. In this light the release party at Helsingung could be analyzed both as a critique and as an extension and strengthening of these forms of government.

Very briefly, a critical analysis could look something like this. The practice regime at Helsingung governs subjects by deconstructing the strong asymmetrical disciplinary/institutional relationship between experts and citizens, and makes other subject positions and categories for subjectification available to parents and youths. This is done by a discursive and material framing of the institution Helsingung as something relatively normal and different from the municipality and other treatment

regimes. This is not primarily a 'treatment', but school and other normal activities. This is substantiated by events, such as the release party, that are very different from the parents' previous experiences with 'the system' which mostly has been about their youths as problematic. When the youths and social workers invite the relatives as guests to a release party, they establish a precarious 'host-guest' relationship. The parents are invited as guests and have, in this way, a responsibility to actively participate and co-create the event. An aspect of this is that the social workers as 'hosts' are putting themselves at stake. They are not in a 'safe' expert position, they have dressed up, and depend on the parents and the youths showing up and playing their roles. This redistributes the subject positions and relational forces where the parents and youths are both more powerful and more responsible. In this way we have a 'soft power' that governs and subjectifies the parents by entangling them in norms and subject positions of 'guests' and 'good parents' – positions as responsible subjects that are very hard to refuse.

Thus, critically read, this is just another way that the techniques of neo-liberal and disciplinary governing becomes more flexible and regains strength. This is of course also what is going on. But as I shall argue, if we analyze this affectively we will be able to see something different, something more. In the next section, I will add an affective layer to the analysis, and see how Stimmung as an analytical strategy can point to how affective form of subjectification allow parents, youth and social workers to become different. The diagram of this is not 'ordering' through signs, but a modulation of Stimmung that opens for movement and becoming. In this way the analysis intends to show how an affective governing can modulate and change the disciplinary, pastoral and neo-liberal strategies we are so familiar with.

The modulation of Stimmung and subjectivity in the Gala premiere
When I arrived at the institution that day in November, I turned the corner and saw the entrance with a red carpet, balloons and a torch. This was something different to what I had anticipated, and there was a modulation of my Stimmung[mood/affective register]. I was Stimt by [phenomenologically affected by/attuned to] the cozy Christmas-like Stimmung [atmosphere]. This changed my way of being relationally in-the-world. I became more receptive, and this opened my 'horizon of understanding' and the possibilities for experience. I think it is plausible to assume that when the relatives and youth arrived 10 minutes later, they were also in different ways Stimt [affected/attuned] by this Stimmung [atmosphere]. Next I entered the kitchen/living room, where

the social workers were preparing the last details. Here it is quite interesting that there was an "*excited and a little nervous, unresolved mood or atmosphere*" among them. The social workers are professionals at work, but even before the 'guests' arrived, this Stimmung [atmosphere] resonated in the room and in and between subjects, bodies and in my interpretation it was also expressed in the social worker's statement: *"I wonder if anyone will show up"*

If we take seriously the idea that Stimmung is a processual phenomenon and *"a joint, coordinated, relational activity" (Wetherell, 2012, p. 83)* then it is exactly not something the participants just create discursively and perform. The gala-premiere is of course also an 'artificially' produced and discursively indexed event, as most social events are. But what matters for this analysis it how it becomes 'real' and affects subjects and bodies through the Stimmungs that are produced.

> *At 4 o-clock, the youths and their relatives begin to arrive, they circulate shakes hands and introduce themselves to each other. [...] In comparison to what we are used to in this institution, people act rather more formally and at the same time they are more friendly. People are shaking hands and are small-talking in groups.*

> *The Stimmung reminds me of what it is like to arrive to a party where you do not know the other guests so well.*

When the youth and their relatives arrive they are Stimt [affected] by this Stimmung [atmosphere] that loosens up the subject positions and categories that are normally associated with treatment institutions and disciplinary forms. The Stimmung opens for discursive /affective co-creation of the event that enables the social workers to 'become hosts' and invites the youths and parents into 'becoming guests', and this makes it possible for new relational subjectivities to emerge. This Stimmung [atmosphere/affective 'patterning'] is not just popping out of nowhere, but has a history and is indeed connected to other Stimmungs, understandings and feelings and wider ' institutions of intelligibility'" (Wetherell, 2012, p. 79), in particular to how the social workers and youth have been working jointly with this event for some time.

To clarify: the analysis describes how Stimmung and subjectivity are modulated. This is done in an event. A heterogeneous assemblage of the youths and their families, their histories and their experiences with representatives of the welfare state. The institution of Helsingung, and the discursive/linguistic framing of the event and different material actants (Latour, 2005) from the villa itself to snacks, candlelights, balloons and bodies that are dressed up. All this contributes to the

event and the Stimmung. This is a timely matter. There are always tones, tunes and Stimmungs, that we move on from, and that set the possibilities for what can emerge. It influences the next gesture, action, thought, emotion, Stimmung, and that again changes – or continues - the meaning and Stimmung of what preceded it. Events, memories and experiences unfolds dynamically through time-space-matter-meanings. The past is folded into the present and so is the future. The expectation of the future, of the next tone, also participates in this dynamic unfolding of the event. This means that if the relatives are Stimt in certain (e.g. disciplinary) ways before the event, it can be very difficult for something new to emerge.

Here Stimmung as an analytical strategy points to a dynamic unfolding and modulation of Stimmung as a 'melodic line of continuous variation' (Deleuze, 1978) that enables different relational forms of subjectivity to unfold, including more appropriated subjective meanings and emotions that flows together in the event, and that makes up the social experience (Middleton & Brown, 2005). However, let us move back to the case, and try to sense how Stimmungs are created and unfolds.

> *We are in the living room of Helsingung: The youths, the relatives and social workers are slowly getting seated. There are candlelights in the window panes and a projector is displaying the computer's welcome screen on the 2x2 meter screen. We are waiting. Somethingis about to start, but we are quite unsure about what.*
>
> *Didda, one of the social workers, stands up in front of the screen, and gives an introduction, to the youths' work with pocket movies.*
>
> *"One element is that we 'become' through the stories other people tell about us. These youths are used to a lot of different stories about themselves, so sometimes it can be nice that they are able to tell their own stories. And here the movies can be a good weapon.*
>
> *She highlights the great work they have put into the movies and how they have been helpful and supportive to each other in the process,* and how the movie project is a part of school.
>
> *Didda says that there are some different products. Some decided to make a movie about something that matters to them, some have chosen a photo series and some have*

> *chosen to tell a story about the development they have been through while being in Helsingung.*

While Didda get help from one of the youths to find the right movie, we are left with the impression that this is something important. This is not *just* about a school project. I experience suspense and an increasing intensity. Again Stimmungs are modulated, shifting towards seriousness, resonating with the Stimmung of a ceremony, where something new are about to be disclosed.

> *The first movie are projected on the screen. We see Benjamin[6], one of the youth from the Day-team, moving towards the camera and squeezing through a hole in a wire fence surrounding a football field. The grass on the football field, seems radiant green, and the pictures almost illuminates the dark room. We now see Benjamin juggling with a football, accompanied by the song "uartig" [naughty] by the popular Danish dance-hall artist Wafande.*

> Now try to listen http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7kZTtVvG-I time 1.23 – 2.10

> *It is an upbeat rather happy song, about partying, sex and having a good time. As we hear this we see some fast sequences of Benjamin shooting goals from different angles. He appears to be a fast, competent football player. Then we see him leaving through the hole in the fence again, accompanied by the final lyrics from Wafande, "come on in, you only get smiles, good karma and only good style/attitude" ending on a high note.*

The movie lasts 47 seconds and we do not see anything apart from Benjamin playing football, but it definitely does something. The multimodal signs resonate and affects the audience, and create a certain loose, happy and relaxed Stimmung. Some of the relatives and social workers are making small movements to the music. And the relatives seem happy, maybe relieved that nothing embarrassing was happening or shown. There is a more intense or energetic Stimmung in the room now.

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[6] The names of the youths are changed, and the names of the social workers are real in accordance with their own wishes.

The next 'movie' is made by Jill And she has chosen a series of pictures where we see her in the classroom, doing homework, having o good time hugging and hanging out with the other youths.

For us who know her background this is in stark contrast to the many negative stories and stigmatizing classifications she has been exposed to by social workers, teachers and psychiatrists, as a bad pupil, troublesome, and low in IQ. In these just 7-8 pictures, she is deliberately showing a more preferred story about who she is. An almost ordinary school pupil who works hard in school and has fun with her good friends. The message that struck me, and the social workers was "I am happy here" and "Yes I can"[7].

In the event there is totally five small movies or picture series like this, between 0.47 and 3.16 minutes. After each film everybody are clapping. An in the end the youth are called up individually in front of the screen to receive flowers, and everyone claps again. Some of the parents are beginning to take photos, which prompts a youth to ask why they don't have a class photo. More cameras are fetched, and the youth pose for the camera, with their arms around each other. We now have a Stimmung of 'graduation' or last day in school. Everybody seems happy and relaxed.

There is no more on the program. One of the social workers says there are more pizzas and snacks. The youths and a lot of the adults walk outside to smoke, but they return and hang out and there seems to be no hurry to leave.

What is going on here? How can we understand this as affective social work? In this article I have described how social workers find it very difficult to work with these youths, and how disciplinary, neo-liberal and pastoral strategies played out in different institutions, obviously have not been productive in making these youths into self-regulating governable subjects within the normal boundaries of youth life. The youth do not find the institutions attractive, and they are not inclined to engage in traditional psy-technologies, be they pastoral; confession, dialogue, therapy or disciplinary; measurement, judgment, sanctioning and control or neo-liberal; allowing the youths to optimizing subjectivity through promises of future economic advantages.

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[7] The "yes i can" impression was discussed subsequently with the social workers, and connotates the optimism surrounding Barak Obama's first election as president at that time, this cultural Stimmung [atmosphere] in this way became a resource for understanding and articulating subjectivity.

The analysis proposed here is that these 'strategies of ordering' with their categories, discourses, norms and techniques that focuses on problems and deviance are so pervasive across Danish society that they become too strong and powerful. The 'lines of light' and 'lines of enunciation' makes subjectivity visible in ways that confine and close down movement and becoming (G Deleuze, 1992). The youths are like deer caught in the headlight of the panopticon. The light is too bright, there is no escape, no residual power, no lines of flight, not enough freedom to engage in vital technologies of the self, movement and becoming, only threats of marginal existence. What these youths need is not more surveillance and norming, on the contrary they have felt useless, wrong, queer and marginalized in so many contexts. In response the bodies freeze up and words dry out. Their form of resistance is indifference, passivity and a silent protest that leaves the traditional forms of governance dumbfounded. This means that social workers for several reasons must invent other forms of subjectification. Informed by post-modern forms of therapy, they are careful and selective with the words, categories and discourses they use. But as the discursive forms of subjectification are precarious, they strategically try to subjectify the youths through 'second order' intervention, that does not prescribe or categorize but instead modulates subjectivity affectively, and produces 'intensity' to 'affect' or 'energize' the youths and creates the right 'atmosphere'. This both loosens the grip of pastoral and disciplinary forms of power strategies, and modulates affectively to open possibilities for the youths to produce their own norms and signs of subjectivity.

A reason for articulating the gala-premiere as innovative affective social work is the relational, cultural and systemic approach, which is an integrated part of the treatment regime. In the gala-premiere the primary objects of intervention are perhaps not the young clients, but rather the way the parents and others think, see, talk and relate to them. We know from interviews with parents and social workers that parents with drug-using young people in many cases resonates with a negative *Stimmung and experiences with* despair, hopelessness, frustration, depression, isolation, that are affecting the whole family, and the parents approach to their children. We have vicious circles at play here. Because certain Stimmungs predisposes the parents possibilities to feel, think and act, this 'closes down' their 'horizon of understanding' so that they are not able to recognize the positive steps the youth are *also* taking in their life, and to move from scolding, shame, guilt, towards to more vital and productive relations. That families and professionals in the field are caught up by such Stimmungs, that are closely connected to normalizing discourses about education, drugs and treatment, and disciplinary and pastoral ways of thinking/feeling/acting towards the youths.

So the gradual transformation of Stimmung that I sensed in the release-party is an affective subjectification modulation of the parents that opens their 'horizon of understanding' and changes their way-of being-relationally-in-the-world. This makes it possible for the youths to distribute their own stories about preferred identities to the relatives – and to be seen, felt and understood, not just as problematic unreliable drug-using youths, but rather as 'normal' youths with competences, capabilities, hopes and dreams; youths in movement, processes of becoming, that are developing their own forms of life, where they deal with their problems - including that they (perhaps) will reduce their use of drugs when the time is right for them.

This translation of preferred identities, is not 'just' a story, but multi-modal resonances that modulate the parents' Stimmung. Drawing on Baudrillard (1994) the pocket movies can be seen as hyper-real signs, used as 'affective weapons' in a multimodal production of identity and increased affective intensity (Blackman, 2012, p. 70) that produces a Stimmung that allows for a break with the 'existing code of signification' and opens up for new understandings, new ways of relating to the youths that in turn make it possible for them to become relationally-different. Following the work of (Chaput, 2010) on reality-TV, the lucidity and brightness of the film and the pervasiveness of the sound are producing "*energy levels [that] seep into our home spaces and inhabit the embodied experience of viewers, compelling us toward new modalities of belonging*." (Chaput, 2010, p. 9) So we have loops of Stimmungs, understandings, cognitions, emotions and subjectivities that mediate by different artifacts and technologies modulate and change each other.

This example of affective modulation of Stimmung, is not just limited to this specific event, but can be seen as a more general strategy or diagram for subjectification in the practices we study. In many cases we experience how the social workers affect the youths by modulating on Stimmung. This is done both by the use of architectural and spatial configurations (Bank & Nissen, in prep) but especially what social workers are using of their own contagious energy, bodily movements, pitch and modulation of voice [Stimme] and enthusiasm in relation to - or on behalf of - the youths. (Bank, Submittet)

This analysis could lead us towards thinking that the primary means for subjectification in post-disciplinary social work are not traditional psy-technologies using knowledge and appropriation of subjectivity through categories, subject positions and discourses. Rather, we must think through a diagram of movement, becoming, as in affective modulating of the potentials of life (Staunæs, 2011) or drawing on Davies (1991) an affective production of agency, that amplifies or prolongs the

force of the youths' own actions and thoughts and enables them to become enthusiastic about their own lives, and thus a new way of working with 'motivation'. The affective strategies are in this way affecting the youths to develop their own preferred ways of being, that secondarily become objectified and distributed as signs in their lifeworld.

Conclusion

Governmentality studies have primarily developed strategies for analyzing how practice regimes produce subjectivity and govern through processes of ordering. Many studies have analyzed how subjectivity is made visible, measurable and an object of knowledge through distinctive ways of thinking, questioning drawing on certain practical rationalities, techniques and technologies (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1990). Governmental and post-structuralist approaches have been criticized, especially by current scholars of affect for relying too much on discourse and language, and neglecting materiality, bodies, ontology and affect (Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick & Frank, 1995). In this article I recognize some of these criticisms and the need for new resources for theorizing about affect, subjectivity and process of becoming, but I am critical of some of the strategies, concepts and theories that are used, (Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick & Frank, 2003) as I find these are incompatible with Governmentality studies and post-structuralist theory and as they lure us in to dichotomies and dualisms and thus restrict, rather than enhance, our capacities and possibilities for analyzing, theorizing and producing change.

I this article I argue that by re-engaging with the roots of post-structuralism, Heidegger's ontology and the concept Stimmung, we could find more useful ways of thinking that would allow us to expand governmental strategies in a quasi-phenomenological analysis of how affects are a part of subjectification processes. Using Stimmung as an analytical concept allows us to explore how affect and discourse are intra-dependent in processes of subjectification. The empirical material is taken from contemporary social work practice, but the analytical strategy should not be limited to the current study. It could be used to analyze affect in other practice regimes, and perhaps also re-applied in analyzing classical corrective disciplinary institutions, the school, the factory, the prison (Foucault, 1977a). The bell that rings, the door that slams, the lock that clicks, the watch that ticks, could all be analyzed as small techniques that modulate Stimmung [intensities, atmospheres or affective registers] and yet are embedded with meaning and cultural significance.

Governmentality studies have analyzed how the psy-sciences the last centuries have contributed to subjectification through processes of ordering, and critical scholars and professionals have excelled in relevant but perhaps futile critiques of these relations of power. But perhaps the time has come for us as critical scholars to engage more directly with the practices we study. A hope is that the affective strategy I have proposed could also have a critical productive potential, and allow us to point towards how contemporary and future social work practices can work both with and against dominant forms of power.

The example in this article shows how subjects through 'affective technologies' are able to modify hegemonic narratives on subjectivity and drug-use and affectively distribute new 'signs of experience', that are more in accordance with their own values, wishes and beliefs. This affective form of subjectification has the potential to change the dynamics and social technologies in which the subjects are entrenched.

In this light I hope this article may be a small contribution to a second order (Brown & Stenner, 2009) or post-psychology (Staunæs & Juelskjær, 2014) that produces vital and productive concepts and critiques and plugs them into the practices to enhance more vital, flexible or 'user-driven' forms of subjectification. It is with this purpose that I propose the concept of Stimmung as an analytical strategy, that can contribute to:

> *".....a kind of criticism that would ... [...] multiply not judgments but signs of existence: it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invent them sometimes – all the better. All the better."* (Foucault, 1997, p. 323)

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Beyond Spaces of Counselling

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Abstract

The article articulates experiments with spatial constructions in two Danish social work agencies, basing on a) a sketchy genealogical reconstruction of conceptualizations and uses of space in social work and counselling; b) a search for theoretical resources to articulate new spaces, and c) data from a long-standing collaboration with the social workers. Beside the classical disciplinary and pastoral spaces, we find spaces of attunement, spaces of production, and public spaces as forms of spatialisations which might be taken as prototypical in attempts to develop social work and counselling.

Keywords: space, place, drugs, social work, youth work, affect

Preview

This is a screen shot from a video recorded at *Helsingung*, a small Danish municipal agency where social workers[1] help young people with social problems that include issues with drugs. We see: Two persons in conversation; the young person on the couch, legs drawn up, anonymised; the counsellor, wearing appropriate glasses and turtleneck, leaning forward. Add to this the presence of the paper sheets, and the fact itself of the photo, directing our clinical gaze – and we recognise a space of counselling, a therapeutic space.

This version is fairly up-to-date. Hollywood gives us images of the psychoanalyst sitting with his notebook behind the couch, or of the direct open-face encounter in more client-centered, humanistic approaches; but clinical and social work practices have moved on. Not long after the above picture was taken, Michael, the counsellor, wants to discuss how Emily, the client,

is doing. Emily has been filling in the Outcome Rating Scale that lies in front of her, in this as in several previous sessions, and Michael has ascertained a declining curve: Emily reports doing worse. He finds this worrisome, since statistics show that a declining ORS curve is correlated with likely dropout. Michael tries to intervene with standard techniques in "solution-focused brief therapy" (the "miracle question", and then "scaling", performed verbally and with his body):

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
[1] Professional categories vary between countries, more than often realized. 'Social worker' is used here as a generic term for people working in the broad social field. They include, in the cases discussed here, psychologists and other (Ma) academics, secondary school teachers, case managers, pedagogues, and unskilled and/or self-taught (12 step) counsellors.

Michael   *When that curve is broken* (showing with hand) *and starts to go up, or at least stops going down, what would, like, for you – I could have all sort of ideas, and your parents, and the rest – but for **you**, what would be the sign that, hey, now it kind of stopped", or, now it's either going up or more like* (hand horizontal) *- ?*

Emily   (looking down) *I don't know.* (silence)

Michael   *How much do you believe in it? What are the chances the curve will break at some point?*

Emily   *I really don't know*

Michael   *Just a guess – what do you think? What would be fair?*

Emily   *But I don't know… like!*

Introduction

This article emerges from a long-term research collaboration with two agencies for young drug users, called "U-turn" and "Helsingung". The research project is called "User-Driven Standards in Social Work": We investigate how standards of youth life (with and without drugs) and standards of social work are reflected, modified, and created through experimental activities for which users' recognition and participation are considered crucial. On a grant from the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, Helsingung implements the "U-turn model", which is described as a new way of helping young people who use drugs.

Our contributions are to record, articulate, and problematise those practices. Accordingly, the main aim of this paper is to contribute to discussions in social work, psychotherapy and counselling, through empirical and productive analysis, using theories of space and subjectivity. The hope is that our analysis can serve in a Hermes function (Serres, 1982), between what is often thought to be conceptually, methodologically distinct disciplines: therapy, social work and cultural geography – and make these traditions intersect and reflect each other productively. This is both exchange, transformation and translation of references, empirical as well as theoretical, and thereby a production of theoretically informed descriptions that can serves as models, or prototypes for future practice (for this methodology, see Nissen, 2009, 2012).

One set of reasons for prototyping new ways of working with young people are the problems we saw Michael encounter in the preview. It is quite common for young clients to be extremely passive and reply in one syllable or with the impenetrable "I don't know". The problem is reported in the Danish clinical literature (Holmgren, 2006; Riber, 2005). The prevalent approach to the problem in the clinical community focuses on individualistic or therapeutic/technical explanations. These could suggest that the young clients are perhaps not sufficiently motivated for counselling, that the relation or therapeutic alliance between client and the counsellor/therapist/social worker is not good enough, or that the specific methods used are inadequate. But the social workers at Helsingung and U-turn experiment with more radical ideas, which call into question some basic assumptions in counselling. One of the ways they do this is by modifying how counselling is *spatialised* – how counselling spaces are constructed and performed, even as spaces that are no longer (only) spaces of counselling. To give a few examples, they furnish one room with a Buddha statue and low couches, and

another room with classic leather furniture from the time of Freud; they devote resources to giving their entry a friendly and inviting atmosphere; they teach while leaving the door open to the corridor; they hold meetings with professionals from other agencies in the open space of the kitchen, where their young clients are allowed to interrupt as they make themselves some tea; they set up representational artefacts such as flipovers that the clients snapshot with their smartphones to take home; they connect to the internet and write letters to colleagues together with clients; etc.

Our intention is to analyse the spaces of our social worker partners as disciplinary – following a long tradition in social theory – but also, perhaps more interestingly, as at least sometimes different from disciplinary spaces; and, most to the point, we aim to understand those different spaces positively as affective spaces, spaces of hope, as workshops and public spaces.

Initially we will sketch how theory and research in psychotherapy and social work have dealt with spatiality historically. The relations and intersections between spatial theory and identity practices and politics, or subjectivity – not to mention their relations to psy-practices and social work - have a long, complex and 'famously messy' history within social theory and are inextricably linked to questions about power (Dale & Burrell, 2008). This will provide us with some historical background about theoretical analyses of spatial practices and bring attention to how we might be able to contribute to these discussions analytically and empirically.

In the first analytical section we will use phenomenological descriptions of counselling in two different places, 'the office' and 'the Buddha', to analyse how these are spatialised though material artefacts, discourse and other cultural aspects. This will show us how these spaces predispose towards different subjectivities and ways of relating. In the next analytical section, will use video recordings from a counselling session to analyse how a counsellor and a client through their activities, dialogues, and bodily movements perform and spatialise a living room differently.

Through these analyses, we will show how spatiality conducts counsellors' and clients' actions and subjectivities, sometimes implicitly and unnoticed, sometimes deliberately.

By conducting two analyses that in turn focus on what we might call *material* and *performative* aspects of space, spatialisation and counselling, respectively, these contrasts will

make it possible for us to articulate our social worker partners' ideas of how some of the difficulties in producing self-reflexive speaking subjects in counselling and therapy are related to spatialisation, and how these problems can be worked with by transgressing some of the fundamental 'spatial dogmas' in therapy: the therapeutic setting as space of reflexivity, and psychological insight as the primary means for change. In this way this article will point toward what a post-therapeutic technology of the self might look like.

Spatiality in Counselling and Social Work

"Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power" (Foucault, 1984, p. 252)

Spatiality have a long history of being used in governing and regulating subjectivity, health and deviance, in making subjects, objects for knowledge and power. Indeed, the historical development of spatial dispersion of subjects in monastic cells, army units, hospitals (Foucault, 1977), asylums (Goffman, 1968; Prior, 1993), social work facilities (Donzelot, 1979) and counselling spaces, can be said to be a genealogy of the modern subject (Elden, 2002).

Drawing on Foucault, there are in particular two spatialised technologies of power that are relevant for our present inquiries: disciplinary and pastoral power. These forms of power are never found in pure form, but blend, modulate and transform into specific institutional practices and spaces by drawing on a plethora of different elements.

Exemplary fields of discipline are the armies, schools and hospitals, where spatial dispersion of subjects is an important part of what makes it possible for individual subjects to be objects of power and knowledge. The 'diagram' - the ideal, standard form - of disciplinary subjectification crucially includes individualisation through cellular dispersion. This makes policing, surveillance and regulation in detail possible, and it installs a permanent reflexivity, the internalisation of a normalising gaze so that subjects engage in self-surveillance and regulation of their behaviour in relation to norms (Foucault, 1977). In Foucault's genealogy, discipline as a technology of power does not remain limited to particular institutions, but becomes dispersed and proliferates as the modern states, subjects and institutions emerge

from and produce each other, in what is termed "the carceral", a generalised disciplinarisation and policing of society (ibid., 293 ff.). One might think that, in this generalisation of discipline, beyond the confines of particular institutions, spatiality would evaporate; in fact, however, it is re-established and re-performed in ever new ways and in ever new places (cf. also Cohen, 1985).

Pastoral power, prototypically found in catholic practices of confession, works through articulation of truth about inner mental states or actions. This establishes reflexivity and subjectifies, as the subject engages in a number of truth relations to the self (Foucault, 1982). These relations are mediated by an authority, either directly to God as in prayer, mediated by men of the church, as in confession, or in more contemporary pastoral relations to parents, school-teachers, employers, friends, therapists, etc. Here, the submission to certain moral or ethical standards is effected through dialogue and identification, rather than surveillance and allocation. Yet, of course, in many forms, pastoral power includes disciplinary elements and vice versa – as we shall see.

Pastoral technologies were to a large extent dispersed, stabilised though spatial technologies in the modern disciplinary institutions. The cell, the confession booth, the interrogation room, the social workers' office, and designated spaces for therapy and counselling, are spatial technologies that seclude the subject from the world and the eyes and ears of other people. This makes articulation of intimate details both possible and required, and strengthens the relation between truth telling and power. In this way, disciplinary and pastoral powers work by combining spatial, material arrangements and discursive procedures and categories in such a way that discourse and materiality are connected, expressed in and gain power from each other.

We might say that, in the Foucauldian analyses of relations between truth-telling, subjectivity and spatiality in disciplinary and pastoral power, subjectification occurs through a "*doubling of language, thought and knowledge, by practices, power relations, and material spatial environments*" (West-Pavlov, 2009, p. 120). Thus, the ubiquitous renderings of Foucauldian discourse analysis as exclusively focused on written and verbal language, in our view, miss important potentials in Foucault's texts. Obviously, this does not mean that these texts have no shortcomings. Some of these limitations become apparent when Foucault and his texts are read as resources for the creation of new prototypes for spatialising social work. For one

thing, the preoccupation with disciplinary and pastoral spaces rarely leads to viable alternatives, that is, positive characterisations of spaces that may be judged productive, beyond being 'Other-spaces' (Foucault, 1986); this is an implication of Foucault's negative epistemology of "refusing what we are" (cf. Nissen, 2013): Secondly, Foucauldian analyses are largely unconnected with contemporary research and literature about psycho-therapy and counselling, where spatial aspects are treated very sparsely or only viewed from within given therapeutic standards. We will now turn briefly to this tradition.

Modern forms of psychotherapy are all indebted to Freud's 'talking cure' (Freud & Breuer, 1895) and his invention of a particular psychoanalytic space. Although psychotherapy, counselling and similar practices can be seen as prototypical, modern pastoral techniques, they have a difficult and precarious relation to disciplinary and pastoral forms of power, both in the wider society and as these are played out and handled in the therapeutic encounter.

According to Freud, the psychoanalytic setting, with the therapist sitting behind the client lying on the couch, is a technology of comfort; supporting the body, dampening external stimuli and enabling the client to relax the body and the mind; relieving the client from gaze of the therapist in order to disrupt the ordinary rational, normative demands from any combination of super ego/society/farther/therapist/God (Freud, 1958). Viewed as a spatialised psy-technology (Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1998), this can be read as attempts to overcome the negative effects of disciplinary (and even pastoral) power, by unsettling standard formats of conversation that facilitate coercive, dominant forms of power,

and to some extent inverse the direction of power and agency (Parker, 2010). Another reading, however, could regard the setup as an extension of these forms of subjectification by staging reflexivity and insight as means for normalisation suited for liberal subjects (Rose, 1996), a form that only appears to be opposed to or distanced from given normative demands. This difference can also be recognised if we look closer a Freud's practice in terms of spatialisation, where an interesting oddity, or discrepancy, appears.

In Freud's few writings about the psychoanalytic space (Freud, 1958), he emphasises how the therapeutic space should dampen external stimuli and intensity and be a neutral space. Extending this, we could see it as space that in certain respects have similar qualities as disciplinary spaces in the clinic or the hospital, where the subject and her disease is purified, a spatial arrangement that has largely been taken up and passed on in modern clinical practices. But when we, on the other hand, look at pictures and descriptions of Freud's actual therapeutic setting, we see a space filled with cultural reference; archaeological items, figures, hand-woven carpets, books and other paraphernalia, a heavily impregnated cultural space. In this way, we have prototypically two very different spatialisations of the therapeutic setting; a 'clinical' and a 'cultural' spatialisation.

In psychoanalytic practices, this prototypical spatial setup still exists in different versions, but many forms of psychotherapy have moved on and experimented with new configurations of space. In client-centered therapy, Carl Rogers (1951) had client and therapist sitting in chairs facing each other, to produce a more authentic and less asymmetrical relation. In systemic family therapy, Tom Andersen recounts the development of the idea of a "reflecting team", from the original tradition of systemic family therapy with supervisors as experts behind the one-way mirror, occasionally telephoning with the therapist with advice; then experimenting with turning the lights and microphones around and having the family watch the supervisors discuss; and finally the inevitable conclusion that the whole set-up with walls and windows is superfluous (Andersen, 1992). A similar movement can be discerned in Seikkula's 'open dialogue' (Seikkula, Laitila, & Rober, 2012).

These experiments with spatial arrangements can be read as a way of working with and changing who are positioned as experts in positions of power, and destabilising patriarchal, pastoral and disciplinary positions where clients are in need of advice, truth and knowledge from – and manipulation by – powerful professionals. They generally appear to move toward dissolving the particular spatial arrangement, rather than create new spaces; along with this, spatiality gradually recedes into the background, and evaporates as an object for analysis and research in psychotherapy.

This development is reflected in the contemporary literature on psychotherapy and counselling that typically focuses on technique, methods or the relation/therapeutic alliance, while spatial aspects are sparsely investigated (Fenner, 2011). Digging a bit deeper, the

neglecting of spatial aspects can be seen as an expression of the deep-seated dualism that haunts psychology and is implicit in most research in psychotherapy, where the active mind is separated from the relatively passive bodies and matter. This leads to seeing therapeutic spaces as neutral, inert, and passive Euclidian containers in which stable self-enclosed subjects act and think, and to neglecting their cultural and productive aspects.

But, as we have seen, many professionals are already on the move away from these epistemological premises, often with a Foucauldian awareness of the "double language" of traditional forms, certainly, but also by creating new kinds of space. Our task is to go along with them and articulate what those might be. For this, we need to expand and deepen the conceptual arsenal.

Resources for Rethinking Space

In this article, then, we try to move away from space as a Kantian epistemological a priori, an Euclidian container, a passive site, a given context for actions; we seek a processual and cultural-historical understanding of subjects and spaces as continually produced; we also, as mentioned, wish to avoid dualisms by analysing both how (therapeutic, educational etc.) spaces are active in producing subjectivity and agency, and how subjects enact and spatialise places (as therapeutic, educational, etc.), as well as transform these spaces by engaging in projects that reach beyond the confinement of the particular place.

One place to start is in a reading of Foucault, which, similar to Derrida in "Cogito and the History of Madness" (Derrida, 1978, p. 36 ff.), finds him addressing theoretical problems that are more general than the specific genealogical configurations he describes.

> *"The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that*

> *delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another."* (Foucault, 1986c, p. 23)

If we take Foucault to thus contribute to a theoretical current, we can see spaces and places theorised as something active, dynamic, both produced by and producing subjectivity, but first of all heterogeneous, multiple, defined by relations or connections and *"constituted as much through the flows that link it to other locations, persons, things, as it is through what goes on 'inside' it "* (Pink, 2009, pp. 29-30). One way to articulate this approach is to portray space as an *assemblage*, composed of multiple heterogeneous elements (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Latour, 2005). In cultural geography (Massey, 2005), actor-network theory (Law, 2002), non-representational theory (Thrift, 2008), and post-structuralism (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Foucault, 1984, 1986) spaces are analysed using a plethora of different analytical or metaphorical concepts such as 'network', 'fluid', 'fire', 'smooth' or 'striated'. In addition, broadly phenomenological approaches take up Foucault's invocation of 'our living in' spaces of such heterogeneity: Before, beyond or below the spaces given to us and reproduced in our spontaneous rendering of their discursive forms, we exist as always-already 'emplaced' (Pink, 2009); place is given to us existentially before any structured space (De Certeau, 1984, Heidegger, 1963). The two approaches can be seen as internally related, since in research, that phenomenological place, even if it may be a pre-cognitive existential, is always arrived at by way of a reflection of the heterogeneity of spaces, of moving between, transforming or being in-between spaces; and conversely, the general idea of a heterogeneity of spaces, over and above their mere differences, basically, must appear to us from the point of view of our emplacement, rather than from any one of those spaces.

Our plan for this article is not a detailed discussion with these interesting theories and concepts. Nor are we authors necessarily agreeing on how to understand them, although we do both commit loosely to a practical, relational, cultural and historical understanding of spaces, where spaces are constructed and defined by connections rather than essences. But, leaving these discussions aside, we will - with a well-worn phrase - use these concepts as a box of tools[2] that allow us to analyse the relations between spaces, subjectivities and

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[2] Deleuze refers to a concept as a 'box of tools' in his conversation with Foucault in: Foucault & Bouchard (1980, pp. 207).

becoming in social work practices - bearing in mind how, as with other tools, our use of them in turn forms our commitments, intentions and subjectivities.

Methodologically we agree with Dovey (2009, p. 13) that an analysis of *"place/power issues require multiplicitous methodologies linking phenomenology, spatial analysis and discourse analysis"*. In order to do this we pay attention to different parts of spatial assemblages in the different analyses, focusing both on how artefacts, signs, and other materials spatialise and how spaces are enacted through activities. In order to do this we will draw on heterogeneous materials: videos and pictures of a live counselling session, phenomenologically reflexive interviews, and participant observations done by our research team.

We have taken up the space / place distinction, although, in academic discourse, space and place are highly contested terms that show little consistency (Dovey, 2009). In this article, we use the term 'space' for designated, structured places such as the office for counselling, the living room, or the classroom, generalised as kinds of space such as 'disciplinary spaces', 'private spaces', etc. In this definition, we are close to De Certeau: *"Space occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual proximities."* … *"space is a practiced place"* (De Certeau, 1988, p. 117).

Yet, when we refer to a specific place by the concept for its space – e.g. "the living room" – we also indexically point to a place that is potentially polyvalent and can become a 'counselling space', and thus may be or become a disciplinary space, a pastoral space or a public space etc. The term space, and the verbs spacing or spatialisation, allow us to analyse these processes of performing space and how different activities, articulations, and forms of subjectivity become possible.

The Materiality of Spaces

In the preview, we saw how the social worker, Michael, was struggling to have a therapeutic conversation with Emily. Emily's body, as we see her crouching in the second screen-shot, could be read as a sign that she does not like to be there, doing that, and her response "I don't know" to Michael's questions, confirms us in this interpretation.

How might this be a matter of space? As mentioned, we intend to make this point in two steps. First, we analyse the phenomenological and reflexive account of another young client, Molly, of her experiences with counselling in two quite different places: an office at the general drug treatment facility, and a particular room at Helsingung called the Buddha. This will serve to highlight spatialisations as material configurations that afford, affect and predispose subjectivities. Subsequently, we return to Emily and Michael to see how different spaces can be enacted in what appears to be the same place.

Molly is a 'young mom' (22 years) who has had 12 counselling sessions with the social worker Terry during the last months. As Helsingung have recently moved to new premises and furnished new rooms for counselling, her openness to an interview gives us a unique opportunity to inquire about 'natural experiments' with spaces for counselling. In the interview, we investigated together Molly's experiences with being in the places we term respectively 'the office' and 'the Buddha'.

The Office

In the picture we see an office similar to the one Molly talks about in the interview.   Just outside of view to the right is a desk with a computer, a phone and different papers, behind the desk on the wall is a white-board that can be used to take notes and visualise during counselling. For an ordinary Danish citizen, this could be a standard neutral, somewhat boring office at any Danish municipality. Let us see how Molly describes it.

Molly   *... there it was a lot like, emh, you got in and sat down there, and it was really very much 'an office'...*

Mads   *Yeah*

Molly   *...that you got into, so it was, like, hard to let go, and relax, right*

Mads   *Mm*

Molly   *...emh, because there was the computer, and the telephones where ringing and... on... no matter where you looked, you were reminded about where you where, and things like that.*

The computers and phones are signs that spatialise this room as an office, and not just an office, but "really very much an office". For many readers of this article, this may not seem so problematic, but when we place Molly statements in the context of the general difficulties reported by practitioners in counselling young people (Holmgren, 2006; Riber, 2005) and through the Foucauldian understanding of disciplinary space, it seems like the office frames Molly's situation as to do with drug problems, and subjects her to the category of being an addict. As Molly says:

Molly   *You are more conscious that it ... that you are the addict who has to sit and talk with the adult professional.*

In this way it is a disciplinary space, which installs a reflexivity in the subject as being deviant This is of course not a matter of the specifics of that office as such, but rather of its significance as functionally, discursively and symbolically connected to other disciplinary spaces: Classrooms, schoolmasters' offices, welfare offices, and rooms for counselling, therapy and testing, where Molly, Emily and many others have experienced being observed, assessed, corrected and marginalised. In this way, the specific spatialisation emerges processually, as the subjects' particular experiences, and the material, cultural and historical references produce this specific disciplinary assemblage. Still, the material affordances of the place do matter. Molly points to the furniture:

Molly   *Well you are being pigeonholed, can you... well, I did feel a little, well that. But you just feel very small when you enter a room where you just have to sit straight up in some plastic chair, you* know *(laughs).*

In the office the "plastic chairs" force Molly to sit upright, and direct her eyes to meet the professional gaze. This materiel and spatial setup emphasises, enhances and stabilises the

asymmetrical relations between Molly and her counsellor Terry, installs a reflexivity, and a way for Molly to understand herself through the addict category.

But the computer and the phone are not only signs indexing this as 'office', but also technical means for inscribing and circulating discursive statements about drug use, personal history, behaviour and identity, beyond Molly's reach and control. These statements are objectified and removed from the context were they were articulated, as truths that at a later point can be read and confirmed by other professionals in order to reorganise the guidance of her behaviour, thoughts and subjectivity. As a node in a network, the office is a spatialising disciplinary technology that, through discourse, artefacts and relations to other spaces, stabilise social categories, subject positions and relations of power. This way, it is quite reasonable to attribute seemingly exaggerated forces to disciplinary spaces. In Duff's discussion of young people's creation of 'private spaces', an informant talks of how the school spaces "*have their use hammered into us*" (Duff, 2009, p. 26). In a similar vein, Molly talks of "*really very much" (an office'),* with an excess of affectedness, which leads to an overload of self-consciousness, to being *"more conscious about that --- that you are the addict".*

Disciplinary spatialisation works as particular forms of temporalisation, too.

Molly   *Because, somehow (*literally: in some place*) I think, when I sit and think back about it, then perhaps I didn't much feel like being there*

Mads   *No?*

Molly   *Because I became very attentive to what it was that I had been doing in my past.*

In the interview, the past situation is reconstructed as a possible unwillingness, which highlights the fundamental ambivalence typically experienced by clients who have reluctantly chosen to come, but as connected to being-at-the-office, rather than to a (lack of) motivation 'within' her or in her relation to drugs; it was being *there* which directed attention to the actions of her personal past as problematic, and made it hard to relax and let go.

On this account, Molly is very directly expressing a problematisation that the Helsingung social workers have often articulated: The orientation to the past as problematic closes down

useful ways of talking. Taking inspiration from "narrative, systemic and solution-focused approaches" – as they describe their approach – they try to achieve a movement toward a focus on what the young people dream about or wish for, without necessarily being preoccupied with the past. In the disciplinary space, the present is interpreted in relation to the past, and the future is absent, empty except in the negative form of the absence of the problems of the past. Here nothing new can grow. No hope or future dreams are coming to life. As Molly says:

Molly   *Because I was afraid that I'd then get stigmatised, or ... I would say something wrong, or something…. "eh, and you just really feel, you just want to get out from there again, you know"*

Molly's experiences of being judged and just wanting to leave resonate with other accounts of how youth in institutions react to counselling in such places, be it offices or designated rooms for counselling, performed as disciplinary spaces. Metaphorically, the youths are caught in the headlight of the Panopticon. The light is too strong, every movement can been seen, and their bodies freeze up and words dry out, and their shadows are cast out behind them, drawing the outlines of their pasts on the screen behind them, identifying them with their past.

This (mostly Foucauldian) analysis shows power, but also a breakdown of the pastoral space as a technology of power. In the sterile, empty standard space for counselling, the disciplinary gaze is too strong, and this closes rather that enhances the possibility for subjectification through the subjects' articulation of truth in a pastoral relation. The potentially pastoral space is over-coded by the discipline that produces silence, marginalisation, inferiority, resentment and perhaps resistance, rather than subjects who can follow their dreams and wishes and projects without being restricted from this by their drug use.

As a contrast, let us see how Molly describes 'the Buddha', a room for counselling that the social workers have manufactured, and analyse this both in relation to cultural and material aspects and also extend the analysis to include affective, enabling aspects of space.

The Buddha – a Space of Attunement

As we can see in the picture, The Buddha looks quite different from the office. And when I ask Molly about how it is for her to have counselling in here, she says:

Molly   *Mmhh... well down here I don't think so much about what I have done. Like, there I think more about it as a place where I come down to get my problems out. So I don't have to go and think about them.*

Molly is articulating the common-sense discourse about psychotherapy and counselling as ' the talking cure'. Here, she can get her problems out, in order to be relived of them, as in a confession. But why is this pastoral technology not over-coded by disciplinary forces here in the Buddha? When we inquire about this in our interviews with Molly and Terry, they say:

Molly   *It becomes more, kind of, like when you have a conversation, for instance if you are at a family party or something like that…there are always some old uncles who sit there and play the wise guys right?* (laughing) *And when you talk with them, like, it becomes more like a conversation, if you can put it like that…*

Terry   *I feel better. Also because I sit in a more relaxed… and cosy chair, compared to my office chair, there, right. It becomes a bit like… I don't think I am so formal, like I can be sometimes. It happens automatically when I am sitting in…*

Both Molly and Terry report experiences of being more relaxed, and of their relation being less formal or feels different from a professional conversation. Before we turn to the spatial and material aspects that are implied, let us have a brief view at how the descriptions about the 'less formal' conversation, connect with an ongoing discussion in psychotherapy and social work about the relation between the professional and the client, and the role of professionalism and expertise.

One tendency in psychology and therapy has been to try to establish legitimacy and credibility by engaging in science and treatment discourses about neutral, objective experts, and by developing standardised methods and instruments. This has an obvious tendency to produce disciplinary connotations, as we likely witnessed in the preview where Michael tried to use a standardised instrument, the "Outcome Rating Scale" in his interaction with Emily.

In contrast to this, humanist psychology and more recent narrative and systemic traditions are critical of psychology and therapy as a neutral science with objective experts, and they try to establish a therapeutic encounter which is more authentic, client-centered, or even makes the client the expert, in order to disrupt asymmetrical (disciplinary) relations and reconfigure the roles and objectives for both the client and the therapist. This can be said to be aligned with discursive rules that according to Philp (1979) governs the form of knowledge in social work as a distinct discursive field: The holistic focus on the person instead of the problems, deviances or diseases, and the recreation of a social subject with full discursive rights, as participant of a social community.

From Molly's descriptions, talking with Terry is "like a conversation"; the assemblage Molly-and-Terry-in-the-Buddha allows Molly to become a speaking social subject and, she is recognised as such by both herself and Terry. Even though the Buddha is a designated room for counselling and there is an asymmetrical relationship in terms of knowledge and power, Molly can relax, open up and engage in conversation. In explaining this, Molly points to artefacts.

Molly   *...where I think down here [in the Buddha] there, there it's more relaxed. Well, there are couches, chairs, pillows all over and ... like.. candles, too, right?, well, all that wasn't there the other places, so it is much more relaxed too be down here.*

One way of understanding this it that the couches, chairs, pillows and candles, and the Buddha statue are artefacts and symbols, that do not connect this place to carceral institutions and involuntary confinement, but rather connects it to a broader culture and commonplace cultural practices such as meditation, yoga and hash-smoking, all practices that have a significant overlap in terms of both symbols, persons, cultural connotations and places. 'The Buddha' is constructed as designated room for counselling, but compared with the office it seems to have a greater capacity for being spatialised in different ways, perhaps because for young users like Molly it can connote both counselling, homeliness, drugs-use and non-disciplinary practices of self-development or spirituality. This is supported by the furniture; the comfortable couch that makes it possible for her to relax her body.

There are obvious parallels to the picture of Freud's office, and for Molly and many other youths[3], the spatial-material configuration of the Buddha seems to help establishing a new kind of pastoral space, or what Duff (2009) terms an "enabling environment", that does not force Molly and Terry into strongly asymmetrical subject positions over-coded by descriptions of deviance.

Molly   *it is more like... [...] not friendship-like, but, but more... well, relaxed, like... it's not as, ... it **is** professional, obviously, but it doesn't feel like that when you come to a place like this"*

Molly establishes a distinction between what she knows - that this is still a professional conversation – and that it does not feel like that, and indicates that these interesting differences do not rely solely on knowledge, but about bodily or emotional ways of being

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[3] The social workers report that some clients get 'electrified' when the see the Buddha, as this resonates with values and forms of living they adhere to. In one instance we have heard about a client who was repelled by these connotations, as she is an active Christian (which is quite rare in the Danish context).

affected. When we ask her about the difference, she has difficulties in explaining it and turns to a more phenomenological and affective phrases:

Molly   *how can I explain it, well, I…. It is just a totally different atmosphere*

We might articulate Molly's experience as special atmosphere, attunement, vibe or spirit, or through what Anderson (2009) terms an 'affective atmosphere' that affects her bodily/emotional way of being and allows an emotional re-ordering. Here, bodies relax, subjects become more open, permeable and receptive, and words flow more freely. In this way, positioning is not just a discursive, but also a material and spatial matter.

The Buddha seems to make it possible to forget and to feel, opening an affective hope (cf. Anderson, 2006): The utopian horizon of creating a social subject, as key dimension of social work, is far from merely a mirage or a cognitive scheme; it exists concretely as a carefully crafted social, material and spatial technology (Brown, 2012) that makes possible futures present in a way that does not predestine them – rather than conceptually specifiable affordances, the space seems to embody a Derrida'ean *l'avenir*.

Performing Liminal Spaces

Matter matters to how space is performed, how it finds its place, and how place is spatialised. As we have seen, material affordances and openings become part of more or less intentionally constructed spatial technologies of affect and attunement. Further, these "technologies" are temporal and processual, in that they facilitate anticipations and becomings. Following (Stenner & Moreno-Gabriel, 2013) – drawing on a long anthropological tradition (Szakolczai, 2009; Turner, 1995) – we can regard the spaces performed in Helsingung as 'liminal' in that their undecidedness and hybridity call forth general issues of existence and community, yet are nevertheless constituted as moments of processes that connect affect with hope and fear. This can be viewed both in terms of the personal narrative of participants – who, for instance, find themselves in-between childhood and adulthood, deviance and rehabilitation etc. – and in terms of the social work facility that defines itself as developing new standards (and of course the professionals in their career trajectories and as on the verge of being recognised as innovators, and even in terms of our own research as hopefully creating new articulations).

The Workshop

The Buddha was thus temporally contextualised by having been materially constructed in the process of physically establishing the facility recognised as new. Molly steps into a new place, still smelling of fresh paint, but also a new space, and thus, perhaps most importantly, a *space of novelty*. Material production as architecture, building and interior decoration should never be lost from sight when we analyse performance and spatialisation[4]. Yet, the performance of space also takes place at more micro scales and with more modest alterations of material objects.

As our first example, we will return to Emily and Michael's counselling session that we began with. Before Michael the counsellor took up the standard solution-focused scaling techniques that performed a disciplinary space, which he failed to turn pastoral, the two of them were engaged in a quite different kind of activity.

Michael   *Look, we have a few things* (points to pc). *We should look into this music project*

Emily   *Yes!*

Michael   *U-turn – do you know U-turn in Copenhagen?*

Emily   *No*

**Michael**   (points to pc screen) *I just had to make this website appear.*

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[4] In Danish, performance should be translated as "fremstilling" which also means production; in Heideggerian lingo, it resembles and unites the German terms *Herstellung* (production), *Darstellung* (display) and *Vorstellung* (imagination). "Construction" might be a good retranslation, were it not for the fact that most readers would associate it with a constructionism that is characterized (often unfairly) as only linguistic and only social as opposed to material, spatial, affective etc.

Michael *U-turn in Copenhagen is a… an agency similar to ours, only … in Copenhagen, obviously, so: bigger, and … they collaborate with us. Part of what I wanted to do, like I told you, right?, is that they have these music- … groups, groups that make music. I thought you could just, I mean, we can read it together.* (Emily takes pc. Michael leans back). *No, why don't you look at it yourself.*

Emily (reads). *Mm – cool!*

Michael (leans forward) *Sonny – he is here* (points to pc screen)

Emily *'Buddy'…*

Michael *Well, I don't know if he would – we studied together. They have some really cool gear. They also do film projects. You wanna see?*

Emily *Sure, I'd like to see that*

They watch a music video together that is posted on the Internet by U-turn. Then Emily finds another YouTube video, which she herself has taken part in producing when she attended a drama school. She comments on how she has lost weight since then. A little later, they return to the music project idea, and Michael suggests they contact his colleague (not quite 'buddy') Sonny.

Michael (Reading from pc) *I write here – I wrote to Sonny: "I write to you because we have a young person here in Helsingung who is very engaged in music and song writing (...) if we could perhaps make an appointment about music projects and making a demo. Let us take it up in the new year. Merry Christmas to you. Michael". And then Sonny writes: "Hi Michael, that sounds like a good idea. Let's talk about it in January. Merry Christmas!"*

Emily *"Merry Christmas!"*

Michael *Mm.* (writes on pc) *OK, now I write: "Hello Sonny…"*

Emily *"Happy new year!"* (laughs)

Michael *"We agreed to get back to this in the new year about a music project for one of the kids at Helsingung. I am sitting here with her now". Eh… "and we thought we should ask you how we should" … "get started"?*

Emily *Yes*

Michael *Or?*

Emily *Yes, "get started"*

Michael and Emily are sitting in the same place as when later they perform therapy and resistance to therapy. But the space they perform is different. First, we should notice how the technologies that connect 'here' with 'there' and 'now' with 'then' are very present, just as they were in Molly's description of "very much an office", but in a very different way. In the office, they belonged to the professionals, as the tools of their power, and belied the confidentiality of a pastoral space embedded in a disciplinary network of spaces. Here, they invite Emily into a public that watches websites and into an emergent music project established – before our very eyes – in an equally emergent collaboration between professionals in two agencies. There, the technological network is outside of the conversation that Molly is participating in, yet frames it deeply, hammering its excess meaning into Molly

even as it remains silent. Here, it is directly the object and medium of the projects they are starting up together.

This space is one of *production*: Overall, what they are beginning is a project that will end up having produced a CD that will be distributed and heard by Emily's friends and family as well as Michael's colleagues and researcher collaborators. And in this particular situation, they are directly co-creating an email that is one of a myriad of intermediate objects in the project. The process of *objectification* is crucial to the professionals: The way that

performances and representations of "Emily" – in terms of a "preferred narrative" such as that of a music talent rather than a drug abuser or a client – are fixed or "frozen" in material artefacts and become stabilised and socially recognised more widely. Even the little email is a text that can be reread, forwarded etc. and represents an institutional commitment much more than would any words spoken eye to eye – as Michael, and probably Emily, too, are well aware. When Michael invites Emily into writing the email, he is quite deliberately continuing a tradition among counsellors inspired by "narrative practice" (Monk, Winslade, Crocket, & Epston, 1997; White, 2007; White & Epston, 1990) to experiment with the ways that preferred narratives can be objectified – using simple techniques such as writing on flip-overs of which the client then takes a snapshot with her smartphone, writing letters or diplomas to clients, etc. Emily's CD is not simply "something else" beside and unrelated to the counselling; it is a *transformation of counselling* viewed as a process of creating and objectifying narratives.

The main point, in the context of the present argument, is the configuration of space. The space that is constituted as a node in a network is radically different when, however modestly, it works to transform that network, and reaches out to other networks that are performed as emergent. One aspect of this is production: The space we have seen Michael and Emily constitute can be likened to a *workshop*, where products are constantly in the process of formation, put together of things brought in from elsewhere and on the way to some more or

less well-defined public of users in yet other places. But the fact that another part of what was performed in that same conversation was 'Solution-Focused Brief Therapy' – or rather, an attempt at it – implies that it is a *liminal* space. It is a space of neither therapy nor music production – or both one and the other; and it is a *space of hope for and becoming of new standards of a social youth work* that fuses counselling with music production as a way of objectifying preferred narratives, and transforms counselling in the process.

Public Spaces: The Stage and the Agora

This implies another aspect that is equally important – the space of public display. Public spaces, as designed and performed "arenas of political deliberation and participation" (Harvey, 2000; Harvey, 2006), have evolved in multiple forms since the Athenian *agora*, not least with, on the one hand, the rise of civil society and its variable distributions of private domains, markets and commons, and, on the other hand, emerging technologies for representing community (Anderson, 1991; Goffman, 1961, 1986a, 1986c, 1990; Illouz, 2003; see also Nissen, 2012, ch. 3). The theatrical stage evolved as a technology of display separated from political deliberation, entertaining a sovereign and later a civil society; but in Modernity, politics increasingly unfold mediated by technologies derived from theatre (Boal, 2000; Brecht, 1971; Mathiesen, 1997) – so that even extra-parliamentary action often takes the shape of 'demos' that are supposed to *represent* a broader public and stage its protest. This development is lamented by (Szakolczai, 2012) who regards theatre as key to the emergence of the permanent liminality, which corrodes Modern culture since authenticity can no longer be assumed or even required[5].

Disciplinary and pastoral spaces have in various ways been carefully controlled as non-public; although Foucault speculated that the disciplinary Panopticon might eventually open the position and the gaze of the guards to the public (Foucault, 1997, 293 ff.), and it is possible to find examples of this[6], the seclusion of disciplinary spaces from public surveillance is still the rule, in primary school classrooms, hospital wards, group counselling and up to Guantanamo.

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[5] The implication is rather, in our view, that we have to rethink authenticity. See Høgsbro (2014) and Taylor (1991).
[6] For instance, some Danish kindergartens have webcams that allow parents to surveil children and teachers at any time

Social work spaces like Molly's 'office' protect the privacy of its clients, while also breaking it open to the disciplinary gaze, blocking democratic scrutiny and securing professional hegemony (as classically described by Goffman, 1961).

However, the gaze of the professions is potentially a form of public eye, too. In our example with Emily and Michael, we owe the very fact that we can watch the scene to a tradition emerging mostly in systemic counselling traditions and derivatives, of video-recording sessions as part of professional supervision and training. But the space is opening further. Michael is presenting the video to researchers as part of a collaboration that seeks beyond therapy, inviting us – writers and readers of this very text – as witnesses and participants in a discussion that is not limited to the knowledge domain and the ethics of a professional discipline, but rather that of critical socio-cultural theory and philosophy. And the video connects, as we saw, counselling with new forms of self-display that include website publishing and the production of a CD with Emily's recognisable face and name. In short, our case is a small part of the radical changes currently taking place in the configurations of discipline with the public/private divide (Illouz, 2008); and in this, Helsingung's development aspirations are crucial. It is a liminal space of hope and becoming which is subjected to public debate; and this makes of it a *new kind of public space as a fusion of the stage and the agora*. When – in a kind of second-order reflexivity – we include our own witnessing of the scene as part of it (knowing, too, that, obviously, Emily and Michael are aware of the recording), we can see that the power flows and the potentials are different from most disciplinary or pastoral spaces. Thus, Emily's resistance to Michael's attempt at framing therapy is no longer just another self-exclusion; it connects with her enthusiastic participation in the music project to become a potent move in the transformation of the practices of Helsingung toward new standards of social youth work.

Once we came to this hypothesis, we could see other, more or less unfolded, instances of such public spaces: Of course, the websites of Helsingung and U-turn themselves, as including various videos and other materials where the young clients present themselves, and thus not only addressing, but also accountable to, a mixed public of youths, relatives, professionals, researchers, managers, and the general public, as agencies developing new standards of social youth work. But also the simple fact that most meetings between professionals at Helsingung were set in the kitchen where youths would be welcome to pop in and make themselves a cup

of tea; and the Helsingung professionals making a point of it by interrupting the meeting to address the youths in a friendly and welcoming manner. And even the 'micro fact' that the door to the classroom at Helsingung is generally kept open: The immediate reason is that youths are distracted more by the closed door (which represents disciplinary school spaces), but the implications can be articulated also in terms of an accountability to a wider public which is premised by Helsingung's identity as development agency.

Conclusion

One prototypical narrative of the "U-turn model" is about a young client who was all "I don't know" in a counselling session at the U-turn, but who suddenly began to talk about his problems and hopes when later on the same day he was with the same counsellor in a swimming-pool, sitting on the pool-side, and on the way back on the bus. That story is not about the specific qualities of the swimming pool or the bus, as spaces arranged or used for counselling, or for any other specific practice. Rather, it is a place Other than that of the institution, a space thus negatively defined, as a way of pointing to the problems with the regular spaces at U-turn. Further, however, that negativity can itself be positively conceptualised as an Outside space that constitutes a 'neutral ground' on which to meet the youth (Nissen, 2015; Vinum & Nissen, 2006). Both these 'negative spaces' – the space that is Other than the disciplinary and pastoral spaces of the treatment institution, and the Outside space – are very valuable as conceptualisations for the development or transformation of social work and counselling, since any such development must include a problematisation of how that work is spatialised.

But we have pushed on to suggest also some positive articulations of spaces constructed and performed by professionals and users at Helsingung and U-turn, as part of their development of new standards of social youth work: Spaces of attunement and production, and public spaces. These positive articulations are meant to endow the material constituents and the processes and performances of spatialisation, with an agency that is absent from the Euclidian container space. The point of this, in terms of relevance, is to provide professionals with prototypes in a more demanding sense: As concrete practices and technologies that have evolved and made differences in these particular places and at these particular moments, but

which could be worth considering elsewhere and later, without ambitioning to make an understanding of those singular circumstances completely irrelevant.

As such, they could still be thought of as tools that can be applied in a range of somewhat similar situations, bearing in mind those differences of circumstance. Yet, it is an important morale of these prototypical narratives that the agencies of these spaces are never simply mastered by a given subject within an intentional rationality. Each of the three spaces considered reach beyond not only counselling, but also any such spatial instrumentalism. Attunement is about being in the world in a more fundamental sense; production is about creating something that lasts beyond its maker; and the public is an expansion of who 'we' are. These are not arguments against space as such (e.g. in favour of a phenomenological place, a network, or an all-encompassing community of everyday life), but aspects of how spaces are constituted that can be usefully reflected as part of creating spaces beyond counselling.

We have also noted that in all these three aspects, the liminality of the spaces as being constituted in a temporality of transformation and becoming is important. Being in these spaces is to find oneself in the hope of new ways to perform social youth work. But conversely, it also points to a very earthly version of hope: Hope is rendered as quite sensuous, practical, and for all to see. Hope, too, is something that takes place.

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Konklusion

I denne afhandling har jeg benyttet governmentality studies til at beskæftige mig med nogle grundspørgsmål om kulturel dannelse af subjektivitet. Dette sker gennem en undersøgelse af en almen styringsproblematik om, hvordan velfærdstatens institutioner (kan) organiseres, udvikles og kvalificeres på måder, der disponerer for at styre, lede og forme borgerne, så disse kan lede sig selv på måder, der sætter dem i stand til at få øget magt over deres liv og udvikle sig i mere produktive og foretrukne retninger.

Jeg har argumenteret for, at dette er en særligt relevant opmærksomhed forskningsmæssigt og samfundsmæssigt, fordi der sker en hastig forandring i de måder, vi styrer og organiserer velfærdsstatens indsatser på. Dette rejser en række problemstillinger, bl.a. fordi den dominerende tendens til styring gennem standardisering og evidens kan siges at stå i modsætning til nogle af de strategier for ledelse og subjektivering, der er centrale i de velfærdsstatslige institutioner, der beskæftiger sig med uddannelse, pædagogik, behandling og socialt arbejde.

For at undersøge dette har jeg udforsket et felt, hvor velfærdstatens paradokser kan siges at stå særligt tydeligt frem: socialt behandlingsarbejde med unge, der har et (problematisk) forbrug af rusmidler, hvor både organiseringen af indsatserne og bestræbelserne på at lede gennem selvledelse kan siges at være vanskelig, prekær og omstridt. I dette felt bliver det tydeligt, hvordan de fremherskende tendenser til organisering af velfærdsstatens institutioner – brugerinddragelse og evidens – disponerer for forskellige måder at lede og subjektivere på. Det sociale arbejde er et særligt interessant felt, fordi der både anvendes normaliserende, disciplinerende styringsstrategier, der er rettet mod det det problematiske og afvigende, samtidig med at man forsøger at omgå disse problemer og anvende liberale, vitalistiske, produktive strategier til at skabe selvledende borgere i mere almen forstand.

Disse udfordringer stiller sig endnu skarpere, fordi det sociale arbejde med disse unge også står i det paradoks mellem styring og autonomi, der kan siges at være grundlæggende i al ledelse og pædagogik: Professionelle, forældre og det sociale system vil gerne have de unge til at gøre noget, de unge ikke gør af sig selv. Men de unge ønsker ofte ikke at komme i behandling, stoppe deres rusmiddelbrug eller indgå i psykologiske samtaler med voksne professionelle.

Samtidigt vil de voksne gerne have de unge til at vælge at stoppe deres rusmiddelbrug og gå i behandling nogenlunde frivilligt. Måske både fordi de ved, at tvang er uhensigtsmæssigt, umuligt eller ikke nytter, men nok særligt fordi nogle af disse voksne har en forståelse af, at problemet ikke bare handler om rusmidler, men også og i særlig grad om en mere almen dannelse af de unge. Det handler om, at de unge skal 'blive til' som borgere, der kan lede sig selv, udøve kvalificeret selvbestemmelse og indgå på normale betingelser i samfundet.

Brugerdrevne standarder

Empirisk udforsker jeg disse spørgsmål ved at analysere, hvordan institutionerne Helsingung og U-turn eksperimenterer med at løse disse vanskeligheder ved at organisere og udvikles deres praksis gennem inddragelse af brugernes perspektiver og benytte produktive og vitalistiske strategier for ledelse og subjektivering. Jeg har afhængigt af den konkrete sammenhæng betegnet og analyseret dette som henholdsvis 'brugerdrevne', 'fleksible' eller '2.ordens' standarder og produktive, vitalistiske og affektive strategier for ledelse og subjektivering.

At institutionerne delvist organiseres ud fra brugerperspektiver, kommer bl.a. til udtryk i, at man søger at gøre tilbuddet attraktivt for de unge ved at imødekomme (en generalisering af) de unges ønsker. Dette sker gennem en sammensætning af forskellige aktiviteter som skole, træning, udflugter, aktiviteter og samtaler. Helsingung og U-turn-modellen kan dermed betegnes som socialt arbejde, fordi sammensætningen af elementer fra uddannelse, pædagogik og behandling etablerer en produktiv udviklingskontekst, der både har et alment fokus på at udvikle de unges kvalificerede ledelse af sig selv, samtidigt med at særlige problemer kan adresseres.

Et andet aspekt ved at arbejde brugerorienteret er, at institutionerne benytter indsigter fra postpsykologien til at reflektere over, hvordan sprog, diskurser og kategorier både organiserer det professionelle arbejde og leder og subjektiverer de unge. Derfor er der en strategisk normaliserende og produktiv anvendelse af sproget, hvor der meget sjældent tales om 'misbrug' eller 'misbrugere' men i stedet om 'unge', der går i 'dagteam' eller 'skole' i 'Helsingung'. Med sådanne postpsykologiske diskursive strategier søger institutionerne at dekonstruere eller og destabilisere, hvad White (2008) ville kalde problematiske identitetsfortællinger, eller hvad vi med Staunæs (2004) kan kalde forskelle mellem den første og det Andet – mellem den rationelle fornuftige skoleelev og den problematiske, umulige, uduelige og ubrugelige misbruger. Denne strategi muliggør og disponerer for nogle mere fleksible forståelser af identitet, så de unge kan bringes til at forstå sig selv sig på flere forskellige måder. Eksempelvis som unge skoleelever, der også (nogle gange) ryger hash.

De diskursive strategier for ledelse, subjektivering og meningsskabelse er vigtige og væsentlige, men da de er velbeskrevne i governmentality studies, postpsykologisk teori og systemiske, narrative og løsningsorienterede terapiformer samt velkendt indenfor felter som socialt arbejde (Kongsgaard, 2014), social-pædagogik (Holmgren, 2010; Riber, 2005) og ledelse (Molly-Søholm, Stegeager, & Willert, 2013), er disse aspekter kun i begrænset omfang gjort til genstand for selvstændige analyser i denne afhandling[19]. Samtidigt kan der være en række indvendinger eller reservationer i forhold til at lægge for stor vægt på sproget, og det kan problematiseres, hvordan sproglige strategier fungerer som neo-liberal styring (Cruikshank, 1999; Rose, 1998). Eksempelvis kan man forholde sig kritisk til, hvad de udbredte erklæringer om at arbejde narrativt, systemisk, løsningsorienteret eller anerkendende egentlig betyder i de konkrete sammenhænge. Er det i nogle tilfælde blot 'newspeak', når vi kalder borgerne for brugere fremfor klienter? Og hvilken indflydelse har brugerne egentlig på

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[19] Under ph.d.-forløbet har jeg dog for at bidrage til at kvalificere sådanne sproglige strategier for subjektivering skrevet et lærebogskapitel om narrative forståelser af personlighed, som jeg bl.a. illustrerer med eksempler fra dette projekt (Bank, 2014).

de velfærdsstatslige institutioner, der erklærer, at de inddrager brugerne? (Asmussen, 2003). Dækker dette over forholdsvis traditionelle eller usammenhængende måder at organisere, lede og subjektivere på? Eller er det endda en (neo-liberal) strategi, der skjuler magtforhold og repression, som når reformer og indskrænkning af rettigheder italesættes som 'starthjælp'?

For at imødegå og undersøge disse problematikker har jeg undersøgt, hvorledes der organisatorisk, diskursivt og materielt produceres (brugerdrevne) standarder, og analyseret, hvordan de organiserer det sociale arbejde, og hvilke strategier for ledelse og subjektivering det disponerer for.

En af de centrale standarder, der organiserer arbejdet i Helsingung og U-turn-modellen, er standarden om at privilegere de unges forståelser af deres problemer og deres ønsker for fremtiden. Et eksempel på dette er, at problembestemmelsen eller problemdefinitionen tager udgangspunkt i, hvad de unge er optagede af og ønsker at forandre. I artiklen 'New standards' benyttede jeg eksemplet med en ung fyr, der ikke havde en interesse i at stoppe med at ryge hash, men i stedet ønskede at få en bedre relation til sin mor. Her muliggør og fastholder standarden om brugerinddragelse, at det er den unges oplevelse og forståelse af udfordringer, mål og drømme, der i første omgang definerer behandlingsarbejdet.

Denne standard disponerer dermed for nogle mere relationelle og kulturelle forståelser, der udvider feltet af intervention og magtudøvelse. At arbejde brugerdrevet er dermed ikke uproblematisk, fordi det betyder, at de professionelle både må bakke den unge op og dermed også må lede på – og intervenere i forhold til – eksempelvis pårørendes, professionelles og samarbejdspartneres forståelser af unge og rusmidler. Det betyder bl.a., at de forsøger at udbrede postpsykologiske standarder til at iagttage, artikulere, forstå og subjektivere de unge og deres forbrug af rusmidler samt de unges egne standarder for ungdomsliv og rusmiddelbrug til andre aktører. I artiklen 'Tuning governmentality' viser jeg dette i relation til pårørende, og gennem det empiriske materiale er det tydeligt, hvordan det er noget, der sker løbende. Eksempelvis dekonstrueres begrebet om misbrug og misbruger i samtaler med professionelle og i den bredere offentlighed gennem kronikker i lokalavisen og formidling på institutionernes hjemmesider. Helt konkret har Socialstyrelsen, i forlængelse af arbejdet med U-turn-modellen, ændret diskursen fra 'unge og misbrug' til 'unges brug af rusmidler'. På den måde kan det sociale arbejde siges at forandre og omforme velfærdsstaten (Nissen, 2012a).

At arbejde brugerorienteret kræver også en vis 'organisatorisk fleksibilitet' og bevægelighed i indsatsen. Dette skabes bl.a. ved, at man i U-turn-modellen henvender sig anonymt til forholdsvist uforpligtende rådgivning. Denne kontakt kan så senere eksempelvis udvikle sig til kortere samtaleforløb eller en egentlig indskrivning i individuelle forløb eller gruppeforløb, hvor tidperspektivet kan være forholdsvis langt og ikke er klart afgrænset. Som jeg har beskrevet, ønsker mange unge i udgangspunktet ikke at være 'i behandling' eller stoppe med at bruge rusmidler. At skabe brugerdrevne standarder gennem en fleksibilitet, i både problembestemmelse, inklusionskriterie og de tilbud, man kan deltage i, virker som en relevant måde at prøve at i arbejde med disse udfordringer på, fordi der skabes en fleksibel udviklingskontekst, hvor de unge løbende og gradvist kan udvikle både ønsker, mål, forståelser af deres problemer og forskellige måder at deltage på.

U-turn-modellen er dermed meget anderledes end institutioner og behandlingstilbud, hvor det er en forudsætning for at begynde et mere produktivt og skabende arbejde, at brugerne frivilligt (liberalt) underkaster sig faste, absolutte (disciplinære) standarder om stoffrihed og (pastoralt) artikulerer et ønske om at ville stoppe. Dette er eksempelvis tilfældet med 12-trinsprogrammer, hvad enten de er brugerorganiserede eller institutionaliserede (Anonymous, 2008). På denne måde undgår U-turn-modellen at udstøde de unge, fordi de ikke tvinges ind i binariteter: Vil du deltage eller ikke? Er du motiveret eller ikke? Vil du tage stoffer eller være afholdende? De unge skal dog stadig vælge, om de vil deltage i behandlingen eller ej, og da alternativet ofte er mere disciplinære foranstaltninger som alternativ, kan tilbuddet ikke siges at være helt frivilligt. At den disciplinære magt på denne måde altid er tilstedeværende, gør det naturligvis særligt vigtigt, at de unge legitimt kan deltage ud fra deres egne problemforståelser og standarder, hvis man ønsker en liberal og produktiv form for ledelse og subjektivering.

Fleksibiliteten og brugerorienteringen kan siges at være et afgørende element, fordi de unge ligesom os andre kan være i tvivl, føle sig ambivalente, skifte mening og ville forskellige ting på samme tid. I U-turn-modellen gøres dette ikke til et problem eller en forhindring for behandlingsarbejdet, men kan i stedet ses som en ressource, fordi det muliggør et polyvalent bevægeligt felt, der mere ligner hverdagslivet. Her er der mulighed for gradvis bevægelse, udvikling og nybrud, hvor socialarbejderne og de unge samskaber emergente mål og standarder i processen, uden nogen af dem nødvendigvis kender retningen eller målet på forhånd. En sådan produktiv og vitalistisk strategi for ledelse og subjektivering er i mit perspektiv et helt centralt aspekt af det sociale arbejde.

Denne form for styring, med en kombination af governmentality og postpsykologiske begreber, kan betegnes som en liberal og stilladserende form for ledelse eller pædagogik (Hansen & Nielsen, 1999; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976), fordi der etableres en fleksibel organisatorisk struktur, en zone for nærmeste udvikling (Vygotsky, 1978), hvor socialarbejderne aktivt medskaber og understøtter de unges bevægelse, samtidigt med at der er en udstrakt frihed, hvor de unge legitimt kan eksperimentere med forskellige og gradvise former for (legitim perifær) deltagelse (Lave & Wenger, 2003). Jeg foreslår, at dette kan ses som et prototypisk eksempel på, hvordan organisering og tilrettelæggelse af indsatser gennem brugerdrevne standarder er meget direkte forbundet med, hvilke strategier for ledelse og subjektivering der er mulige og sandsynlige.

I Helsingung etableres der en række af sådanne fleksible stilladserende og brugerorienterede udviklingskontekster, der muliggør og understøtter forskellige former for legitim deltagelse og aktivitet: indskrivningen, problembestemmelsen, undervisningen, samtalerummet, klasseværelset og de forskellige aktiviteter, hvor man kan være sammen med de professionelle og de andre unge om noget fælles tredje. Samtidigt er det forholdsvis nemt at forlade disse kontekster på en legitim måde, eksempelvis ved at tage hyppige rygepauser i undervisningen, hilse og småsnakke med dem, der går forbi klasselokalet, mens man har undervisning, eller ved at tale om andre ting end problemer i samtalerummet. Sådanne opbrud kunne blive set som uvelkomne afbrydelser eller useriøsitet, men faktisk muliggør det, at de unge kontinuerligt og aktivt selv kan vælge aktiviteterne og fællesskabet til.

Dette kan forstås som en liberal form for subjektivering, hvor den unges udvikling af selv-ledelse og selvbestemmelse faciliteres og stilladseres gennem en række gradvise 'små valg'. På denne måde er

selve fleksibiliteten og brugerorienteringen ikke blot et middel til at få de unge til at deltage, men i sig selv en intervention, der bidrager til deres opøvelse af selvledelse og valg, hvilket er en 'klassisk' liberal styringsstrategi (Foucault, 2009). Samtidig muliggør den fleksible og brugerorienterede organisering, at de unge gradvist kan udvikle mål, ønsker eller drømme og får mulighed for at adressere deres problemer. De skaber med andre ord emergente standarder for deres foretrukne måder at leve på, hvormed de både leder sig selv sig og samtidigt leder på andres forståelse af, hvem de er. Dette er dog ikke bare en liberal laissez-faire, men netop en social og kulturel samskabelse, hvor socialarbejderne og praksisregimet disponerer for, at denne dannelse af standarder og udfoldelse af liv tager særlige retninger. På den måde er U-turn-modellen et prototypisk eksempel på socialt arbejde.

Positive mål og brugerinddragelse arbejdes der naturligvis med i mange behandlings- og socialpædagogiske sammenhænge, men at fastholde en brugerorientering kan være vanskeligt, fordi et fokus på problemer og rusmidler bestandigt risikerer at overkode de unges perspektiver. Jeg har skitseret, hvordan det kan skyldes, at pårørende, politikere, professionelle og medier forholder sig til problemer gennem en dominerende diskurs om misbrug eller gennem individualpsykologiske begreber som motivation. Ligeledes kan der opstå et potentielt problem, når socialarbejdernes egne standarder og ambitioner på de unges vegne løber af med dem, eller de når deres grænse for rummelighed og forståelse. På den måde kan standarder om at privilegere brugernes perspektiver nemt komme i konflikt med andre (institutionelle) standarder og ambitioner. For at få blik for, hvordan sådanne udfordringer håndteres, har jeg undersøgt, hvordan der dannes emergente standarder, som benyttes til at guide og kvalificere det konkrete arbejde. Et eksempel fra U-turn er, at der skabes diskursive standarder om, at man ikke (nødvendigvis) fokuserer på rusmidlerne, men må gå en omvej for at hjælpe den unge videre (U-Turn, 2011). I artiklen 'New standards' viser jeg bl.a., hvordan socialarbejderne benytter postpsykologiske begreber og forståelser til at producere institutionelle standarder, der gør det muligt for dem at se de unge som altid-allerede aktive, deltagende, lærende subjekter (Dean, 2010).

Gennem produktionen af emergente standarder disciplinerer og subjektiverer socialarbejderne sig selv og regulerer deres praksis. Dette muliggør, at de kan forstå sig selv som kompetente professionelle, der ikke bare lader stå til, men etablerer et normaliserende og produktivt subjektivende blik på de unge, refleksivt privilegerer de unges perspektiver og dermed bidrager til deres udvikling af emergente standarder for ungdomsliv og rusmiddelbrug. Dette peger på, at institutionelle standarder ikke bare kan overføres fra en 'model' gennem skriftlige beskrivelser, men løbende må importeres, produceres og modificeres i den specifikke praksis.

Materialitet, rum, krop

De standarder, der kontinuerligt overføres, produceres og benyttes til at organisere og guide praksis, er ikke kun diskursive, men også materielle og kropslige. Et eksempel på, hvordan standarder materialiseres, behandles af medforskeren Morten Halberg (2013), der med inspiration fra vores dialoger tager initiativ til en praksis om, at socialarbejderne i Helsingung løbende skal notere, hvilke positive ting de bemærker om de unge, og hænge disse observationer op på en centralt placeret

tavle i det fælles kontor. Disse udsagn kan så senere gives videre til de unge i såkaldt værdsættende ceremonier. Man kunne problematisere tavlen og post-it-sedlerne som et moderne panoptikon, der subjektiverer de unge gennem synliggørelse. Halsbergs (2013) analyse viser dog, at det også fungerer som en postpsykologisk 2. ordens-teknologi, der synliggør, hvilket blik socialarbejderne har på de unge, og disponerer, medierer og disciplinerer i retning af et produktivt blik på alle de unge. Simple teknologier kan have en stor effekt i socialt arbejde (Elgaard Jensen, 2011).

Et af denne afhandlings særlige bidrag er at forfølge denne tematik ved at analysere, hvordan materielle og spatiale konfigurationer benyttes til at organisere praksis på måder, der både er virkningsfulde i forhold til de unge, men som også former socialarbejderne og deres praksis. I artiklen "Spaces beyond" analyserer jeg sammen med Morten Nissen, hvorledes rum ikke blot er passive containere, men noget, der skabes, performes og aktivt kan benyttes til at organisere, lede og subjektivere. Som beskrevet oplever mange professionelle vanskeligheder, når de forsøger at have samtaler med unge, fordi disse ofte er meget fåmælte, ikke svarer eller svarer 'det ved jeg ikke'.

I artiklen analyserer vi dette som en konsekvens af, hvordan samtalerummet kan siges at blive spatialisereret meget disciplinært, hvilket orienterer de unges opmærksomhed mod problemer og fortiden. I analysen fremstiller vi Helsingsungs eksperiment med samtalerummet 'buddah' som prototypisk for, hvordan sådanne problemer kan overskrides ved at benytte artefakter og materialer til at spatialisere et rum, der ikke er overkodet af det disciplinære, men i højere grad muliggør mere produktive pastorale former for ledelse, der åbner for håb mod fremtiden. Samtidig analyserer vi, hvordan Helsingungs arbejde med produktiv skabelse af eksempelvis kunstneriske produkter henvendt til en bredere offentlighed producerer nogle mere fleksible, permeable rum, der overskrider og transformerer, hvad man kan forstå ved terapi og socialt arbejde.

Et væsentligt aspekt ved de former for ledelse og subjektivering, jeg har undersøgt, er, at de på forskellig vis forskyder eller overskrider et individuelt fokus på de unge, deres vanskeligheder og deres forbrug af rusmidler. I artiklerne 'Spaces beyond' og 'Tuning governmentality' analyserer jeg særligt, hvordan dette gøres, ved at materialer, artefakter, betydninger og aktiviteter spatialiserer og producerer de institutionelle rum på måder, der forskyder opmærksomheden fra det afvigende og problematiske og fremstiller de unge som normale, aktive, legitime subjekter. Et andet gennemgørende og særligt væsentligt bidrag er, at jeg i denne afhandling viser, hvordan disse former for subjektivering sker affektivt.

Affektiv ledelse og subjektivering

I indledningen præsenterede jeg, hvordan socialarbejderen Lise koblede sig på noget, der var energifuldt for en ung fyr, jeg har kaldt Kevin. Kevin viste, hvordan man 'tramper', og der blev skabt en energi og begejstring og måske en afgørende forandring. Eksemplet illustrerer den form for affektiv ledelse og subjektivering, der er en gennemgående opmærksomhed i afhandlingen. Forståelsen af affektivitet som væsentligt i det sociale arbejde er ikke ny. I min tidligere udforskning af U-turn fortalte medforskerne, hvordan det er afgørende at 'skabe energi', 'der skal ske noget', 'sætte gang i den', hvis man vil lave gruppesamtaler med de unge (Bank, 2010). Lederen fra U-turn

taler også om, at der er en særlig ånd i U-turn, og i U-turn-modellen heder det, at "*det skal være livgivende og sjovt*". Denne opmærksomhed på affektivitet formuleres oftest i forhold til spatialitet, fx "*et livgivende og spændende miljø*" og "*bevidst etablerede hyggelige lokaler*" med "*en venlig, afslappet og imødekommende atmosfære*" (U-Turn, 2010).

Vi har her at gøre med en række affektive fænomener – energi, atmosfære, stemning, hygge, afslapning – der tilsyneladende er velkendte og væsentlige for praksis, men som artikuleres relativt vagt i a-teoretiske almenbegreber. Dette kan hænge sammen med, at disse fænomener, så vidt jeg er bekendt med, heller ikke behandles i den systemiske, narrative og løsningsorienterede litteratur.

Der er en stigende interesse for affekt, både indenfor både governmentality studies og i human- og samfundsvidenskaberne (Clough, Goldberg, Schiff, Weeks, & Willse, 2007; Koivunen, 2010; Wetherell, 2012). Mine særligt interessante forskningsbidrag er dels psykologisk-fænomenologiske analyser af, hvordan 'affekt' benyttes i ledelse af ledelse og subjektivering, og dels fremstilling af strategier og begreber – i særdeleshed Heideggers begreb om stemning – til at analysere dette.

I 'New standards' analyserer jeg, hvordan affektiv påvirkning gennem energi, intensitet eller 'afsmittende begejstring' er en strategi, som socialarbejderne bruger i forhold til at skabe forandring. Denne styringsstrategi er særligt interessant, fordi den overskrider de traditionelle forståelser af, hvordan agency produceres diskursivt (Davies, 1990), og prototypisk fremstiller, hvordan en produktiv og vitalistisk form for ledelse virker både diskursivt, kropsligt og affektivt, ved at socialarbejderen bliver begejstret på de unges vegne, påvirker dem og giver dem noget 'styrke og power'.

I 'Tuning governmentality' arbejder jeg i særlig grad videre med dette teoretisk og empirisk. Her går jeg i dialog med affect studies og argumenterer for, at Heideggers begreb om stemning er et særligt velegnet fænomenologisk, analytisk og teoretisk begreb til at forstå affektive former for ledelse og subjektivering og bredere til at forstå subjektivitet.

Hvis jeg benytter denne analysestrategi i forhold til eksemplet med Kevin, kan det bl.a. vise os, at musikken og bevægelsen af kroppe bidrager til at skabe en stemning, der åbner en fælles forståelseshorisont og nye måder, hvorpå socialarbejderen og Kevin kan være sammen, forstå eller resonere med hinanden. Dette muliggør dermed, at de også kan have nogle produktive pastorale samtaler, som Kevin ifølge socialarbejderen 'er rigtig glad for'. Interessen for affekt og stemninger udfoldes også i artiklen 'Spaces beyond', hvor det belyses, hvordan styringsstrategier har materielle, symbolske og affektive dimensioner, der udfolder sig særligt kraftigt i visse typer af kontorer og samtalerum. Her ser vis, hvordan der kan produceres stemninger, der enten der hæmmer muligheden for produktive samtaler eller åbner for affektivt håb og orientering mod fremtiden.

I artiklerne 'Tuning governmentality' og 'Spaces beyond' udvider jeg forståelsen af affektiv ledelse i mere sociale og kollektive retninger. I eksemplet med gallapremieren fremstiller jeg, hvordan de unges teknologisk medierede selvfremstillinger i form af 'lommevideoer' parasiterer på tv-mediet, musikvideoen og andre populærkulturelle former. Dermed produceres en teknologisk medieret pastoral bekendelse, der giver de unge mere styrke, rådighed og legitimitet til selv at fremstille deres foretrukne standarder for identitet, etik og livsførsel. I gallapremieren benytter de unge og

socialarbejderne diskursive, materielle og spatiale teknologier til at producere en stemning, der åbner et mulighedsrum, hvor disse standarder cirkuleres diskursivt, affektivt, kropsligt og materielt. I denne forståelse sker der en affektiv ledelse af de pårørende gennem en modulation og produktion af stemning, hvor de pårørende bringes til at forstå og relatere sig til de unge på nye måder, således at den gensidige subjektivering, der foregår mellem de unge og deres pårørende, kan bevæge sig i mere positive og produktive retninger.

I artiklerne er det forskellige aspekter af affektiv ledelse og subjektivering, der fremhæves, og som jeg argumenterer for i 'Tuning governmentality', er det væsentligt at forstå, at der i min anvendelse af stemning som analytisk begreb for affekt er tale om et samspil af diskurs, mening, materialitet og affekt, indfoldet i institutionelle, samfundsmæssig praksisser, der er tidslige såvel som historisk specifikke.

De socialarbejdere, vi samarbejder med – og forhåbentlig mange andre – kan genkende de her beskrevne former for affektiv subjektivering, men kan ofte ikke beskrive det. Med de prototypiske eksempler og de analytiske greb arbejder jeg referencetransformerende og udvikler med begrebet om stemning både et teoretisk konsistent begreb og en mere generel stratregi til at analysere affektive former for ledelse på måder, der er fænomenologisk og psykologisk adækvate, og som er kompatible med både governmentality studies og systemiske, narrative og løsningsorienterede former for terapi. Dette muliggør både praksisrelevante og teoretisk konsistente analyser (Argyris & Schön, 1974) af, hvordan der i en række sammenhænge ikke bare ledes gennem diskurser, institutioner og materialiteter, men ved at skabe og modulere stemninger, intensiteter, energier og atmosfærer. Disse affektive former for styring, ledelse og subjektivering er ikke kun at finde i det sociale arbejde, men kan spores på tværs af (velfærdsstatens) institutioner (fx Juelskjær & Staunæs, 2015; Staunæs & Bjerg, 2011).

Brugerdrevne standarder og affektive organisationer

I afhandlingen har jeg undersøgt, hvordan man kan organisere det sociale arbejde, så der sker en produktiv og vitalistisk ledelse og subjektivering. Analyseret gennem styringsstrategierne, kan vi betegne Helsingung som en grundlæggende liberal styringspraksis, der søger at lede gennem individets frihed, og som påvirker ved at tilrettelægge et felt, der disponerer for og sandsynliggør særlige bevægelser og handlinger.

Til trods for at de nutidige former for ledelse i stigende grad kan siges at være liberale, produktive, vitalistiske eller potentialiserende, risikerer problematiske disciplinære strategier til stadighed at blive taget i anvendelse, når den liberale styring ikke fungerer, og der opstår vanskeligheder, der stiller spørgsmålstegn ved subjektets evne og ret til at udøve kvalificeret selvbestemmelse (Philp, 1979). Man kan argumentere for, at de disciplinære strategier, eksempelvis restriktive regimer for rusmiddelbrug, indespærring af lovovertrædere eller brugen af karakterer, kan anses som anakronistiske og inadækvate i forhold til mange af de problemstillinger, vi møder i velfærdsstatens institutioner. Jeg argumenterer ikke for, at de disciplinære former ikke er produktive, eller at de ikke fortsat kan kombineres med pastorale, liberale og affektive strategier i velfærdstatens institutioner. Derimod forekommer det indlysende, at de disciplinære strategier i en række tilfælde formodentlig gør væsentligt mere skade end gavn, fordi det, som disciplinen søger at frembringe – et refleksivt subjekt, der vurderer sig selv i forhold til kulturelle normer og standarder – ofte ikke er det, der mangler. Tværtimod kan man argumentere for, at selv-refleksion og normerende vurdering er så indfoldet i det moderne subjekt, at det i stigende grad er det, der skaber problemer (White, 2002, 2008). De unge oplever, at de ikke lever op til standarder om entreprenant selvudfoldelse og projektorienteret livførelse (Fogh Jensen, 2009; Rose, 1998), og løsningen synes derfor ikke at være mere disciplinær vurdering, regulering og sanktion, men derimod mindre eller helt andre strategier for ledelse og subjektivering.

Når Helsingung og U-turn søger at få de unge til at udvikle egne standarder for liv og rusmiddelbrug, kan det ses som en hensigtsmæssig liberal stratregi om en almen og produktiv ledelse og subjektivering, der sigter mod, at subjektet øger sin kapacitet for vitalistisk og produktiv selvledelse, uden dette er bundet til et institutionelt regime, og som derfor kan anvendes på tværs af kontekster.

Den liberale form for styring kan ses som en konsekvens af den post-moderne situation, hvor vi har forladt forestillingerne om central privilegeret viden i staten eller dens institutioner eller fælles normer og standarder for sandhed og subjektivitet. Derfor skaber staten i en (neo)liberal optik blot betingelser, hvorunder det kan uddelegeres til markedets transaktioner eller subjekternes individuelle rationelle valg og handlinger at skabe 'samfundet', 'økonomien' eller 'psykologien'. Selvom der således sker en forskydning fra disciplinære til mere liberale former for styring, er det

stadig en del af den samme individualiserende og rationalistiske model for styring, der baserer sig på en fiktion om et universelt, rationelt, nyttemaksimerende (neo-liberalt) subjekt. Denne model for subjektivitet kritiseres teoretisk (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Rose, 1998), og som vi har set, viser der sig en række praktiske problemer. Når man med en liberal-pastoral styringsstrategi lader det være op til

de unge at definere sandheder og standarder, er man afhængig af at bringe subjektet til at vælge at indgå i dialog (Karlsen & Villadsen, 2008). Her møder det sociale arbejde en række vanskeligheder, fordi de unge netop ikke nødvendigvis tager denne 'forpligtelse til frihed' på sig, men responderer med tavshed, passivitet og valget om ikke at vælge (Rose, 1998).

 I forhold til disse vanskeligheder må nye styringsstrategier og modeller for subjektivitet tages i anvendelse. Den affektive styring virker ikke ved at appropriere – beslaglægge, udpege, synliggøre og objektivere – eller gennem individualisering og tilrettelæggelse af valg, men gennem andre logikker og registre. En liberal-affektiv strategi etablerer et felt af affektive vektorer – begejstring, energi, stemning, intensitet, bevægelse og flow – der gennemstrømmer og forbinder subjekter, og som man kobler sig på eller trækkes med af. Disse kan være restriktive og lukke ned for tilblivelse som i post-9/11 eller finanskrisernes cirkulation af frygt, angst og depression (Berlant, 2011; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2005; Virilio, 2012) eller åbne for optimisme og livgivende energi og håb om fremtiden som i en stemning af Obamas 'Yes We Can' (B. Anderson, 2006). Omvendt kan også angsten være produktiv (Kierkegaard, 1964), og håbet ondsindet og ødelæggende (Berlant, 2011).

 I en affektiv logik leder og subjektiver velfærdsstatens institutioner i stigende grad gennem produktion og cirkulation af affekt (Staunæs & Bjerg, 2011). Det kan, som jeg har foreslået, forstås som produktion og modulation af stemninger eller som hos Juelskjær and Staunæs (2015) gennem orkestrering af intensiteter, der cirkulerer gennem subjekter, kroppe og institutioner (Blackman, 2012). I dette perspektiv skabes (velfærdstatens) institutioner måske i stigende grad netop gennem ledelse og cirkulation af affekt (Thrift, 2006). Hvis affektive strategier i stigende grad er dem, der benyttes i velfærdsstatens organisationer, så betyder det, at velfærdstatens professionelle på en ny måde både bliver genstande for styring og de kroppe, der skal levere det 'overskud af affekt', der skal påvirke og skabe forandring hos borgerne. De professionelle er dermed ikke eksperter, der benytter viden og teknikker, men affektive arbejdere, der må arbejde på og med sig selv og kultivere en beredthed til at respondere dynamisk og affektivt på nye problemer og kontinuerligt levere energi og begejstring. (Hochschild, 2003). Som socialarbejderen Lise siger: "Det kræver sgu' noget energi at inspirere til forandring".

Refleksion, selvkritik og perspektivering

En standard i de praksisser, jeg har undersøgt, er kritisk at reflektere over begreber og de former for magt, ledelse og subjektivering, der udøves. Denne fordring om kritisk refleksivitet gælder naturligvis også for min forskning og de teoretiske traditioner, jeg benytter. I overensstemmelse med min tilgang vil jeg nu fokusere på en produktiv selvkritik.

Informeret af governmentality studies kan man spørge til, hvad jeg med mine analyser og begreber fik blik for? Hvad blev synligt og udsigeligt, og hvad blev henlagt i skygge og tavshed? Hvilke mulige effekter har udforskningen? Med hvilke magt- og vidensformer?   Hvad lykkedes for mig? Hvad forandrede sig undervejs og med hvilke konsekvenser? Og fra den bredere refleksive palet: Fik jeg tilrettelagt undersøgelsen på en sådan måde, at jeg ikke tvang mine teoretiske antageler og kæpheste ned over det empiriske materiale? Blev det muligt at se noget, jeg ikke havde forestillet mig eller tænkt? Lod jeg fænomenerne komme til syne? (Heidegger, 1995). Kunne mine objekter og genstande gøre modstand (Latour, 2000) og være genstridige? (Stengers, 1997).

Det korte svar er, at jeg fik indfriet min kundskabsambition om at etablere et vitalistisk og produktivt blik på de strategier, hvormed velfærdsstatens institutioner leder og subjektiverer borgerne, så disse kan lede sig selv på måder, der sætter dem i stand til at få øget magt over deres egne liv og betingelser og udvikle deres liv i mere produktive og foretrukne retninger. Samtidigt skete der undervejs en række forskydninger og udviklinger af projektet, af min forståelse og af mig som forsker, så jeg fik blik for dette på nogle andre måder, end jeg havde forestillet mig. Men så igen:

> "Hvad ville en stræben efter viden være værd, hvis den kun skulle sørge for erhvervelsen af erkendelserne, og ikke også på en eller anden måde så vidt muligt skulle sørge for at føre den erkendende på vildveje? " (Foucault, 2004, p. 20)

En af de store forandringer i projektet er, at der skete en forskydning fra et fokus på standarder mod en opmærksomhed på affektive styringsstrategier. Indledningsvist havde jeg en forestilling om brugerdrevne standarder som nogle, man næsten kunne udpege og indholdsbestemme, eksempelvis en standard for, hvad en anerkendende samtale er, som prototypisk kunne handle om at lytte og være decentreret. Denne interesse udsprang af oplevelser af, hvordan professionelle ofte benytter begrebet anerkendelse, når de taler om praksis, men sjældent er i stand til at give en nærmere definition af, hvad anerkendelse betyder. En nærmere udforskning, af hvad eksempelvis anerkendelse betyder i praksis, kunne dermed være referencetransformerende og bidrage til at kvalificere praksis.

Samtidigt var jeg naturligvis opmærksom på, at en sådan standard ikke bare gnidningsfrit kunne overføres fra én praksis til en anden. Derfor var min hensigt at

trække på begrebet 'translation' fra aktør-netværk-teori og STS og undersøge, hvordan standarder overføres fra U-turn-modellen til Helsingung på den måde, at standarden modificeres og forandres i processen, samtidigt med at den forandrer den praksis, hvor den anvendes (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005).

Behandlingen af standarder er mest tydelig i artiklen 'New standards', hvor jeg har lavet en prototypisk fremstilling af, hvordan en standard om brugerorientering refleksivt skabes og benyttes til at guide, styre lede, organisere og kvalificere Helsingungs praksis.

I lyset af den drejning, afhandlingen tog i retning af udforskning af affektive strategier, kan jeg dog også reflektere over, at jeg måske med min forståelse af standard-begrebet var indfanget af en 'moderne' eller strukturalistisk forståelse af både videnskab og praksis og en medfølgende ambition om af forstå, kortlægge og vide. Med mine egne ord blev jeg måske blind for, at også et fokus på standarder var en approprierende strategi. Dette er en af grundende til, at begrebet om standarder, på trods af at det er centralt, primært benyttes som et analysestrategisk greb og kun diskuteres eksplicit i en af afhandlingens artikler. Mere udfoldede analyser af standarder og translation kunne dog stadigt være relevante, eksempelvis ved bearbejdning af mine præliminære analyser, af hvordan medarbejderne i Helsingung 'overfører' U-turn-modellen til deres egen praksis. Der er bl.a. empirisk materiale fra medarbejdernes diskussioner af, hvilke navne og begreber man skal benytte i Helsingung. Eksempelvis hedder tilbuddet til de yngste unge i Helsingung et 'dagteam', da dette ifølge medarbejderne signalerer mere fælleskab og energi og knap så meget plejehjem og dagcenter som navnet daggruppe i U-turn. Her sker en (strategisk) produktion af postpsykologiske sproglige standarder for praksis, og det kunne det være spændende at gå videre og udfolde en række diskussioner af U-turn-modellen og om forholdet mellem model og praksis. Her kunne man diskutere immanente standarder i praksis, standarder fra et STS-perspektiv og diskutere det yderligere i forhold til evidens (Bowker & Star, 1999; Busch, 2011; Juul Jensen, 1986; Lampland & Star, 2009; Timmermans & Berg, 2003).

I afhandlingen berører jeg forskellige steder, hvordan medarbejderne aktivt arbejder med at kultivere en åbenhed og refleksivitet i forhold til deres praksis og skabe emergente standarder, som de leder og subjektiverer sig selv og hinanden med. Dette tema er særdeles relevant og udfoldes forhåbentligt i en kommende artikel, hvor en oplagt mulighed er at undersøge udvikling af postpsykologisk ekspertise i relation til de ovenstående temaer om modeller og standarder. Her finder jeg det oplagt at trække på litteratur om narrative terapeuters liv (White, 1997) og eksistentiel supervision (Van Deurzen, Young, & Psychol, 2009), der kan give nogle andre perspektiver end de traditionelle vidensbaserede og reflekterende forståelser af hvad det vil sige at være professionel (Polanyi, 1997; Schön, 2000). Her kunne man inddrage affektive og performative forståelser af subjektivitet, fx gennem læsninger af Butler (1997) og Heidegger (2007). På den måde ville det være muligt at analysere, hvordan en professionel ikke bare skabes gennem tilegnelsen af viden eller færdigheder, men også ved at der i supervisionen og den daglige praksis kultiveres en åbenhed, tillid, responsivitet og refleksivitet, hvor den professionelle subjektiveres som en person med særlige kapaciteter til at påvirke og blive påvirket, etisk, eksistentielt og affektivt. I den forbindelse ville det også være oplagt at arbejde kritisk og problematiserende med socialarbejdernes 'affektive arbejde' (Hardt & Negri, 2009; Hochschild, 2003).

Et anden tematik, som jeg sammen med min kollega Sten Jørgensen forfølger i en kommende artikel, er en nærmere udforskning af motivation. Her er en mulighed for at beskæftige sig med de forskellige strategier, som jeg har skitseret i denne afhandling: at arbejde med små skridt og undgå

'det store spørgsmål' om de unges motivation, at skabe emergente standarder eller at koble sig affektivt på allerede eksisterende tendenser.

Endeligt kunne det være interessant at beskæftige sig meget mere med, hvordan Helsingung og U-turn-modellen overskrider det individuelle fokus på de unge og arbejder med forældre og andre professionelle. Hvilken forskel gør det for forældrene og de unge og samspillet i familien, at forældrene går i forældregruppe? Hvilke nye forståelser og standarder skabes der mellem forældrene? Hvordan relaterer dette sig til tabuer om rusmidler? Og hvilke former for ledelse og subjektivering finder sted i disse grupper? Hvordan udbredes standarder fra Helsingung til de kommunale institutioner? Hvilke konflikter og kampe giver det anledning til?

Ligeledes kunne selve min forskerposition, min teoretiske tæthed til feltet og min særlige form for kritik og anvendelse af governmentality studies gøres til genstand for yderlige diskussioner. I afhandlingen er anvendelsen af postpsykologiske forståelser, begreber, metoder og standarder i overensstemmelse med min analysestrategi fremstillet relativt positivt. Det kunne dog også være interessant at beskæftige sig nærmere med, hvilke problemstiller der opstår med anvendelsen af postpsykologien? Hvad får man ikke øje på? Hvilke modsætningsforhold opstår der i relation til andre aktører? (se Barington, 2015).

I afhandlingen betyder min produktive og vitalistiske analysestrategi og min metodologi, at jeg generelt ikke har lagt vægt på meget udfoldede begrebsdefinitioner. Dette skyldes, at jeg har ønsket at bibeholde en refleksiv og teoretisk åbenhed, og at begreberne i høj grad benyttes som analytiske strategier og redskaber, hvormed jeg se skabe og fremstille (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996; Foucault & Bouchard, 1980). Det betyder dog ikke, at det ikke også kunne være interessant med nogle mere indgående teoretiske og filosofiske diskussioner, eksempelvis omkring affekt, vitalisme og subjektivitet og forholdet mellem post-strukturalisme og fænomenologi og psykologi. Det kunne være diskussioner med inddragelse af Heidegger, Foucault og Massumi og en nærmere udfoldelse af forholdet mellem normer og kulturelt skabte standarder, Foucaults selv-teknologier og affektivitet (Foucault, 2000c).

En refleksion omkring den empiriske udforskning og samarbejdet med medforskerne er, at vi har været utroligt privilegerede. Både som forsker og psykolog kan man opleve det vanskeligt at få adgang til professionelles praksis, selvom det måske burde være en selvfølgelighed, at man som psykolog og socialarbejder kvalificerer sit arbejde ved at gøre det til genstand for kollektiv refleksion og demokratisk kontrol. Dette er i særlig grad tilfældet, når man arbejder i institutioner og asymmetriske magtrelationer, hvor borgere, brugere, patienter eller klienter ikke helt frivilligt deltager. Her kan en manglende åbenhed endda siges at være uetisk og stærkt problematisk.

I den henseende har medarbejderne i Helsingung og supervisorerne i U-turn været forbilledligt åbne, samtidig med at der også har været kritiske diskussioner af vores rolle som forskere. Medforskerne har aktivt inviteret os til at deltage i mange forskellige sammenhænge, tilladt os at optage deres samtaler, indgået i diskussioner og dermed bidraget afgørende og i endnu større udtrækning, end vi turde håbe på. Hvis jeg skal pege på nogle begrænsninger, kunne vi have ønsket os mere materiale og større belysning af de unges perspektiv. Denne mangel skyldes dels logistiske udfordringer, men i særlig grad ekstra vanskeligheder med unge under 18 år, hvor det er nødvendigt med forældrenes

tilladelse. Disse vanskeligheder forstærkes af, at deltagelsen i et behandlingstilbud for rusmiddelbrugere for både unge og forældre kan være vanskeligt og prekært. Samtidig har medarbejderne også haft høje etiske standarder om at beskytte de unge mod at føle sig udstillede og blive gjort til genstand for forskning.

Med denne kritiske refleksion over andre mulige perspektiver og projekter vil jeg afslutningsvist bevæge mig over i en form for kritik, der er mere i overensstemmelse med denne afhandling og forfatterens foretrukne måde at være på. Jeg har valgt at arbejde med en produktiv og vitalistiske analysestrategi, hvilket bl.a. betyder, at jeg skriver mig selv tydeligt frem, fremstiller og udstiller min væren-i-verden, mit perspektiv, min 'omsorgsfulde' omgang med verden og mit normative sigte (Haraway, 1988; Heidegger, 1962). Dette er ikke (kun) et udtryk for selvtilfredshed, men en refleksiv bestræbelse på at synliggøre, at også dette videnskabelige arbejde er perspektivisk og normativt informeret, og at forskerne og medforskerne kan siges at have samskabt og konstrueret såvel projektet som forskningsobjekterne (Steier, 1991; Stengers, 1997). Samtidig er det et forsøg på at skabe konsistens mellem forskningens metateoretiske antagelser, udforskningens analysestrategier, metodologi og metoder og de vidensformer, antagelser og måder at opfatter mennesker og den sociale verden på, som findes i praksis (Alvesson & Skjöldberg, 2009; T. Jensen, Christensen, & Tanggaard, 2005).

Som nævnt fandt en række forskydninger sted gennem projektet. En at de centrale begivenheder, der i særlig grad forandrede mit fokus og min forståelse var gallapremieren. Gallapremieren var en enkeltstående begivenhed, der blev produceret emergent, og var ikke en del af min plan om udforskning af organisatoriske processer. Medforskerne, som kendte til mine interesser, inviterede mig imidlertid til at deltage, fordi de mente, jeg ville finde det interessant, og som jeg beskriver i artiklen 'Tuning governmentality', var det i høj grad tilfældet. Da jeg ankommer til Helsingung og drejer op af havegangen til hoveddøren bliver jeg påvirket sanseligt. Jeg bliver stemt, og stemningen gør mig fænomenologisk mere åben og receptiv. MacLure (2013) beskriver, hvordan særligt interessante opmærksomheder træder frem, når man arbejder med data, og at det er, som om empirien 'gløder' [glow] og påkalder sig opmærksomhed og definerer retningen for forskningen. Denne opmærksomhed kan jeg tage et skridt videre, fordi jeg oplever, at det er stemningen, der 'in real time' forandrer både mig som forsker og de øvrige deltagere. Vi var høje på stemningen bagefter, selvom det nok kun var nogle af de unge, der havde røget fed.

Her fik det empiriske materiale lov til at træde frem på en ny måde, og mine egne oplevelser blev gjort til genstand, samtidigt med at jeg blev forført eller ledt på nye veje, affektivt. Dette forandrede mit fokus og bevirkede, at jeg blev i stand til at se, fornemme og interessere mig for affektive aspekter, der ikke traditionelt gøres til genstand for governmentality-analyser. Skønt dette ikke var en eksplicit del af metodologien, kan denne tilgang siges at være en del af projektets videnskabsteoretiske og metodologiske ramme, ligesom af brugen af egne oplevelser som empirisk genstand er en klassisk antropologisk metode, som ligger indenfor det metodologiske repertoire, jeg trækker på. Dette tema og en række metodologiske refleksioner kunne fortjene en uddybende behandling, eksempelvis forholdet mellem governmentality studies og praksisforskning, udforskningen af affektive fænomener gennem sensorisk etnografi (Pink, 2009) og spørgsmålet, om

der er brug for en etik for, hvor langt man bør lade sig (d)rive med af det empiriske materiale (MacLure, 2013).

Oplevelsen med gallapremieren fik mig til at beskæftige mig yderligere med affect studies, som jeg hidtil havde studeret med en mere distanceret akademisk interesse. Denne interesse udsprang ikke i udgangspunktet fra en intellektuel undring, men gennem en situeret væren og en kropslig fornemmelse. En problematik trådte frem. Hvordan kunne man indenfor governmentality studies og i de systemiske, narrative og løsningsorientrede terapiformer forstå og analysere disse på en gang flygtige, men samtidigt meget kraftfulde og tydelige oplevelser? Dette blev en velkommen lejlighed til at gentænke forholdet mellem to af de traditioner, der i mit akademiske virke har formet mig mest og haft min vedvarende interesse, men som forekom mig uforenelige: på den ene side: eksistentiel fænomenologi og socialfænomenologi og på den anden side post-strukturalistisk teori og governmentality studies. Mit arbejde med at forbinde disse traditioner gennem begrebet om stemning er allerede beskrevet, men det fører til en refleksion over faren i at være for indrulleret i og grave sig stadigt dybere ned i afgrænsede (specialiserede) teoretiske traditioner, metoder og forståelser. Som Ian Hacking (2007, p. 293) påpeger, så må videnskaberne bestandigt krydse grænser og lære af hinanden, og kun skarpt afgrænses og defineres i organisatoriske og administrative sammenhænge.

Opmærksomheden på dette befordrer en kultivering af en større åbenhed for at trække på vidensformer og metoder, der kan være fremmedartede, hvilket dog ikke betyder, at jeg mener, man frit kan trække på forskellige traditioner. Ligeledes ændrer det ikke ved den store skepsis, jeg har for udbredelsen af biologiske, genetiske, evolutionære og empiristiske tilgange i psykologien. Disse perspektiver har naturligvis en række fordele, men kan kritiseres for ikke at fremstille adækvate og tilstrækkeligt komplekse forståelser af 'det psykologiske' og for at reducere psykologiens genstande til noget, der kan indfanges og beslaglægges af særlig metoder – som eksempelvis i evidensmetodologien. Samtidigt er det problematisk, at sådanne tilgange fremstilles som objektive og neutrale (Haraway, 1988; Rose, 1998).

Mine analyser af affektive styringsstrategier giver anledning til en yderligere refleksion over min egen evne til at "påvirke og blive påvirket" – min egen kapacitet til affekt. Hvordan kan det være, at jeg bliver optaget af affekt? Som psykolog er den refleksive standard at pege på, at det jo nok har noget med mig at gøre. Og da jeg bl.a. danner mig gennem standarder fra en narrativ psykologi (Bruner, 1999; Polkinghorne, 1988; White, 2008) og governmentality studies, leder jeg ikke efter svaret i min barndom eller intra-psykiske kognitive strukturer, men nærmere i praksis. I noget, jeg gør; en færdighed, jeg; eller noget, der er vigtigt for mig. Dette er de klassiske refleksive spørgsmål i narrativ terapi (White, 2008).

Og ja, når jeg forelæser for kommende psykologer eller holder oplæg for vores samarbejdspartnere og medforskere, så benytter jeg mig i høj grad af at skabe energi. Jeg benytter kropslige fagter, modulerer med min stemme, taler begejstret og viser billeder og filmklip. På den måde bryder jeg med en klassisk (diciplinær?) akademisk form og leder og påvirker gennem energi, engagement og begejstring for det, jeg taler om og er interesseret i. Samtidigt bliver jeg selv grebet af stemningen. Jeg benytter altså affektive strategier til både at lede mig selv og andre. Med disse distribuerer jeg (teoretiske) standarder, hvormed deltagerne kan forandre deres forståelse og måde at være i verden

på og forhåbentligt blive i stand til at udfolde mere refleksive, produktive og vitalistiske og foretrukne måder at være og handle på som personer og professionelle.

 På den vis har denne udforskning ført mig tilbage til og givet mig lejlighed til at gentænke mit eget grundlag. Både de analytiske perspektiver, min fortælling om mig selv som akademiker og de strategier og former for ledelse, jeg udøver på mig selv og på andre. Med denne refleksion har jeg forsøgt at fremstille en måde at tænke og gøre psykologi på. En 2. ordens-psykologi, der refleksivt reformulerer sit eget grundlag og medskaber verden i bestræbelsen på at forandre (Brown & Stenner, 2009). Om dette forehavende er lykkedes – at fremstille en kritisk, refleksiv, affektiv, poetisk produktiv fortælling, der både er relevant og konsistent og subjektiverer mig som kvalificeret til ph.d.-graden – må nu være op til læserens normerende vurdering og fornemmelse af intensitet og begejstring.

> *"I can't help but dream about a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to bring an ouvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life: it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply not judgments but signs of existence: it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invent them sometimes – all the better. All the better."* (Foucault, 1997, p. 323)

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MADS BANK
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